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THE PROBLEM OF THE PHILIPPINES.

BY THE RIGHT HON. SIR CHARLES W. DILKE, BART., M. P.; THE
HON. JOHN BARRETT, LATE UNITED STATES MINISTER
TO SIAM ; AND HUGH H. LUSK.

I.

THE editor has asked me to write, even if I can only write briefly, on the probable outcome of the war, and calls my attention to the fact that influential opinions are being expressed by leading men in the United States against a departure from the traditional policy of the country, or that recommended by Washington, and against any annexation of territory or acquisition of protectorates. This is an American question, in which the advice of an Englishman is an impertinence, even if he has a clear view and, consequently, advice to give. There are, however, some considerations of a general nature which affect the matter, and which, although secondary, are worth taking into account.

It seems to me impossible for the United States to hand back to such a colonial rule as that of Spain populations who have been emancipated from that rule by the action of the great Republic, or by the chances of war. It seems to me almost as impossible for the United States to sell people like sheep, and to be a party to

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arrangements which, for example, would hand over the Philippines to another power against the wish of their inhabitants. It is probable that the inhabitants of the Philippines would prefer the rule of the United States, or a United States protectorate, to British or German rule; and, further, the handing over of the Philippines to any other country would be attended with immense risk of general war.

I understand that the leader of the Philippine insurrection has already arranged with the United States Admiral to set up a republic, which could not, without American protection, have any chance of permanence, but which might, in the opinion of those who know the islands best, if aided by a strong officer, succeed in maintaining authority and order. To restore the Philippines to Spain, to hand them over to another power, or to govern them as an integral part of the United States, seem to me, I confess, to be policies equally certain of rejection upon sound consideration; and the system of protectorate is, in my opinion, the inevitable outcome of the existing situation. All endeavors ought to be directed toward making it a success.

One of the reasons which, I understand, are given for the proposals to avoid responsibility in the Philippines, for example, if not also in the West Indies, is that the United States do not possess a trained Colonial service. That difficulty is probably exaggerated. The British Colonial service, and the British Foreign Office service—and it must be remembered that the Foreign Office here administers vast territories, such as the British East African protectorate and the Central African protectorate (which is, in fact, a colony where there is nothing to protect)—are partly filled with trained men, but they also contain among their public servants gentlemen who have been brought from other professions into their posts abroad, and they have to deal with some most unhealthy climates, to which it is not easy to get anybody at all to go. Then, the Foreign Office has had to take over from chartered companies men who have themselves, in some cases, been put into their service without training or preparation. The personal difficulties caused by the rapid extension of our rule in Africa have been very great, and we are far, indeed, from possessing there, in great portions of our territory, a Civil Service similar to, or at all comparable with, that which in India forms one of the greatest glories of our rule. One administrator of Uganda was

forced by the paucity of his staff to give a province to his valet; and yet, on the whole, our men have shown themselves worthy of the confidence which has been reposed in them almost by chance. Young guardsmen and other soldiers have conducted civil administrations, in some cases with remarkable success, under the accumulation of every possible circumstance of difficulty; and I cannot but think that there must be plenty of men in the United States of a similar type.

There is some democratic dislike, I think, of the idea of selecting men from your navy, which, like the navy of the French Republic, is an aristocratic service. Why are navies always aristocratic? Even in this country, while the non-commissioned officer of the army often rises to commissioned rank, in the navy this never happens; and I believe that in the case of the United States the quarter-deck is as completely free from the presence of promoted warrant officers, or men from the lower deck, as is the case in the navy of France or the United Kingdom. Still, if any democratic prejudice on this score could be got over, what admirable administrators for the Philippines would American naval officers make!

CHARLES W. DILKE.

II.*

IN the capture and occupation of the Philippines the United States will be confronted by one of the gravest and yet most interesting problems in the history of our foreign relations. The President, Congress—and the people who develop the sentiment that guides the executive and legislative branches of our Government in their acts—have before them, in the determination of what shall be done with the Philippines, a question second only in importance to that of the fate of Cuba, and possibly involving equally serious issues and international complications.

The great European powers and Japan are deeply concerned in the future of the Philippines. They recognize that the nation holding them—if one of the first magnitude—will have a vantage

* This article—which reached the REVIEW only in time for publication now—is unique in its interest because of the fact that it was written before the outbreak of hostilities between Spain and the United States. It addresses itself, nevertheless, to the situation in Eastern waters which has actually resulted from the war, the author having anticipated the question which the brilliant victory of Admiral Dewey suddenly thrust upon public consideration. As is well known, Mr. Barrett has made, for many years, a special study of the countries of the Far East in their relations to the development of American commerce.—Ed. N. A. R.

ground of inestimable strategical and commercial value; and they will watch with a more jealous attitude the disposition of these islands, matchless in wealth and location, than they will the fate of Cuba.

The Philippines are the southern key to the Far East; they hold a position in the South not much less important than that of Japan in the North; the South China Sea, the pathway of the numberless steamers and ships that come to the Far East by the Suez and Cape Town routes, is under the eye, as it were, of Manila; a fleet of warships could sail from Manila Bay, scour this Mediterranean of the East, and return to signal Corregidor island in four days; all this, I mean, if some first-class power, like America, England, France, Germany or Japan controlled the islands.

The American people, I fear, do not appreciate the actual importance of the Philippines, their wealth and resources, their location and possibilities, their area and population. I will intimate no reflection whatever on our distinguished Executive, for whom I have profound admiration, nor on Congress, whose splendid support of the President at the critical moment I have with pride described to my friends of other nationalities in the Far East; but I draw my conclusions from the apparent unpreparedness of our Government to support Commodore Dewey with supply and troopships, as well as with more war vessels, if he intends to descend on Manila, and the Spanish Government shall reinforce their present naval and military strength in the East Indies with battleships and troops before the United States can reinforce its Asiatic fleet; from the ignorance of the conditions, customs, and wants of the inhabitants displayed in numerous letters received from representative business houses; from the flippant and satirical tone of many writers and newspaper contributors who have apparently never visited the islands; and from a critical survey of most of the matter printed in America about the cities of Manila, Iloilo, Cebú, and their commerce and trade, as well as general descriptions of Luzon, Mindanao, Samar, Panay, Mindoro, Leyte, Negros and other islands of the group.

If anyone doubts the strategical and commercial importance of the Philippines, he should obtain a map of the Far East and study carefully that splendid coast line of Eastern Asia that reaches from Singapore and Bangkok to Tientsin and Vladivostock, with its many ports, its mighty rivers, its general greatness and its

sheltered seas guarded by such island lands or groups as Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Borneo, Java and Sumatra. It has no equal in the wide world. And along this coast and among all these islands none stands out more prominently than the Philippines, over which the American flag may yet float. There are those who will call me a dreamer, an enthusiast, and a framer of fantasies, but my conclusions are based on accurate information of the Philippines, their cities, their open ports and their distant inland country. I have summarized the opinions of those who know the people and have studied their natures and capabilities. I have myself carefully investigated their resources—forest, agricultural, mineral and animal.

The purpose of this article does not include a description of the Philippines, and of Manila, their famous capital. In the *REVIEW* for February, 1897, under the caption, "The Cuba of the Far East," I endeavored in brief terms to execute that commission. Nor shall I discuss the unhappy features of government, so often the subject of comment. The main point of my argument—with due regard for the views of others, but with the confidence and earnestness born of many years' experience and travel in the Far East, and continued association with those who have mastered the field—is that the United States Government, if it seizes the Philippines, should consider deliberately and thoroughly all phases of the question: What shall be the ultimate disposition of the islands in the light of their great strategical and commercial importance?

These four propositions can be outlined as representing the different policies that can be followed by the United States in determining the future of the Philippines:

1. They can be held as a permanent possession, colony, territory, or State of the United States.
2. They can be returned to Spain on the payment of a war indemnity.
3. They can be given their independence.
4. They can be sold to some nation (other than Spain) under favorable conditions, or exchanged for certain of its possessions or for reciprocal advantages.

Of these eventualities it would now seem that the first or fourth is more likely of realization than the second or third. It is a grave question whether Spain would be able to pay such war

indemnity as the United States would demand, if a conflict is prolonged and its cost runs into the hundreds of millions. It is true that assistance might be offered from Rome, in view of the vast Church interests in the Philippines; or that some friendly power might act as security, itself holding the islands as a hostage until the debt was liquidated. But both these possibilities are doubtful. The United States might, even then, hesitate to deliver the Philippines until the indemnity was fully paid; and, under the influence of American occupation for a number of years, conditions of freedom of life, worship, administration and trade would develop that would completely change the status of affairs, and make it impossible for Spain to hold and govern them, even were they turned over to her.

The independence of the islands may sound well, but the reasons for it are far outweighed by those against it. A cardinal point is that the natives themselves are not equal to it. The masses of population are totally unprepared for such a change, and the leaders who are both able and honest are so very few that, were independence granted, the islands would descend into constant civil wars and develop conditions that would either compel the United States to exercise a costly supervision over them, or cause another power, like England, France, Japan or Germany, to take them for the protection of their own interests there. What is more, the natives, including the insurgent leaders, do not themselves expect nor ask for independence. If they are sincere in what they have said to me, and to others who have mingled with them, the chief desideratum they seek is actual and lasting reform of the present abuses, especially the grinding taxation that keeps the majority of them in comparative poverty. Had Spain executed the reforms promised time and time again, or had she deliberately undertaken a system of colonial government such as exists in the British possessions of India or in those of Holland in Java, it is altogether probable that there would be no insurgent party of strength in the Philippines. If the United States occupies the islands, the object of the insurgents will be to show such strength in co-operating with the United States forces, and such a general demand for reforms, that they will at once be recognized by the United States as a power in the Philippines, and hence that they will receive immediately the reforms sought; or that they will be made such a party to any treaty embodying the

delivery of the islands to another nation that their rights will be forever assured. Were the United States to signify the intention of holding the Philippines as a colony, the natives would be content and drop all agitation for independence and for reforms, knowing that the latter would surely come with the organization of a provisional government.

The proposition to make the Philippines a permanent possession of the United States will no doubt seem at first impracticable and be strongly opposed as against precedent, traditional policy, and the best interests of the American people. It will be argued that we could never grant actual citizenship to 7,000,000 Philipinos, and that, unless the islands are made a State or an integral part of the Union, we would have no adequate system of government for them, and that the experience would be a sad one. The contention would also be advanced that the expense of fortifying and garrisoning Manila and other points, and of protecting them with an ample naval force, would be a burden we should not undertake to carry. Perhaps the strongest adverse argument will be that the permanent occupation will place us on the same basis with European nations as a foreign colonial power, and make us a party to all international entanglements in either Asia or Europe, and destroy the splendid New World isolation that gives the Monroe doctrine its breath of life. If we do not even intend to annex Cuba at our very doors, it may seem foolish to consider the permanent possession of the Philippines, which are nearly 7,000 miles distant from our Pacific shores.

On the other hand, there are grave reasons why we should not surrender this group of islands—more resourceful and greater in area, population and opportunities than Cuba, and so situated as to command the commerce and trade of the Far East and the routes thereof—without careful consideration of the advantages that might follow ownership. I would not intimate that I actually favor permanent possession, because then I would be defeating the chief point of my argument, that the United States should consider all sides of the question deliberately before taking final action, by myself jumping to a conclusion before it is definitely known what is best.

If conditions, precedents, law, the Constitution, and traditional policy are against colonization, is it not possible, after a great war that has no respect for precedents and traditions and

evolves entirely new conditions, that our Constitution or laws shall be so modified as to permit a system of colonial or dependent government? If the American people will undertake a mighty war with all its dangers, horrors, and cost, can they be too conservative to permit the passage of such enactments as will provide a safe government for the Philippines, without granting that degree of citizenship in such a colony as will permit actual voting powers in the United States. Other nations, particularly Great Britain, have so perfectly developed this system that we have abundant data and precedent in determining what is the best method.

But what have we to gain by taking possession of the Philippines and holding them as a colony or dependent State?

(1.) We would have an unsurpassed point in the Far East from which to extend our commerce and trade and gain our share in the immense distribution of material prizes that must follow the opening of China, operating from Manila as a base, as does England from Hong Kong.

(2.) As England has Hong Kong and Singapore, France Saigon, Germany Kiaochow, Russia Port Arthur, the United States would have the great city of Manila as an American capital in the Far East, from which to extend both our material and moral influence where vast interests are at stake, and through which the United States could keep in closest touch with all developments.

(3.) We would have, in the Philippines themselves, one of the greatest undeveloped opportunities in all the world—a group of islands with numberless riches and resources awaiting exploitation, and capable of providing a market for a large quantity of our manufactured products.

(4.) We would have in Manila a large and wealthy city and commercial *entrepot*, located on one of the finest harbors in the world, and backed up by a country that outranks Japan in variety of resources, but which is not much more developed in the interior than Borneo.

(5.) The steamers and ships that now ply between San Francisco, Portland, Tacoma and Seattle in the United States, and Yokohama, Shanghai and Hong Kong in the Far East, would either make Manila their ultimate destination or have adequate connections with it, thus placing the ports, merchants, and manufacturers in closer relations with all Asia than ever before.

(6.) The Islands would easily be self-supporting in the matter of government after they were once placed in running order, and they should provide an abundant revenue for improvements of all kinds, even to harbor defences and other fortifications, thus removing the great danger of proving a financial burden to ourselves. This is apart from the profits resulting to America and American interests in trade exchange, and in exploiting the resources of this wonderful group, which includes over 1,500 islands, and has a combined area equal to that of New York and New England together.

(7.) The present situation demonstrates the vital necessity of having a naval (as well as a commercial) base in Asiatic waters. The moment neutrality is declared our fleet has no place in which to rendezvous, to coal, or to repair, and is 7,000 miles from the nearest home port! We hope, and are confident, that our ships will be more than a match for the Spanish fleet at Manila, but, supposing they are unsuccessful, where can they go to recoup and recoal? Assuming that they defeat the Spanish squadron and a more powerful one comes out from Spain to meet them, where can they put in for protection or preparation if they are not equally matched, or if some of the ships are unfit for action?

(8.) The growing importance of the Pacific, of Pacific commerce, Pacific politics, Pacific lands, and the responsibilities resting on the United States in connection with that growth, together with the impending opening of China and the wide reaching effect thereof upon the United States as well as upon Europe, demand that we do not shirk the duty of governing the Philippines, which must play a leading part in all this development. What with the cutting of the Nicaragua Canal, the annexation of Hawaii, the laying of a Pacific cable, the rapid progress of our Pacific Coast interests, the increase in our trade with the Far East, and the necessity of finding wider foreign markets for our surplus products, is it too much to expect that we shall endeavor to hold the Philippines as a permanent possession if we succeed in taking them from Spain?

The other alternative and fourth proposition of ultimate disposal—that of selling to another power or exchanging for reciprocal advantages—is assuredly worthy of practical investigation, but there are two very serious obstacles in the way. One is that few if any powers would pay our price, or give us in exchange

what we would ask. Another is the probable objection of other European powers to one of their number obtaining such an overwhelming advantage in the East as would plainly result from the possession of the Philippines, and the vigorous protests that would be aroused, which in time might lead to most serious diplomatic differences with countries whose good will we would otherwise keep. If we would sell or exchange, we would naturally turn first to Great Britain, because her commercial policy would be favorable to our interests, and she is the only important nation that has possessions which we would want in exchange. If Great Britain would give us her outposts off our Atlantic Coast, like Bermuda and the Bahamas, together with Jamaica or some of the Windward Islands, in exchange for the Philippines, we should not be losers in the end, but England might not think as favorably of the bargain as we, while France might interpose objections that her coast of Annam and Cambodia should be flanked by British Philippines. Neither France nor Germany has colonies that we would accept in exchange, and in view of their alleged kindly feelings towards Spain it is doubtful if they would endeavor to buy of us, while England would probably object strenuously to France's absolutely controlling the China Sea, as would be the case if she owned the Philippines. Japan is undoubtedly a power that would be only too glad to possess them, and she is even now gazing upon them with anxious eyes; but Japan could hardly afford to pay the price and she has nothing to give us in exchange. After Great Britain, American sentiment would presumably favor Japan, provided she would vouchsafe full commercial rights for America. I would not intimate that we have any antipathy for French or German possession as French or German, but the commercial methods and policies of those lands do not seem to favor us as do those of England.

My observations on this point of disposal to another power are purely speculative; for no one can tell what war may bring forth and what new turn our foreign relations may take in consequence. But they may serve in a slight degree to awaken interest in a vital issue, if the fortunes of war shall give the Philippines to the United States.

In conclusion, it behooves me to state that these opinions and arguments are written before war is declared between Spain and the United States, but when the announcement is momentarily

expected. If, therefore, there are certain propositions and inferences not in accord with what shall have developed between the day of preparation and that of publication, I ask the forbearance of those who might otherwise deem my conclusions strange and incompatible with existing conditions.

Whether we capture and hold the Philippines, or Spain shall successfully resist our efforts, on the one hand, or war shall not bring us face to face with the specific problems outlined, the truth remains, beyond question or quibble, that now is the critical time when the United States should strain every nerve and bend all her energies to keep well to the front in the mighty struggle that has begun for the supremacy of the Pacific Seas. If we seize the opportunity we may become leaders forever, but if we are laggards now we will remain laggards until the crack of doom. The rule of the survival of the fittest applies to nations as well as to the animal kingdom. It is a cruel, relentless principle being exercised in a cruel, relentless competition of mighty forces; and these will trample over us without sympathy or remorse unless we are trained to endure and strong enough to stand the pace.

JOHN BARRETT.

III.

THE fortunes of war have placed the Philippine Islands at the disposal of this country. In doing so, they have prepared for America a problem perhaps the most difficult of all which the war will be responsible for, and probably the one which is the least understood. It is not too much to say that very few persons in the United States know anything of the Philippines, their present condition, or their inhabitants. Most of us know, indeed, where the islands lie, and that the group contains many islands, certainly numbering more than a thousand, of which ten are of considerable size; that the islands are rich in soil, and highly tropical in climate; that their area is considerably greater than that of the British islands; and finally that they contain six or seven millions of native inhabitants.

But the present position of this country in its relations to these islands and to Spain imperatively demands that both the Government and the people of the United States should know a good deal more than this. Admiral Dewey's victory at Manila was not

merely a brilliant naval action. It was one of those events that mould history. For the time at least Spain's empire in the Pacific was destroyed along with her fleet, and, unless by the action of this country, it cannot possibly be restored. Nor is this all. The victory served the purpose of encouraging, consolidating, and rendering successful the native revolt against Spanish authority in the island of Luzon, which was otherwise hardly possible. Both these results—neither of which was or could have been foreseen—have rendered the victory of Manila a turning point in the history of this country also. Nations, like individuals, never escape the consequences of their own actions, and in the present case the working of this universal law is likely to be more than ordinarily self-evident.

The islands, practically at our disposal to-day, have been possessed—it would be a perversion of language to say that they had been either occupied or governed—for nearly three centuries by Spain, and our victory has put an end to that possession. The natives have been claimed as subjects of the Spanish crown; many of them—though almost entirely in one island of the group—have been the victims of Spanish oppression and misgovernment during most of the period; to a very limited extent they have learned the Spanish language, and a considerable number of them have been, nominally at least, converted to Christianity by Spanish missionaries; and, finally, it may be said that with very few exceptions they have conceived a very hearty dislike for their Spanish taskmasters. This dislike, rendered effective by the defeat at Manila, has enabled the insurgents of the island of Luzon to defy Spain and set up at least a nominal government of their own. It represents only a part of the people of Luzon, and can hardly be said to control even those whom it represents, but undoubtedly it stands for the fact that the sympathies of the inhabitants of Luzon—the only island intimately acquainted with Spanish methods of government—are with anybody who opposes Spain.

The problem of the Philippines is not a simple one, indeed it is not even a single one, but consists of two very distinct parts which may demand somewhat different solutions before any justice can be done to either. To make this clear, it becomes necessary to state more fully the actual situation as it is to-day, and also as it has been under the so-called Spanish dominion of the islands.

For nearly three centuries past Spain has professed not only to own but also to occupy the Philippine islands, and in a certain very limited sense she has done so, with the exception of a short time early in this century, when they were taken from her by Great Britain, as this country has taken them now. This is only correct, however, so far as the outside world is concerned. Spain has never in fact either owned or occupied the islands as a whole. What she has really owned, and to some extent occupied, is the island of Luzon, the largest of the group, where she founded the city of Manila and several smaller towns. In this island she established a government, which, if neither just nor enlightened, was largely operative, and here she made serious efforts to Christianize and civilize the natives. Luzon, however, is only one of ten large islands in the group, the united areas of the others greatly exceeding its own, and it is believed to be far from the richest of the group in natural resources. Like the others, it is mountainous, but, unlike some of them, it has not been proved to contain any minerals of value for purposes of trade or commerce. Parts of the island are unquestionably productive, and, in better hands than either the natives or their Spanish masters, it might long before this time have been nearly as rich a possession for Spain as Java has long been for Holland. But there is no reason to believe that it is nearly so rich, or could be made nearly so productive, in any hands, as some of the more southerly islands of the group, which contain richer soil and are situated nearer to the equator.

Luzon is the most temperate in climate of the Philippine group. By far the larger part of the island lies to the north of Manila, between the fifteenth and nineteenth parallels of latitude, and that section of the island contains the only districts likely to prove very largely productive, even if they are made the most of by the application of energy and capital. It is not to be forgotten that a great difference exists between islands lying within the tropics near a continent like our own or Asia, and those that lie in the midst of the ocean, like the Philippine group. In their case ten or fifteen degrees of latitude make a very appreciable difference in climate, especially in the matter of rainfall, which is in tropical climates the great factor in production. For this reason, the southern Philippines will be found to be the richest islands for the production of nearly every kind of crop which

has the special value attaching to tropical vegetation in the markets of the world.

It is these southern islands of the group over which Spain has at no time exercised more than the most nominal authority. As a matter of fact, they are almost unexplored, and unknown even to Spanish travellers; their inhabitants have never dreamed of acknowledging any practical authority over them on the part of Spanish officials, except at a few points on the sea coast; they do not speak the language, obey the laws, or profess the religion of the Europeans who have nominally ruled the country for two centuries and a half. The chief of the islands are Mindanao, the most southerly and, next to Luzon, the largest and most populous of the group; Leyte and Samar, lying directly to the north and continuing the chain of more recent and active volcanic forces which begin with the lofty volcanic mountain at the very southernmost point of the group; and the islands of Bohol, Sebu, Negros and Panay, which lie to the west out of the main line of volcanic disturbance, and are the only parts of the group that are known to contain minerals of extent and value. In these islands and their future, there lies to-day the most difficult part of the problem which is involved in our new acquisition.

It cannot be too emphatically insisted upon that the Philippines are, for all practical purposes, a country of possibilities rather than of any considerable present value. The soil is for the most part of that rich volcanic character which seems, in conjunction with tropical heat and rains, to produce the richest vegetation of the most valued kinds; the natives, while entirely uncivilized, and practically independent, which really means without government of any kind, are not as a rule hard to deal with, nor are they usually unfriendly to strangers, or averse to Europeans; and the influence of Christianity, so far as it has gone, has prepared the way for that intercourse with superior races which lays the foundation of civilization. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the native races of these islands have all the vices of their condition. Less even than those of Luzon are they at all inclined to exert themselves to do any useful work. At present they have no idea either of self-government or of permitting anyone else to govern them. Accustomed to the domestic tyranny of their chiefs as their normal condition, and to small tribal wars as their common employment, they present by no means a

very hopeful field for the operations which are to develop their resources or to elevate their condition.

The people of Luzon, it must always be remembered, are not only not in the same condition as those of the southern islands—they are not the same people at all. The race is different; the language—or rather the languages, for there are many, more distinct than French and English—is in no way similar; the manners, customs and habits of the tribes differ widely from those of the northern island, and also from one another. It might be possible, though it is probable that the experiment would be attended with much risk and trouble, to proclaim a protectorate over Luzon and to allow the natives to try for themselves the experience of self-government. Possibly, it might not be a more disastrous failure than similar experiments have been in some of our own Central American Republics. It could not, and would not in any case, extend to the southern islands. By no possible stretch of imagination could it be supposed that the Presidency or Dictatorship of Aguinaldo or any other leader of Luzon extended to the independent, and more than equally warlike and populous, islands lying nearer the equator, and it would be impossible to expect European nations to respect the transparent fiction to the disregard of their own interests, as soon as the troops of this country were withdrawn from the islands.

It does not rest with America to say whether or not the islands of the southern Philippines shall be self-governing, for in their present condition nothing can make them so. If the islands were returned to Spain, indeed, they might remain in something like the condition they have been in so long, which is one of non-government, but certainly not of anything which can by any stretch of courtesy be called self-government. Spain, in her exhausted condition, would be less able than ever either to control or to civilize the natives; less likely, if possible, than ever to do anything toward developing the resources of the group. In such a case it would only be a question of time until it dawned on Spanish statesmen, and even on the Spanish people, that they had nothing to gain by keeping this feeble ghost of their departed foreign empire, but much to gain by selling it to some other European power. The new departure might well be for the better—indeed, it could hardly be for the worse, whether France, Germany, or even Russia, became the buyer—but it could not in that

case be said that this country had faced the problem which her own actions had produced. It might on the contrary be said with truth that, having entered upon a war in the great cause of humanity and advancing civilization, she had used its favorable results as far as they served her own purposes, and fell in with her own most direct interests, by freeing Cuba and taking charge of Porto Rico, but that she had cast away the future of considerably more than double as large a population, when she found that the problem of their civilization was not an easy one, and might not, at any rate for many years, be a directly profitable one.

To return the island of Luzon to Spain is, indeed, hardly possible for America. A restoration which would be possible of acceptance by a proud nation like the Spaniards must be an untrammelled restoration. Such a restoration was made by Great Britain after the Napoleonic wars more than eighty years ago, with the result that the lapse of nearly a century has seen no real improvement in the condition of the islands or their people. In that case, however, there was practically no choice. Britain could have done little or nothing with or for the country, and Spain had not really been the enemy of England except upon Napoleon's compulsion. The position to-day is, in all respects, a different one. Spain has had her opportunity for three-quarters of a century or more, in the light of modern sentiment and modern example, to govern and civilize the Philippines, and her failure is complete. She has applied the methods of two centuries ago to the country and people, with the result that her government is less beneficial and more impossible now than it was then. Should Spain now be restored to what she unquestionably regards as her rights of sovereignty in the Philippines, her first step must be a renewal of the atrocities of her war in Cuba. The soldiers deported from Cuba and Porto Rico at the expense of this country, would be employed—nay, they must be employed—in reducing to subjection the rebels of Luzon, who have acted in concert with ourselves, and have gone far to render our operations successful—to such a subjection as was proposed for Cuba. Such a position only needs to be faced to be recognized for what it is—impossible.

And to return the southern Philippines to Spain is to return them to the condition of hopeless stagnation and barbarism in which two centuries and a half of nominal occupation and control by that country have left them. Spain would assuredly be in no

better condition to civilize her distant dependency when war had exhausted her treasury and demoralized her government. She would be no more likely to engage with energy and enterprise in the task of developing the resources and elevating the inhabitants of the Philippines than during all the years of comparative prosperity at home. If there was a change at all, it would inevitably be a change for the worse—though indeed, to those who know by personal observation what she has done, or rather what she has left undone, in her dominions of the southern Philippines, such a change seems hardly possible.

But, it may be said, there is still the expedient of a protectorate, jointly with Spain herself, if she will, but in any case an American protectorate, under which the people of these neglected islands may learn to govern themselves and develop their own resources. It may be said with confidence that the idea of a joint protectorate is an impossible dream. Spain could gain nothing by such an arrangement, and her pride would prompt her rather to abandon the last shreds of her colonial empire than to submit to the constant control of this country in dealing with her emancipated subjects. If it were possible, moreover, it would prove a hopeless failure. Of all protectorates, a joint one is under any circumstances the very worst, as experience has shown conclusively in the case of Samoa; and where the powers which it gave were to be exercised by a victorious and a defeated nation jointly, it would either be a farce, or it would shortly develop into a tragedy.

Nor would America's sole protectorate in any degree meet the difficulties of the case. A protectorate supposes a government which is to be protected and maintained, and no such government either does or can exist, at any rate in the greater part of the Philippine group. A republic of Luzon would probably prove a failure so complete as to make Spanish domination appear beneficent by comparison, but a republic of Mindanao, Sebu, or Negros would at present be a simple impossibility. The natives could neither understand its methods nor its objects even in the smallest degree, and no one tribe out of the eight or ten, now totally distinct, could hope to work in concert with another. If indeed it were conceivable that a small body of American or European adventurers should settle in these islands, they might in the course of time repeat—though under circumstances of far greater diffi-

culty and danger—the process which has, perhaps happily, ended in the annexation of Hawaii by this country. The one condition which renders this impossible, even if it were in any sense desirable, is that no time would be allowed for the development of the project. Whatever America proposes to do in the Philippines she must do quickly, and she must do it decisively. It is something worse than idle to suppose that she could by any possibility extend a Monroe doctrine to the islands of the Oriental Archipelago, and, having authorized the institution of a native anarchy under the name of self-government, call upon the nations of Europe to respect its excesses on the ground that they were perpetrated under the shadow of her protecting flag. Such an assumption of power would inevitably defeat its own purpose, and its only logical result would be to launch this nation upon a long and disastrous career of warfare, if not of conquest.

As matters stand, our choice is a limited one. We may, if we are prepared to do so, abandon the Philippine islands to Spain at the end of the war. We may, if a feeling of shame does not prevent, declare in effect that, having secured the freedom of Cuba, which we regarded as essential to our own comfort, and the well-being of our own people who had invested money there, and having taken possession of Porto Rico, which we regarded as of special value to us for strategic and other reasons, we are satisfied. In that case we have only to abandon all claims upon the Philippines which the war may have given us, and to hand over the Philippine insurgents in Luzon to their inevitable fate at the hands of Spain. By this course it may as well be admitted we shall save money, and we shall also wash our hands of not a few embarrassing questions and anxious responsibilities. It may be as well to remind ourselves, however, as a nation, that the process of hand-washing does not always serve as a satisfactory solution of a difficult problem. The Nemesis of national responsibilities declined is as real and as relentless in its vengeance as that of national wrongs committed, and no easy-going assumption of indifference can save any nation from its retribution. It is true that nothing was farther from the mind of the Government and people of America, when they entered upon a war with Spain, than burdening themselves with distant dependencies, but it is no new experience that nations, like individuals, are to a large extent at the mercy of the events unexpectedly following on their own

actions. The question which will demand an answer is not what we intended when we began the war with Spain; it is not even altogether what we professed at that time as our intentions and wishes; it is only to a limited extent what we desire and would prefer now; it is rather what we must do if we would meet the obligations we have incurred to the cause of humanity and civilization. To do this will involve dealing in some way with the problem of the Philippines.

In dealing with this problem it is necessary to remember that it is not one but two-fold. There is the problem of that part of the group which has been to some extent occupied, in a certain limited sense governed, and in a very small degree civilized, by Spain; and there is the larger problem of the disposal of the greater part of the islands, of which none of these things can be said. With regard to Luzon, with its partial civilization, and its largely successful body of insurgents, it is impossible that we should simply abandon our position, for such a course would mean treachery to men whom we have treated as practically our allies, and equal treachery to the cause of humanity, for which we have undertaken the war. Whatever happens, it is evident that the position of the insurgents in Luzon must be provided for, at least to the extent of rescuing them from the vengeance of the Spanish government and people. It may well be argued that if we consider ourselves bound by the dictates of ordinary humanity to assure liberty to the insurgents and people of Cuba, we are not less bound to do as much for those of Luzon, where the power is even more completely in our hands. This might be done by recognizing a Republic of Luzon, and handing over the island, freed from Spanish control, to its own people, under a treaty by which Spain would agree not to attempt its reconquest. Unless we did more than this, indeed, the experiment would almost certainly prove a failure, and after a short period of anarchy and bloodshed our republican offspring would merge into the dominions of Japan, Germany, or France. If we went further and declared a protectorate, we should to all intents and purposes have to annex the island ourselves, or at least to submit to being saddled with the expenses and international complications incident to annexation, with a good deal less than its advantages and profits.

And even this would not be a possible solution of the difficulty

respecting two-thirds of the group. There cannot even be a nominal republic of the southern Philippines. Divided as they are among tribes, wholly uncivilized and wholly independent of one another, any possible bond of union must be a bond imposed from the outside for generations yet to come. The Spaniards have not, and never have had, more than small trading stations on these islands, and they have never even attempted to govern or to civilize them. The position is almost identical with that of the islands of New Zealand at the time when Britain annexed them to her empire nearly sixty years ago. The wonderful success which has attended that experiment affords the highest encouragement to any nation that will apply the methods which in that country have preserved and civilized the native race, but it proclaims emphatically that it can only be attained by a firm hand and a consistent policy. If this country should desire to preserve the southern Philippines on the one hand from native barbarism, and on the other from absorption by some foreign nation, whose policy would almost certainly be unfriendly to our commercial expansion, it can be done by treating them as an outlying territory of the United States, and practically in no other way. If left in Spanish hands, with one or more coaling and trading ports secured, they would be little better than a useless anxiety; if made the subject of another make-believe popular government, as was the case with Hawaii, they would eventually become territories after a period of comparative stagnation and anxiety.

It is, of course, for the Government and people of this country to say whether they will deal with the Philippines at all or not. It is for them to decide whether they desire that commercial expansion on the other side of the Pacific which can only be effectively secured by the possession of some territory nearer than our own Pacific coast; nearer, too, than our little rocky outpost of Hawaii. If we do not, then a treaty with Spain which shall at any rate nominally assure pardon for her Philippine rebels may possibly serve our turn. Should that not appear to us sufficient, we may demand that Luzon shall be set free to govern itself as best it can. In either case the result will almost certainly be the same; we shall have taken possession of the islands only to hand them back to a period of bloodshed and anarchy, to be followed by their annexation by some European or Asiatic power, which will give them something at least of peace and security, and in

return will probably receive wealth from their developed resources. If, on the other hand, this country should decide that she will accept the responsibility cast upon her by events, it is hardly too much to say that there is but one way in which she can do it effectively. She can discard the illusion of a self-governing republic, which could only mean the tyranny of a few half-castes over a large population, confessedly incapable of self-government, and treat the whole of the islands as a territory until she has developed their resources and civilized their people. The undertaking will be a serious one, but its success is more than a possibility, and its rewards would be substantial.

HUGH H. Lusk.

LITERATURE FOR CHILDREN.

BY RICHARD BURTON.

THE keynote of modern education is found in the right instruction of children. The acceptance and spread of the kindergarten idea may be said to have revolutionized our notions in respect of this problem, and from this as a central principle and efficient cause all betterment of pedagogic methods in the higher grades of school and college and university life have come. Touching these subsequent periods, the most important and significant change in the conception of the proper grading and relative value of studies, is the recognition of English, in the broad sense, as a natural centre of culture for an English-speaking person. It is coming to be felt that education in the English language, literature and life, for purposes of vital broadening and enrichment, is of pronounced importance for those who speak the tongue. As a result, in our manifold institutions of learning, the English course is accorded more time, more attention and more dignity as a branch of work. All who keep abreast of modern pedagogic thought are aware of this.

Along with the changed attitude toward English goes a wiser appreciation of the use of literature in this study: a tendency to make literary instruction more dominant and to introduce it at an earlier period of the school life, postponing the purely analytic studies—of which grammar is a type—to a later time. The banner cry of those leaders who have at heart the interests of the primary and intermediate grades now seems to be: "Not facts, ideals"—a phrase the sentiment of which is revolutionary to the older notions. Psychology has taught us that the intuitive emotional impressions can be received best at a comparatively tender age: and such are the very impressions imparted by the early contact with noble literature. The plastic sensibilities are ready

for the effect of poetry and imaginative prose; all that stands for the heart-side and the soul-side of literature may to the best advantage be inculcated during that receptive hour of childhood, when the good can be appreciated, though mayhap it cannot be explained. It is a splendid victory that has been won in the grasping and engrossing of this idea; instead of the three R's of the old-time educational dispensation, we have substituted the three H's, the hand, the head and the heart, each to be trained, all to be interrelated—the manual, mental and emotional evoked in the organic unity which is properly theirs.

This shift and broadening of ideals is a cause for rejoicing. The thesis, then, that the best literature is not too good for young children in the school or in the home, that to stimulate the imagination and awaken the soul, through the gracious ministries of song and story and soul revelation, is of more importance than the memorizing of dates or the utilities of the multiplication table, is pretty well established. One who undertakes to argue for the making of early instruction in literature ethical and inspirational rather than analytic and knowing, has his audience with him as it never would have been a generation ago. We now regard education, not so much as an attempt to fill up a scholar with facts and figures or to prepare him for money-getting; and more as the drawing forth of the powers in such symmetry that the moral and spiritual faculties shall have precedence over those intellectual. Hence the emphasis put upon the efficacy of early ideals and the fruitful influence of great literature, which, by the very condition of its greatness, is a power that makes for spiritual quickening.

But what are the best methods in bringing about this precious nurture of children through contact with the word-work and soul-work of poets, orators, dramatists and weavers of story? What literature shall be given them, and how and when?

At the outset we must contradistinguish between boys and girls. Boys like action, adventure: they run to the sensational, even truculent, in reading; girls, *per contra*, like the domestic, that which centres about the family affections and the sweet ministries of home. This is a broad generalization. Girls there be who have a fondness for "Tom Brown at Rugby"; boys, who admire "Little Women." But the distinction holds, and it suggests at once the disadvantage of a public school where sex in

literary or other education must be ignored, more or less. Of course, there are to-day those who see no sex in the thought-processes and emotions of young people of opposite sexes, who, indeed, go further and regard mind-stuff as sexless throughout life. Such will pooh-pooh our notion. But to the present writer the willingness to overlook, or the practical inability to recognize, such claims, show shallow thinking. Great laws of nature arraign themselves against puny man here.

But, waiving this point, it may be remarked that the fast-growing inclination to give children pieces of literature in the whole, instead of by scraps in excerpts, as in earlier days, is an excellent thing. A piece of literature is an organism and should, therefore, be put before the scholar, no matter how young, with its head on and standing on both feet. This idea is now generally acted upon. Witness the enormous growth of text-books presenting literary masterpieces in their entirety—or, if this is not done, at least in substance, keeping to the organic structure. Certain critics of the inner circle affect to sneer at this tendency: Andrew Lang, for example, laments what he deems the Bowdlerization and cheapening of the classics, an objection whimsical enough. Nor must the moral aspect of the editing of literature be overlooked—this, too, provocative of cultured sneers. Mr. Howells has written true and noble words on this:

“I hope the time will come,” says he, “when the beast-man will be so far subdued and tamed in us that the memory of him in literature shall be left to perish; that what is lewd and ribald in the great poets shall be kept out of such editions as are meant for general reading, and that the pedant-pride which now perpetuates it as an essential part of those poets shall no longer have its way. At the end of the ends such things do defile, they do corrupt.”

It is well to get such testimony from a captain of letters.

In view of all this preparation of standard writings for the young, there is little excuse for putting children off with the second-best and the well-enough. The choicest is not too good. In the dominant division, fiction, the pabulum furnished us children of a larger growth by Optic and Alger, and Mayne Reid, has been superseded by more heavenly food. And the older aristocracy of child literature still makes its appeal in books like “Robinson Crusoe” and Kingsley’s “Water Babies,” to mention two that stand for many. Inasmuch as the spiritually beautiful, as we have said, is the most desirable of all, books of this sort should

come first in favor—beginning with the Bible. Not the didactic, goody-goody stuff which made the old-time Sunday School library too often a place of tears and penance for healthy-minded young folk. The day is clean gone by for the tales wherein the bad boy who goes a-fishing on the Sabbath gets, not fish, but a flogging, to be triumphed over in a most un-Christian way by the good little boy who didn't go—probably because he daren't. No; I mean that which is lovely, inspirational; literature where the artistic and the ethical are recognized for the kinsmen they are, linked by the subtlest, sweetest, strongest of ties. And at the very head and forefront of such books the Bible must be placed. The Bible, in judicious selections, not gulped down whole, is pre-eminently a book for literary and ethical stimulation. We hear much of the Bible as literature nowadays, and Professor Moulton's most suggestive volume is symptomatic, summarizing well a changed attitude, a truer philosophy. A new interest in, a deeper love toward, the Scriptures is thus born. Once concede this use of the Book and the question of its function in the school is settled. It should have its place there, along with other great literature, as a quickener of the sense of beauty and the sense of right. To make it a theological text-book is monstrous, and if its daily presence among the pupils meant denominational teaching or propagandism, we would have none of it. But regard the Bible as a composite, a wonderful repository of history, prophecy, song, story, drama and naïve people-science, matchless in expression and surcharged with the ethical temper, and its exclusion were suicidal. Better for many of us had we been made in the school, yes, and in the nursery, to commit to memory long passages and chosen parts of the Old and New Testaments—as did the young John Ruskin, it will be remembered, that great man's testimony to the potent influence upon him of the Book being worth repeating always:

“Walter Scott and Pope's Homer were reading of my own selection, but my mother forced me, by steady daily toil, to learn long chapters of the Bible by heart, as well as to read every syllable through aloud, hard names and all, from Genesis to the Apocalypse, about once a year; and to that discipline—patient, accurate and resolute—I owe, not only a knowledge of the Book, which I find occasionally serviceable, but much of my general power of taking pains and the best part of my taste in literature. From Walter Scott's novels I might easily, as I grew older, have fallen to other people's novels; and Pope might perhaps have led me to take Johnson's English or Gibbon's as types of language, but once knowing the 32d of Deuteronomy,

the 119th Psalm, the 15th of 1st Corinthians, the Sermon on the Mount, and the most of the Apocalypse, every syllable by heart, and having always a way of thinking with myself what words meant, it was not possible for me, even in the foolishhest times of youth, to write entirely superficial or formal English."

And again he declares of this experience that he counts it "very confidently the most precious and, on the whole, the one essential part of all my education."

This mention of the memorizing of Scripture by one of the masters of pure style leads on to the remark that, in bringing children into contact with the great literature of the world, the habit of committing to memory is most fruitful. The storing of the mind with choice passages will prove a godsend in after years—will yield good, I incline to think, even if it be done parrot-like at the time. The pedagogic tendency now is in all branches to teach independence of speech, rather than the mechanically memorized lesson. In the literature of knowledge (science), no doubt the danger lies in the latter; but, in the literature of power, which we are here considering, the memory is a trusty and valued servant who guards us from the loss of veritable treasure. How many of us in mature life can testify to the comfort and help and uplift that have come from stray fragments of poem, or essay, or oration learned years before, perhaps in childhood? Often, when we are separated from books, listless, distraught, sick, they have been evangels bringing pure, sweet and noble images, and a quickened spirit.

But now, lumping boys and girls together—which, though bad psychology, seems, so far as the school goes, to be necessary—and admitting the major premise that great literature should be given them and given them early, a few more specific remarks may be made. There is considerable choice, within the category of great literature, of what is wisest to use. Divers kind of fish come into this drag-net. I apprehend that, in the intellectual and spiritual gradation from youth to maturity, the objective literature, the literature of action and character and picturesqueness, rather than that which is subjective, will be best adapted to the purpose. Hence, fiction of the Walter Scott and Stevenson kind will have preference over that of Thackeray and George Eliot. In poetry, the epic, the ballad and the lyric of simple song will prove better than reflective or purely descriptive verse. History on the personal graphic side—treating it as Carlyle conceived it to be, the

story of great men—is good for the little ones and most affected by them. Dickens' "Child's History of England," whatever its faults, has the shining merit of grasping this fact. So, of course, biography will attract more than the essay proper, for example (and still more the essay improper), that form being food for the adult digestion. I should conclude that a child who liked Charles Lamb's papers or, to mention a latter-day author, Agnes Repplier's, needed to be sent out into the open, with orders to ride a wheel or play golf or tennis. Certainly, the preference would seem alarmingly priggish, though such children may exist, as do three-headed pigs, and other abnormalities. Speaking broadly, it is amazing how children of the healthy, normal, matter-of-fact sort like literature that is alive, wholesome, having sentiment, not sentimentality, and some narrative human interest. As a rule, they relish it. I once experimented with a boy who hated the very word "literature," and whose soul was completely absorbed in football and track athletics. I read to him, in course, Homer's "Odyssey," in Palmer's fine prose translation, a canto a night. The result was he imitated Oliver Twist, calling for more in case I flagged. And yet this was a lad of the unliterary age of fifteen, who could not abide the mere mention of poetry. But, naturally enough, he fell in love with the wanderings of that fine old buccaneer, Ulysses; naturally enough, he liked to hear about the Cyclops and the Sirens and all the rest of it. The smell of the sea was in it all, and the smack of adventure and the magic of marvel. Be assured that the reader did not damage his case by telling the boy beforehand that here was a master poem. That had been a stupid letting of the cat out of the bag. Get the story going, and all is well; the world of children loves a story as the grown-up world is said to love a lover.

Then, if we come to discriminate between prose and poetry, the former must have the preference with young folk in mind and the latter administered only in homeopathic doses. Here again the sexes differ; girls, as a class, care more for poetry than boys, as, indeed, do women more than men. Poetry, broadly speaking, is more subjective and elusive than prose, hence it is less adapted to the immature comprehension. Yet verse, on its musical side, with its alliteration and rhyme, its rhythm and picture-making, has often a great fascination for children, as mothers many will testify, and an acquaintance with this, the

highest form of literature, should be inculcated at a tender age, as likely to be of paramount service in creating ideals and developing the sense of beauty. The slow gradations by which this may be effected is a test of the nicest skill of the educator. The road from the "Mother Goose" jingles to the dramatic monologues of a Browning, is a long, but not necessarily weary, one. Professor William J. Rolfe, in his recent excellent little work, "The Elementary Study of English," advocates the use of poetry in the grammar school grade:

"Let me suggest," he says, "that the critical study of some masterpiece of literature, especially poetry, is one of the best possible exercises for the teacher in this department. It may or may not be something that one has to teach in school—it is well, in my opinion, that it should be something above the range of one's daily work—but the manner of study is of more importance than the matter."

The work will prove, he thinks, for the pupil of this age, "at once a delightful recreation and valuable self culture."

Some principle in choosing out of the whole *corpus literarium* the literature which can be grasped and enjoyed by the young is important, in order to avoid a false sentimentality which too often plays about this subject. I refer to that misconception which sees the child, not as it really is, but as it appears through the illusion of our mature sentiment. Perhaps the finest expression in poetry of this view is found in Wordsworth's peerless ode on the "Intimations of Immortality in Early Childhood." That this is a superlative piece of English poetry, we all know; fewer, I fear, have realized that its psychology is very dubious. If the poet had presented the child as caught up in and by his affection, transmuted into something which had all the beauty and innocence of youth with the high thought that comes with years, he had been impeccable. But to impute to the child, *per se*, a kind of angelhood is essentially untrue. Boys and girls do not have those shadowy intimations, nor do they come trailing clouds of glory from on high. These little ones' helplessness and loveliness and trusting lack of guile constitute the most winsome appeal on earth to older folk. It is right and seemly to overflow with feeling about children. But Wordsworth goes further: he says practically that the child is nearer high, pure and wondrous things than the man, which contradicts all science and common sense. The brutal fact is that your normal child, sound of mind and limb, is, in comparison with what he may come to be, a healthy little ani-

mal; more selfish in a naïve way, more absorbed in practical and carnal matters, and not a bit interested in supernal affairs.

Our child literature, therefore, must be chosen with this truth—palatable or otherwise—in mind; if it is not so chosen, we shall get into a fog. We must, on the contrary, work gradually from the concrete toward the abstract ideal, always seeing to it that the lesson in the most objective bit of literature is wholesome and holy. The ethical quality may be as strong, be it remembered, in the straightforward story of narration as in the pious preachment; the sermon may be there, though hidden in the envelopment of art, the reader being all unwittingly influenced by what George Eliot calls the “slow contagion of good.” I knew a teacher in a Sunday School who was looked at askance by some of the members because, after the more serious matters were successfully dispatched, he read to his class of urchins Aldrich’s little masterpiece, “The Story of a Bad Boy.” But I am sure it did them good (the attendance showed it interested them), and that the Sunday School library is impoverished, ethically and otherwise, which does not include that particular volume.

The difficulty of discrimination in schools in the matter of literature for boys and girls, has been spoken of; all other discriminations—that between backward and forward pupils, for example—are also difficult wherever children are taught and studied *en masse*. This suggests the noble function, the superlative importance, of the home in purveying literature to the little ones. There the child can get that individual attention, that loving study, as a detached personal problem, which from its very nature is beyond the province of the school. Those schools which are famous the world over for their fruitful methods—one thinks of Froebel and Pestalozzi—have taken their cue from the home. The Kindergarten, in sooth, is an adaptation of the playground and nursery. No wonder it is being emphasized that mothers are the first teachers—that is, teachers not by rôle, but from the nature of their inherent relation to the child; amateurs, not in the sense of ignorant workers, but as lovers of the task. What may not parents in the environment of the home accomplish for the cause of higher education! Says Professor James P. Munroe, in his stimulating work on “The Educational Ideal:”

“With the mothers, and fathers too, aroused to the fact that they are teachers, and that the home is a schoolhouse; with the study which they

must increasingly give, under this new light, to that complex organism, the child ; with the psychological and psychical sciences resting upon data which shall be thus collected, the day for a rapid growth in educational methods is not far distant. . . . Having, after centuries of wandering, brought the child back to his proper atmosphere—the home—having determined who shall be responsible for his teaching, and what shall be the final aim of that teaching, we have, indeed, put the educational question upon a sound and healthy basis. We have at last learned how to follow nature, and we are beginning to understand that the best education, indeed the only right education, is a natural one.”

So, in this matter of literature for the young, the influence of the home teaching is enormous; all the school can do pales before it. Let the mother add to the poet's rhyme the music of her soft and beloved voice; let great fiction be read to the breathless group of curly heads about the fire; and the wonders of science be unrolled, the thrilling scenes and splendid personalities of history displayed. Children thus inspired may be trusted to become sensitive to literature long before they know what the word means, or have reasoned at all upon their mental experiences. It is comforting to reflect that a mother, a parent, wishing in our day to do this for the nearest and dearest, is helped as never before—by enlightened librarians and libraries of generous habits; by child literature from the best authors of our time; by plenty of good criticism, furnishing a lamp to the seeker's feet. Children are lucky to be children nowadays, for the idea is pretty well disseminated that the very choicest from all the garnered riches of the great world of literature should be given them, that they may early be possessed of thoughts and feelings that are true and large, sweet and beautiful.

RICHARD BURTON.

THE LATEST REFORM IN IRELAND.

BY JOHN J. CLANCY, M. P.

To use a seeming paradox, reforms come slowly, yet quickly, too, in Ireland. For more than half a century, the great majority of the Irish people had been calling out in vain for a change in the system of administering their local affairs. Within my own time in Parliament—that is, during the last thirteen or fourteen years—efforts were annually made, up to last year, to alter that system even in part; but they all failed; and it is safe to say that, twelve months ago, no one in Ireland expected a different result, in respect of this matter, in the near future. Since then, however, not merely a change, but a complete revolution has been virtually accomplished in the Irish system of local government. By the time these lines are published the royal assent will, in all probability, have been given to an act which will take the administration of most Irish affairs of a local character out of the hands of a class, and place them for the first time in modern history in the hands of the people.

It would be an error to suppose that this Unionist measure of local government for Ireland is in any degree a satisfaction of the Irish National demand for legislative independence. It is not Home Rule. Home Rule means a National Parliament and a National Executive for all affairs distinctively Irish. Local self-government merely means the administration by the Irish people, through elected local bodies, of the laws passed by the British Parliament for the management of Irish local affairs. The Government offer it, avowedly, indeed, as a rival to and a substitute for Home Rule; Ireland, on the other hand, receives it merely as an installment of justice, and warns its authors that it can never satisfy the aspirations of the Irish Nation after National liberty. Yet, it may well be doubted whether the Irish minority at whose

powers and privileges it strikes a final and fatal blow would not be well advised if they, at last, acted on the assumption that there is now scarcely anything left to them for the sake of which they ought to continue to oppose Home Rule.

A quarter of a century ago, the establishment of the system of secret voting at Parliamentary elections marked the commencement of the decline of the political power of the Irish aristocracy and gentry, who mainly constitute the minority in three and a half of the four provinces of Ireland. In 1884 that power was extinguished by the establishment of household suffrage, by which the occupier of the poorest cabin was placed, in the matter of a vote, on an equality with the owner of the richest mansion. The various Land Acts have stripped them of the right of capricious eviction and of raising rents at will, which they had so long exercised without mercy. There remained to them the management of county affairs, and this privilege is now about to pass out of their grasp, with the result that the new possessors of power can, if they please, keep them ostracised for all time from all share in the transaction of business which has been in their control ever since the English upset the Irish tribal system and introduced English law into Ireland.

To understand the extent of the change which is now determined on, and which will be in working order throughout Ireland in less than a year, it is necessary first to describe the system of Irish Local Government which is about to pass away forever. Broadly speaking, that system consisted of three parts, viz.: the Grand Jury, the Poor Law Boards, and various forms of Municipal Government in towns and cities. Let me deal with each in turn as briefly as possible.

The Grand Jury was about the most anomalous and indefensible institution which can be conceived. It consisted, usually, of a couple of dozen persons chosen from a larger number selected by the High Sheriff for the county or the city, as the case might be, the High Sheriff himself being the nominee of the Lord Lieutenant, who acted on the recommendation of the Superior Court Judges, who, in their turn, always recommended some leading landlord and magistrate. The only limit to the Sheriff's freedom of choice was the obligation to summon to the Grand Jury a representative of each division of the area over which he presided; that requirement fulfilled—and he could and did fulfill it often by

summoning persons who to his knowledge could not or would not attend—he could make up his jury as he liked; and, in fact, the Grand Jury in every Irish county, down even to the present year, has always consisted almost entirely of members of the landlord class, and mainly of Protestants also. To bodies thus constituted was entrusted the control of all public roads and other public works of the county, the contracts therefor, the management of the prisons, the care of the public buildings, the power to contribute to infirmaries, lunatic asylums and fever hospitals, the appointment of all the paid officials of the county, and the right to levy a tax called the county cess, which, of late years, has produced considerably more than a million pounds sterling annually. Associated with the Grand Juries were smaller bodies, the members of which met at “Presentment Sessions” once or twice a year to initiate county works. Those bodies also were non-elective, and represented mainly the landlords and magistrates of the respective counties.

In the old days, these Grand Juries became—not unnaturally—not merely nests of jobbery and corruption, but an agency of social and political oppression. They devised sinecures for the friends and relatives of their constituent members. They spent the public money on roads and bridges for their own private convenience and advantage. Accepted by the Government as the mouthpieces of public opinion in Ireland, they seized every possible opportunity to bring down coercion on the masses of the people, who periodically showed, not merely by words but by deeds, their discontent with the Grand Jury system and the working of the land laws. For many years past, indeed, the Grand Juries have not been open to all those charges. They have not, as a rule, been the corrupt jobbers they were forty or fifty years ago. Their administration of the business entrusted to them has been fairly honest and efficient. But in their constitution they have, on the whole, continued to be what they were; they have, broadly speaking, confined the appointments in their gift to hangers-on of their own class, and they have continued to show a bitter anti-Irish spirit.

When the Irish Poor Law system was established, it was no longer felt to be possible to create another set of public institutions, supported by the taxes of the people, on a purely non-elective and non-representative basis. But the Eng-

lish rulers of Ireland at that time had neither the courage, nor the justice, nor the wisdom, to abandon the old policy of hatred and distrust of the Irish people. They went only a little way in practically recognizing the representative principle in the constitution of the bodies appointed to give relief to the destitute poor. They gave votes, indeed, for members of the Poor Law Boards to every rate-payer; but they took care that the landlords should be at the same time predominant in those bodies, and this end they secured by two devices. First, the multiple vote was introduced, whereby a landlord might in some conceivable cases have as many as thirty-six votes, while the average tenant could have no more than one. In the second place, it was boldly decided that a full half of every Board should consist of magistrates as *ex-officio* members. Yet the Boards of Poor Law Guardians have in the course of time become more or less popular bodies, and, besides their original function of dispensing relief out of the rates to the destitute poor, have been invested with the management of so many other matters in recent years that their title is now really a misnomer. They are, for instance, the sanitary authorities in all rural and in some urban districts; they have to do with the registration of births, deaths, and marriages, and—not to go through the whole list of their powers and duties—they have had the administration of the Laborers' Acts, under which a good deal has been done, since the year 1883, to improve the homes of agricultural laborers.

It remains to notice the system of Government in the towns and cities. In this case there has been some degree of reality in the phrase, "local self-government"—at least, for the last forty or fifty years. Down to 1840 there was no really representative system of government in any Irish town or city. The corporations, in the few places which possessed corporations, were representative only of a small minority professing the Protestant religion, although in almost every one of those places the overwhelming majority of the citizens were Catholics; and right gaily did the men in possession of power plunder and squander the municipal revenues. In Dublin, for instance, the city possessed a splendid freehold estate, which might now produce such a revenue as would suffice to meet at least half the city expenditure, but that estate was given away, sometimes in after-dinner orgies, to distinguished personages for barleycorns a year, the private

considerations, of course, to the corrupt corporators not appearing in the deeds. In this way certain families have been in possession of whole streets of houses in Dublin for generations, and it is only of recent years that their long leases have begun to fall in and that the city has begun to get hold of its own again. In 1840, when the first great Municipal Reform Act was passed, the state of the Dublin City finances was such that Daniel O'Connell, the first Catholic Lord Mayor, and the other Catholic corporators, elected in that year, had to put their hands into their own pockets, and with their own money redeem the very furniture of the Dublin Mansion House, which had been seized by the Sheriff for debt. Since the year mentioned the corporations have been more or less representative, and since 1854 the smaller towns in Ireland have been allowed the right to possess municipal institutions of a less important, but still representative, character. In respect, however, of both the corporations of the cities and of the town boards of the smaller civic communities, the franchise for municipal purposes has been ridiculously restricted. In Dublin, the population exceeds 300,000; the Parliamentary electorate is upwards of 40,000; but the municipal electorate amounts to only about 8,000 or 9,000; and the same story is true of all the other municipalities, except a few which, like Belfast, have by special acts of Parliament obtained extensions of the suffrage peculiar to themselves.

Here, then, was a state of things which, assuredly, required mending, and, as I have said, innumerable efforts to mend it had been made up to last year with no result. Last summer, however, the reform now virtually accomplished was announced to the House of Commons one afternoon by Mr. Arthur Balfour, without anyone having asked for it and without any warning whatever.

The chief features of the measure may be briefly described.

In the first place, the ground is cleared by absolutely sweeping away the Grand Juries for fiscal purposes. Those bodies are still retained for their original purpose—that, namely, of dealing with indictments. Whether they will long continue even for that purpose remains to be seen, for the gentry will hardly care to give themselves the trouble of assembling together twice every year to determine whether or not they will send a few prisoners forward for trial by a judge and petty jury. The probability is that they will not do so, and that in a few years' time the Grand Juries

will be relieved of their criminal business also, and will thus cease to exist for all purposes. With them go the Boards of Guardians as they are at present constituted. Bodies will still continue to exist under that name, but they will be no longer constituted as they are now. The only existing Local Government institutions which are left untouched are the City Corporations and the Town Boards. It may be said at once that this work of demolition was the one necessary preliminary to any really satisfactory scheme of Irish Local Government reform. Any attempt to patch up the Grand Juries, for instance, or to rear a new edifice of local administration on such a foundation, would have inevitably ended in failure. Nor would any attempt to reconstruct the Boards of Guardians have been in the least successful if the *ex-officio* element had been left in existence. The Government were, therefore, wise in laying the axe to the very roots of the old system of local administration.

In the place of the Grand Juries and the Boards of Guardians there has been set up a rather complicated system of County Councils and District Councils, these latter being sub-divided into two classes—Urban District Councils and Rural District Councils; and at this point one provision applicable to all those bodies, and also to every Corporation and Town Board in the country, may be conveniently mentioned. It is that which enacts that the electorate in each case shall be the Parliamentary electorate, in addition to peers and to such women as would, if they were men, be qualified for the Parliamentary franchise. Here is manifestly a great reform in itself. For, what is the Parliamentary electorate? If the registration system did not throw obstacles in the way, it would embrace, broadly speaking, every head of a household in the land, in addition to other classes of persons; and even as it is, it actually does contain the greater number of the householders in town and country. The objection has been made that a large number of those electors will thus have the power of saying who shall spend the public rates and, to some extent, how those rates shall be spent, and may even be elected to spend them, although they need not pay rates themselves at all. The allusion is to lodgers and the occupiers of tenement houses in towns; and it is, no doubt, true that those and one or two other smaller classes of voters are not directly responsible for the payment of rates. But everyone who pays rent may be said to pay rates also.

If he does not pay them directly, he pays them indirectly. At any rate, all will now vote, whether they pay rates or not, and every one will have only one vote. The change is a vast one, in view of the narrow foundation on which even the most popular Irish local institutions have hitherto rested. It means the transfer of power from a class to the people. It means the ousting of what used to be the English garrison in Ireland from what it had come to regard as its inalienable heritage. It marks the entry of the Irish Nation, after ages of weary waiting, into at least a considerable portion of its birthright.

To the County Councils, which will thus repose on a thoroughly popular basis, and one of which will be established in every county, will be entrusted all the fiscal business of the Grand Juries, with one exception. The excepted business is that of assessing compensation for malicious injuries. Here a few words of explanation are, perhaps, necessary. One of the laws peculiar to Ireland is that under which, when an outrage is perpetrated on a human being or on certain sorts of property, the whole community in the midst of which it occurs may be mulcted in a fine. It is a barbarous relic of a barbarous past, and in the hands of the Grand Juries it has been made, from time to time, an instrument of gross and vindictive injustice. No one expected that the present Government would take occasion of this reform to repeal that law; and very few, indeed, expected that they would transfer the administration of it to the new elective bodies. But it was equally impossible, under the circumstances, to leave it to the Grand Juries, and what has been done is to entrust it to the County Courts with a right of appeal to the judges on circuit at Assizes. Whether this particular change will work satisfactorily remains to be seen. In addition to the fiscal business of the Grand Juries (with the single exception mentioned) the County Councils will also have the control of the lunatic asylums; a participation in the control of other public bodies, such as Boards of Inland Navigation and County Infirmaries, to the cost of which they contribute; the power of making, assessing, and levying all rates within rural areas and of dispensing the proceeds; the conduct of the preparation of the voters' lists; and other less important rights and duties which it would be too tedious to set forth in full detail. It may be added that the County Councils will each consist of, on the average, about forty members returned

by single-membered constituencies; they must meet at least four times a year, but, of course, may meet as much oftener as they like, or delegate their work to committees, whose acts, however, to be valid, must receive their sanction; they will be elected triennially, all the members being chosen together; and the Chairman will be a Justice of the Peace for the County—the first instance, by the way, of a person in Ireland owing his position as a Justice to popular election.

The area over which the County Councils will have jurisdiction for certain purposes is sub-divided for the purposes of the Rural District Councils and—where the conditions for them exist—of Urban District Councils. The latter will be constituted only where there are towns of over 6,000 population, unless towns of a smaller population, but above 1,500, petition with practical unanimity to be constituted urban districts. Except in the latter event, many counties in Ireland will have no Urban District Councils, and in those counties, accordingly, the County Councils and the Rural District Councils will divide between them the administration of local affairs. The electoral districts will be the same in all cases as those for the County Councils, and the elections, as in the case also of the elections for the County Councils, will be triennial, all the members being elected together.

The Urban District Councils, where they exist, will be almost as important in respect of the business entrusted to them as the County Councils themselves. They will have, within the area of their jurisdiction, some of the Grand Jury business which the County Councils will possess in the rural districts—such, for instance, as the management of the roads and other public works, and the collection and expenditure of their own rates; and they will, besides, have the business of the Boards of Poor Law Guardians as “sanitary authorities”—a multifarious collection of duties, the due discharge of which embraces, in many cases, the provision of an adequate water supply for a large civic community as well as that of a proper system of sewerage. Except, in fact, in the matter of business affecting the whole county, including the urban area, the Urban District Councils will be of equal importance with the County Councils, and will, perhaps, have even more to do than the latter. They will, of course, from the nature of the case, meet oftener and, by reason of that fact, attract greater attention.

The Rural District Councils, as such, will have all the business of the Boards of Poor Law Guardians except that of dispensing relief to the destitute poor and that of assessing and raising the poor's rate; and they will have the former part of this latter business also when they sit, not as Rural District Councils, but as Boards of Guardians. From what I have said as to the constitution of the present Boards of Guardians it will be easily understood that the establishment of these Rural District Councils, elected entirely, as they will be, by the Parliamentary electorate, will mean in practical effect a radical change. The exclusion of the *ex-officio* element from all power in the administration of the business of the Poor Law Boards is in itself a serious change. For the history of the action of this *ex-officio* element in Irish Boards of Guardians is the history of one of the greatest scandals of the time. Appointed because they were supposed to be persons who could always be relied upon to do what was right—or, at least, what was right in the eyes of the Government—the *ex-officio* members of the Boards of Guardians habitually neglected their duties and attended the meetings of the bodies to which they belonged only when a job was to be perpetrated; and hence it has come to pass that the overwhelming majority of the Poor Law Guardians in regular attendance at the meetings of their respective Boards, have in only a few cases been able to determine, for instance, who should occupy a paid office in the Guardians' service. All this, of course, will now come to an end, and only persons elected by the votes of the householders of the country will have anything to do with any part of the Guardians' business.

I now come to the provisions in the new Irish Local Government scheme regarding the cities and towns of Ireland. In mentioning that the franchise has been extended in these municipalities, I have indicated the greatest change made in the case of these municipalities. Doubtless, the results of the extension of the suffrage will not, generally speaking, have a material effect on the political situation in any place. Nationalists and Orangemen are in such an overwhelming majority in their respective districts that it does not really matter to either party, as a party, whether the suffrage is extended or not. But, otherwise, the result cannot but be important. It will give the workingmen, for instance, in the cities and towns, a power which they have never hitherto possessed in the selection of their municipal representatives. But

there is another point of importance. In accordance with the scheme adopted in England and Scotland, certain large civic communities—namely, Dublin, Belfast, Cork, Limerick, Derry, and Waterford—have been constituted “county boroughs,” and their governing bodies, without a change of name, have been made County Councils for their respective areas. By this means the six cities mentioned have been made practically self-governing in respect of all local affairs, except the distribution of relief to the destitute poor, which they will share in conjunction with the adjoining rural districts. But it will be very different with the other cities and towns which have hitherto ruled themselves by means of Corporations or Town Boards. These latter will, if they qualify as the urban districts for Urban District Councils, have the powers and advantages of urban districts which I have already described; but, as to all other matters, they will be merged in the counties to which they respectively belong; and how all this will affect some of them, at least, may be imagined from one example. Take the case of Galway. Here is a very ancient and historic town. Two hundred years ago it had a commercial connection with Spain which rendered it one of the most important commercial centres of Western Europe, and has left its impress on the place to the present day. In 1840 it was deprived of its Mayor and Corporation, but it still retains its separate existence as “a county of a city,” with the attendant accompaniments of a Sheriff of its own, a city magistracy, and other incidents of a similar kind. Galway will now lose its position as “a county of a city,” and, with it, all the other distinctive marks of a separate civic community which it has possessed for hundreds of years. The circumstance will not mean much pecuniary loss for Galway; but one can easily understand how it will otherwise affect it adversely. The case of Galway is that of at least ten or twelve other towns and cities.

Such, then, in broad outline, is the new scheme of local government reform for Ireland; and, no doubt, the reader will have already grasped its chief feature. It does not enlarge the scope of the powers of local authorities in Ireland except in a few unimportant particulars. What it mainly does is to transfer that power as it exists from local bodies, which were either not representative at all or were so little representative as to be practically non-representative, to bodies elected on a popular franchise.

It has been pointed out that this measure of local government

reform is not Home Rule. So much must be evident from the explanation given of its principal details. It deals, in the first place, with the question of administration, and not with the subject of law-making; in the second place, the matters of administration with which it is concerned are all of a strictly local, not of a national, character. But it remains to be pointed out that it does not amount even to the local self-government which one of its chief authors has for years been recommending for Ireland and without which, he used to contend, Ireland ought not to be content. Mr. Chamberlain, in the days when he was supposed to be a Home Ruler, denounced the system under which an Irishman "could not stir a foot, nor lift a finger, without being confronted, interfered with, controlled by alien boards of foreign officials," and advocated the substitution for that system of "a system of genuine Irish administration of Irish affairs." So far as the present local government scheme goes, it unquestionably tends in that direction; but every one of "the alien boards of foreign officials" of which Mr. Chamberlain spoke will continue to exist and will exercise every one of its old powers of control concurrently with the establishment of the new elective local bodies. In some respects, indeed, one of those central boards—the Local Government Board—will have, under the new scheme, if anything, a greater power of control than it has ever hitherto possessed. The new scheme, therefore, does not mean even what may be called Chamberlain Home Rule. But, in truth, Mr. Chamberlain cannot very well have known very much of his subject when he advocated the abolition of the central boards referred to and the replacing of them by representative Irish boards, if he thought that he could carry out such a programme without taking a pretty considerable step in the direction of real Home Rule. To make the additional change which he contemplated would be to go a long way towards setting up an Irish National Executive, and to have an Irish National Executive dependent on a foreign Parliament would be both an absurdity and an impossibility. The next inevitable step would be to set up an Irish Legislature.

A word or two now about the financial provisions of the new system of Irish local government. The grant of a sum of between £700,000 and £800,000 to be appropriated to the payment of half the local rates in the agricultural districts of Ireland, is to be disposed of by paying the landlords' half of "the poor rate" and half

of "the county cess" for the tenant—the poor rate and the county cess being the two chief rates levied in Ireland and the only rates levied in the agricultural districts. As the poor rate is the only one to which landlords are liable, that class, therefore, will be entirely free from local rates for the future. It is on this ground that the Government and the Unionist party justify their change of attitude on this whole question of Irish local self-government, and even propose a measure dealing with that subject which goes beyond anything to which they have been hitherto willing to agree. But one notable change in the incidence of rating follows. Henceforth, not only the whole of the existing local rates will be borne by the occupiers or tenants and none of them by the landlords, but all future rates also will be borne by the occupiers or tenants, for there is an express provision to that effect in the Government measure. Now, this liberation of the landlords, as such, from all local burdens, may seem to some advocates of the interests of the tenants to be unjust. Personally, I do not think that it is a matter of much practical consequence. In the first place, in the case of agricultural tenancies, in respect of which rents may be fixed by the courts under the Land Acts, a higher rent has always hitherto been allowed to the landlords than they would have got if they had paid none of the local rates, and in other cases the landlords have always taken care to exact in rent what they paid in rates. In the second place, as regards existing rents, express provision is made for an adjustment of rent to meet the change in the incidence of rating. In other words, although the proposal of the Government is a novel one, and at first sight favorable to the landlords, in practical effect it will scarcely make any change at all.

As to what will be its consequences, much might be written. If it works well—that is to say, if the Nationalist majority, who will have a majority everywhere outside two or three counties in Ulster, do not utterly boycott the minority from the new bodies, but allow them to have a fair representation upon them; and, if the new boards administer well and honestly the business entrusted to them—at least half of the whole case against Home Rule in the larger and proper sense will have disappeared. It will be no longer possible to allege that the Irish people are unfit to govern themselves or manage their own affairs; at least, it will be rather difficult to get many persons to believe such an allega-

tion. On the other hand, of course, if the reverse takes place in the actual working of the new system, one may expect to hear more frequently than ever the old cry that the Irish Nation is incapable of managing its own business justly or wisely, though even under such circumstances it might and, indeed, would have no justification. This being so, it is to be hoped that the electorate, and the bodies which it will call into existence by its votes, will remember the responsibilities cast upon them and act accordingly; and there is, I may add, a fair prospect that this hope will be realized. But a more important point remains to be noticed. It is that it will be impossible long to maintain a system under which bodies elected on a household franchise to administer local affairs are controlled by other bodies responsible only to a British Ministry. The thing will be an anomaly from the start, and after a while will seem, as well as be, intolerable. But only one remedy for such a state of things can be found. It is Home Rule—the very thing which this concession of local self-government was intended to avert; and it is a conviction that such is the case, which has already led some English, as well as Irish, opponents of Home Rule seriously to reconsider their whole position on that question.

J. J. CLANCY.

LEPROSY AND THE HAWAIIAN ANNEXATION.

BY BURNSIDE FOSTER, M. D.

Now that the annexation of Hawaii has become history and Hawaii has become a territory of the United States, among the many important problems with which we are confronted, by no means the least difficult is the leprosy question. It is a fact well known to medical science that a race hitherto free from a certain specific infection, when once infected, presents an ideal soil for the development of that disease. The history of smallpox, measles and leprosy, as well as other diseases, demonstrates that fact. Up to 1849, leprosy had been unknown in the Sandwich Islands. In that year, according to tradition, there landed in Hawaii two Chinese sailors, both lepers. In a few years the disease had spread with a rapidity hitherto unknown, until to-day it has been estimated that nearly 10 per cent. of the Hawaiian natives are lepers, and many thousands have died of the disease during the last fifty years.

During the last twenty-five years the attention of many able and painstaking scientific men has been directed to the study of leprosy in Hawaii, but in spite of their efforts the disease continues to spread; and, unless checked, it undoubtedly threatens the ultimate extinction of the race. The responsibility of this matter has now been assumed by the United States, and as we already have undertaken to free Cuba from the curse of Spanish rule, so must we undertake the far more difficult task of freeing Hawaii from the curse of leprosy.

Of all human maladies, leprosy is believed to be the most ancient. We find from a medical papyrus discovered in Memphis an account of this disease as having existed in Egypt at least 4,000 years before Christ, and there is also documentary evidence that it

was known in India and China from the most remote antiquity. During the Middle Ages it was very generally diffused throughout Europe, and was prevalent during the twelfth century to an extent far greater than ever known either before or since. There were at that time nearly 2,000 leper hospitals or "Lazar houses" in Europe. It seemed to decline gradually during the next two or three centuries, and by the end of the seventeenth century it had become a very rare disease. During the present century there has been a decided increase in the prevalence of this disease in various parts of the world, and a considerable number of cases have been imported from Europe into this country.

Clinically, two varieties of the disease are recognized—the tuberos or tubercular, where the lesions are chiefly confined to the skin and mucous membranes, and the anæsthetic form, where the lesions are chiefly confined to the peripheral nerves. Very frequently the two forms are combined, and we have the mixed type of leprosy. Although there probably is from the nature of the disease an initial lesion of leprosy, it has only been possible to determine this in a few isolated cases. The bacillus probably gains entrance through some slight abrasion of the skin or mucous membrane, and its immediate action is so slight as to pass unnoticed. The period of incubation varies from a few weeks to many years.

In forming an opinion from ancient medical literature concerning the prevalence of leprosy, it must be constantly borne in mind that many other diseases were confounded with it, and that lupus, psoriasis, elephantiasis, morphœa, vitiligo and other affections of the skin were, probably for a long time, all considered to be leprosy.

The earliest visible symptoms of tuberos leprosy consist of irregular brownish or mahogany colored spots, appearing usually at first on the face, over the eyebrows and on the cheeks. At first these spots are not infiltrated, but later they become nodular and form the characteristic "tubers;" these pigmented infiltrations of the skin soon appear upon the arms, around the wrists, on the back of the hands and about the feet and ankles. The hair usually falls wherever the skin is affected. These spots and tubers are often anæsthetic. The disease thus slowly progresses, the exposed parts of the body being chiefly affected. Often the bodily health is but little interfered with, the chief complaints being of

general debility and drowsiness, and of some itching of the skin and various neuralgic pains. The tubers may soften and break, producing indolent ulcers; or they may soften without breaking, and be gradually absorbed and disappear. Early in the disease, the mucous membrane of the mouth, throat and nose becomes similarly affected; and when the disease reaches the larynx it produces a peculiar and characteristic alteration of the voice, as well as obstructive symptoms. Some of the infiltrated swellings, both on the skin and mucous membranes, are slow and chronic in their development, while others appear acutely with inflammatory symptoms. These latter often undergo a sort of resolution and disappear, leaving pigmented spots. The more slowly developing ones remain and often reach a large size and become confluent. Occasionally, as the result of some acute intercurrent disease, all the tumors disappear for a time and afterward return. Late in the disease, when many of the tumors have begun to break down and ulcerate, and when there is evidence that some of the internal organs are affected, the patient becomes cachectic, and there is often a daily fever of intermittent character. In places where bone and cartilage lie near the skin, these tissues are commonly affected, and peculiar deformities result. The disease almost invariably ends fatally, but the end may not come for many years.

The earlier symptoms of anæsthetic leprosy consist of localized areas of cutaneous anæsthesia, with or without alterations of pigment. The spots that appear are irregular brownish or bluish flat patches, which develop slowly and spread at the edges, coalescing with other spots and often forming large, irregular patches. The color of these patches usually fades in the centre and persists around the edges. A favorite seat of the peculiar eruption of this form of leprosy is the back. The diminished sensibility of the skin and the localized interference with its nutrition render it susceptible to injury from the slightest cause; and from the rupture of a small blister or from slight exposure to either heat or cold, extensive and very destructive ulcerative processes may result. In this manner, connective tissue, muscle and even bone may be destroyed, and it is thus that the spontaneous amputations so common in this form of leprosy occur. Muscular wasting is a common symptom, beginning usually in the hand and gradually extending to the muscles of the arm. Motor as well as sensory paralysis occurs, and one true motor nerve, the

facial, is almost always attacked. Most of the muscles of expression are later paralyzed. Later, the leprous process extends to the larger nerve trunks, the ulnar, radial and median especially. At the elbow, the ulnar nerve can be plainly felt as a tense, swollen cord, rolling beneath the finger.

The progress of this form of leprosy, like that of the tuberculous form, is very slow, and the symptoms vary according to the localization of the disease. Occasionally, there is a spontaneous cessation of the disease and the visible symptoms may disappear entirely, leaving only the deformities which have been produced by the ulcerations and destructive processes. Many patients live to an advanced age or die of some intervening acute disease. More usually, however, they develop a cachectic condition, associated with disease of the internal organs, and, after a long period of progressive emaciation, die of exhaustion.

Concerning the etiology of leprosy, much has been written but little has been accurately determined. Since Hansen discovered the *lepra bacillus* in 1874, our knowledge of the real cause of leprosy has advanced but little. It is established that the bacillus is always found in the leprous tumors, and it seems only natural to believe that it constitutes the "*contagium vivum*;" but all attempts to inoculate the disease, with perhaps a single exception, either upon human beings or animals, have failed; nor has it been possible to cultivate the bacillus outside of the body.

That leprosy is a contagious disease is unanimously admitted by the best authorities; but the exact manner of its contagion is certainly difficult to understand. There are many examples of persons living for years in the most intimate family relations with lepers and remaining uninfected. And often but one member of the family will acquire the disease. On the other hand, the history of the disease, in different parts of the world, shows that it never originates spontaneously, but that its origin can always be traced to human importation. There are also a very large number of recorded cases where leprosy has resulted from a single contact of an abraded surface with some lesion or secretion of an infected individual. These apparently contradictory facts must be explained on the theory that some peculiar, inherent predisposition, which exists only in a limited number of individuals, is necessary for the development of this strange disease. There is no reason to believe that leprosy is an hereditary disease. No instance of

congenital leprosy has ever been reported, and, although a very considerable number of lepers have emigrated from Scandinavian countries to the Northwestern States of this country, many of whom have married, no leprosy has developed among their children or remote descendants. Climate, social conditions and personal habits, doubtless, are important etiological factors, but only when the infection is present. The *lepra bacillus* probably gains entrance into the system through some abrasion of a mucous membrane, as the nose or throat, or of the skin. If the individual presents a suitable soil for its development, the disease, after a long period of incubation, manifests itself first at the point of entrance.

Such being the nature of this horrible disease, which afflicts probably not less than 6,000 of the inhabitants of the new territory which we have just acquired, what are we going to do about it? The first thing which is emphasized, to the writer's mind, is the necessity of adding another department to the machinery of our Government; a department of public health, with a minister in the President's Cabinet. For some years, the medical profession of this country has insisted upon the necessity of this step, and the present emergency is but another of the many arguments in its favor. The next appropriate step would seem to be the appointment of a leprosy commission to investigate the subject on the spot; to make, so far as possible, an accurate census of the lepers of Hawaii, and to see that all infected persons are completely segregated. There is already a leper colony at Molokai* where between fourteen hundred and fifteen hundred lepers are restrained; but there are probably three times that number at large among the islands, and the extinction of the disease can only be accomplished by completely isolating every infected individual. Another important function of the Government lies in the education of the people who are likely to be brought into contact with lepers, in regard to the dangers of infection and the precautions necessary to be taken. Soldiers temporarily garrisoned at Hawaii, clerks, Government and other employees in their social, domestic and other intimate relations with the natives, will all be liable to exposure to this infection; a danger, to be sure, which intelligent precautions will render slight, but which certainly

* For an excellent account of the Leper Colony at Molokai, see an article by Dr. Prince A. Morrow in THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for November, 1897

should not be lost sight of. It must be remembered that the contagion of leprosy is not in the air, and that proximity alone is probably not dangerous; nor is the mere touching of a leper, ordinarily, sufficient to convey the disease. The *lepra bacillus* resides in the blood, in the secretions and certain of the tissues of the infected person, and it is necessary for the bacillus to gain entrance through some abraded surface to produce the disease. It will, therefore, be readily understood that a person may reside for years in a colony of lepers without contracting the disease, if he understands the precautions necessary to avoid the dangers of contagion. The laws at present in force in Hawaii authorize the segregation by the health authorities of all known lepers, and it seems probable that the laws are strictly enforced, although it is known that for various reasons many lepers escape detection. The number of those with pronounced leprosy who remain at large is probably small, but there are undoubtedly several thousand individuals who have already become infected, but in whom the disease has not yet developed symptoms which enable it to be recognized. It is among such cases that the great danger of disseminating the disease lies.

Among the early results of annexation will undoubtedly be a largely increased immigration to as well as emigration from the islands. Many of those who either know or suspect that they have the disease will undoubtedly attempt to escape to this country, while those from this country who settle in Hawaii will be thrown into more or less intimate relations with the already infected but unrecognized lepers. The extinction of leprosy in Hawaii can only be effected by complete segregation, which cannot be accomplished until our methods of making an early diagnosis of the disease are more accurate than at present.

It would certainly seem worth while for the United States to take this question immediately in hand, and to appoint a commission of bacteriologists properly equipped and with every facility for the study of the leprosy problem. England has gained the eternal gratitude of humanity for her Jenner and her Lister, France for her Pasteur, Germany for her Robert Koch. Shall not America, which has already given to the world the priceless blessing of anæsthesia, gain further glory by striking leprosy from the calendar of human afflictions?

BURNSIDE FOSTER.

AN ANGLO-AMERICAN *VERSUS* A EUROPEAN COMBINATION.

BY THE RIGHT HON. SIR RICHARD TEMPLE, BART., G. C. S. I.

I PROPOSE to present the leading facts relative to the strength of an Anglo-American combination as compared with a European combination. To present fully the facts, mainly statistical, bearing on such a mighty subject as this in two hemispheres, would require more space than could be afforded in this *REVIEW*. But some summary of them may be comprised in the space of an article like the present. I have heard American friends say that an Anglo-American combination would be equal, even superior, in strength to any other combination of nations and powers that could be imagined. British people, perhaps, would not be quite so sanguine as that. Still, those Britons who may be of an imperial and specially patriotic disposition believe in their hearts that such must be the case. This belief, however, would rest not so much on statistical facts as on a confidence in the qualities of the Anglo-Saxon race on both sides of the Atlantic. It may be well, however, to consider briefly how the leading facts would be found to stand.

I must, however, at the outset specify the terms of the supposed combinations. On the one side, of course, there is no doubt. The United States with their belongings, the British Empire with its belongings, constitute two very intelligible units. On the other side would be a European combination of, at least, three great Powers, France, Germany, Russia—three units also very intelligible. Other countries might be added, but the addition of them would confuse. If Austria were added on the European side, then Italy would have to be added on the British side. Some complication, too, would arise in the estimate if the lesser coun-

tries of Europe were added. So I propose to confine the comparison to the great practical question: What would be the combined national strength of France, Germany and Russia, in comparison with the combined strength of the United States and the British Empire? This comparison will be made without a hostile thought against any one of these three European Powers. For, although Britain is threatened sometimes with a combination of France and Russia, she is on very good terms with Germany, and she tries to keep the Germans aloof from any anti-British Russian combination. But we may well estimate what our combined Anglo-American strength really is relatively to the rest of the world, while praying to Providence that we may ever be spared the necessity of making a trial of such strength. And though my American readers must be prepared to find a formidable array of figures on the other side, yet they will see a brave show of similar facts and figures on our side. Distance and areas will be expressed in English miles and English square miles.

It is to be remembered that on many points the figures are approximate only, inasmuch as they could not be rendered quite complete without a considerable discussion.

The first and greatest factor in such a comparison is that of population. In that, again, a principal element is that of white people as compared with colored. Now, for the European combination, the population of France may be set down approximately at 39 millions; that of Germany, or the German Empire, at 53 millions; that of Russia (in Europe and Asia) at 130 millions, of whom 110 millions are white and the rest are colored, with a grand total of 221 millions of white people for the most part—truly a tremendous figure. The Asiatic, African and colored people may be taken at 53 millions for France, 11 millions for Germany, or 64 millions in all. The summary then would be for the three Powers 221 millions, mostly white, 64 millions colored; in all 285 millions. What, then, would the Anglo-American combination have to present in competition with this? In the first place, the population of the United States may be set down at 70 millions, mainly white. The population of the United Kingdom may be taken at 40 millions, that of the self-governing colonies at 15 millions, entirely white, or 55 millions in all. The total, then, would amount to 125 millions, mostly white, on our side, being considerably less than that of the European side. On the other

hand, the British Empire has an enormous total of colored people, not less than 350 millions, in all parts of the world, of whom about 290 millions belong to India. There is nothing like this to be shown on the European side. And, although the colored millions are in no wise comparable in power to white millions, still from the positions they occupy, the trade they produce, the wealth they contribute, the soldiers they could furnish—they constitute an element of strength to our side, or our combination. Our grand total, then, would amount to 475 millions, more than one-third of the population of the globe. Thus, it will be for the discriminating reader to judge which of the two combinations has the best of it in respect of population-statistics.

But the comparison does not end here. For the Anglo-American population has far greater room for growth than the European. France and Germany can hardly contain more people than they have now. The Russian people may yet further increase, for Russia is not densely peopled. So much is this the case that many suppose the Slavonic people to be the coming race in the future of the world. Such a forecast, however, can hardly be maintained in the presence of the Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American race. The United States could support more than a hundred millions; and Canada might have a score or more of millions. Who shall say how many scores of millions Australia, with the adjacent islands, and South Africa may count hereafter? It may be said that all the regions where white people can multiply are in the possession of the Anglo-American race. Thus the power of expansion augments enormously the status of the Anglo-American population.

Politically, however, the material strength of population depends largely on the situation of its area and on its distribution with reference to the ocean; or, in other words, on the accessibility of its seaboard. The area on both sides is enormous. The French Empire at home and abroad may be taken at $3\frac{3}{4}$ million square miles; similarly, that of the German Empire at $1\frac{1}{4}$ million square miles, and that of Russia at $8\frac{3}{4}$ million square miles; the total for the three mounts up to $13\frac{3}{4}$ millions of square miles. On the other side, the United States, with their belongings, show an area of $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions of square miles; while the British Empire, with all its colonies and dependencies, has $11\frac{3}{4}$ millions of square miles; the total for the two being $15\frac{1}{4}$ millions of square miles. Cer-

tainly the amount of desert, or otherwise impracticable land on the other side, is considerable. The French have much of the Great African Desert, and they were understood to be displeased when an English statesman spoke of their acquisition as "light land." So also Siberia, though vastly improvable, contains large tracts as yet unimproved. Something of the same sort must be admitted on our side also. The area of the United States, indeed, barring, perhaps, the zone of territory known as the Rocky Mountains, is more or less excellent. But the British Empire has some impracticable tracts bordering on the Arctic Ocean and a central desert in the Australian Continent. On the whole the Anglo-American combination loses nothing by the comparison of area.

But then comes the all important point of the distribution of population upon area. In other words, what is the length of coast-line on the two sides, and what are the harbors? For the exercise of world-wide influence, a population on the sea-coast is worth infinitely more than a population residing inland. This is an axiom ever to be remembered in any estimate of international forces.

Now, the coast line of France is considerable, being about 1,500 miles in length, with three commercial harbors, Havre, Bordeaux with its estuary, and Marseilles—irrespective of naval harbors, to be considered separately. Germany has also about 1,500 miles, but that includes Hamburg, the best and largest harbor on the continent of Europe; also Wilhelmshaven, a commercial as well as a naval station. The Russian lines on the Baltic and the Black Sea may be reckoned at about 2,500 miles, with commercial harbors, such as those near the mouth of the Neva and Odessa, of not more than ordinary importance. There is the navigable part of the Arctic Ocean with Archangel, indeed, some 1,500 miles; but it is of no use reckoning the frozen coast of Siberia; and at the eastern end, on the Pacific, the harbors are so defective that Russia felt herself obliged to seek a port in Chinese waters. Further, both France and Germany have coast lines in Asia and Africa. The German coast line in Africa and elsewhere may be about 1,500 miles in length. The French coast in Western Africa, from Tunis southward, may be taken at about 3,500 miles, without any important harbor; in Southeastern Asia, called Indo-China, about 1,500 miles, with two commercial positions of first-rate capabilities, but as yet imperfectly developed—namely,

Saigon (in the delta of the Mekhong) and Tonkin. There is also the large island of Madagascar, with a coast line of 2,500 miles.

On the whole, the total coast line of the European combination as indicated above would hardly exceed 17,000 miles, with only one harbor of the very first rank—namely, Hamburg. In this combination, the population in Russia is mainly inland, very far inland, too. More than half the population of Germany and of France is far inland also; and, with both nations, the coast probably plays but a secondary part in the national life.

Let us compare all this with the coast lines and harbors of an Anglo-American combination. Here will be found the very strongest point in the comparison for our side. The United States have 3,000 miles on the Atlantic, with the harbors of Boston, New York, Baltimore and New Orleans, and 2,000 miles on the Pacific, with the harbors of San Francisco and Portland, together with 3,000 miles for Alaska and its islands. A portion of the population is, indeed, inland; but more than half, perhaps nearly two-thirds, is on or within reach of the coast. The United Kingdom, or the British Isles, has a coast line of about 6,000 miles in all, with the harbors of London, Liverpool, Glasgow, Belfast and others. In the British Isles the whole population is either on, or within easy reach of, the coast. The Indian Empire has about 6,500 miles of coast, with the harbors of Calcutta, Bombay, Kurrachi and Rangoon. Borneo, New Guinea and other islands have 6,500 miles. The Australian Continent, with Tasmania and New Zealand, has not less than 16,000 miles of coast, with the harbors of Sydney and Melbourne; the population being mostly near the coast. The British sphere and dominion in Africa has fully 7,000 miles, with the harbors of Cape-town, Port Elizabeth, Zanzibar, Lagos and Alexandria. In the Far East, there are two detached harbors of much consequence, namely, Hong Kong and Singapore. On the Atlantic, Canada has 2,500 miles of coast, and on the Pacific 2,000 miles, with the harbor of Vancouver. There are other British possessions in North and South America, with a total coast line of 7,500 miles.

It is, moreover, noteworthy that the Anglo-American coast lines are full of indentations. Political geographers have always observed that such indentations, forming bays and arms of the sea, facilitate intercourse, give shelter to enterprise, and establish commercial power.

Thus on our side there is seen the enormous total of 62,000 miles of coast and 19 first-rate harbors, against 17,000 miles and 5 harbors on the other side. The superiority here shown for the Anglo-American combination is of the highest importance. For undoubtedly here, *here*, is the basis of national resourcefulness and the seat of empire.

On the whole, it may be considered that the Anglo-American population of 125 millions, by reason of its situation, equals in effective power the 221 millions on the European side, as shown above; while the British Empire contributes to the Anglo-American side a colored population vastly exceeding any element of that kind to be found in the European combination.

Much, of course, has been done on both sides for communication by railway from the coast lines far inland. The length of railways in France may be set down at 23,500 miles, of Germany at 29,000 miles, of Russia at 27,000 miles, or 79,500 miles in all. For the Anglo-American combination the mileage would be somewhat as follows: For the United States 182,000 miles—by far the largest mileage shown by any dominion in the world; for the British Isles, 21,000 miles; for India and the colonies, 55,000 miles—a grand total of 258,000 miles. In this respect there is a great advantage on the Anglo-American side.

As regards inland navigation, that has so far been superseded by railways that the statistics need not be given. But manifestly the rivers and canals of France, Germany and Russia, together with the North Russian lakes, are hardly comparable with those of the North American Continent, the North American lakes, the Nile, the Niger, and the Zambesi, in Africa, and the rivers and canals of India and Burma—all on the Anglo-American side.

It is difficult to present a true statement of international trade, owing to the relative value of gold and silver, and to the unavoidable reckoning of the same classes of articles two or three times over. Still, on the face of the statistics, the following results would appear on the two sides, as measured in value by gold or the pound sterling. The total annual trade of the British Empire amounts to 1,200 millions sterling, in value. The annual trade of the United States may be taken at 1,900 millions of dollars, or 400 millions sterling. The total on the Anglo-American side amounts thus to the amazing sum of 1,600 millions annually. On the other side, the trade of the French Empire may be taken

at 450 millions sterling, annually; that of the German Empire at 475 millions; that of Russia at 200 millions, the francs, the marks and the silver roubles being reckoned in gold, the total on their side being thus 1,120 millions; distinctly less than that of the Anglo-American combination.

So with the tonnage of shipping; that may be estimated at ten millions of tons for the British Isles, to which may be added one million for the United States; in all, eleven millions for the Anglo-American side. On the other side, there will be one million tons for France, one and a half millions for Germany, and three-quarters of a million for Russia; in all three and a quarter millions. If to this, say, another half million of tons were added by reason of the efforts being made by Germany to develop her steam navigation, there would still remain a mighty advantage in this respect on the Anglo-American side.

In connection with this subject the number of men engaged in oceanic fishing is an element in national strength. The number of such men in the British Empire can hardly be less than 150,000, and in the United States 170,000; in all 320,000 for the Anglo-American side. In France the number of such men does not seem to exceed 85,000, and that for Germany 15,000; in all 100,000 on the European side.

In so far as the production of the precious metals may be an element in national strength, that is so conclusively to the advantage of the Anglo-American side that statistics need hardly be produced. There are few mines on the European side. The Russian mines can hardly bear comparison with the remains of the mines of Australia, the new mines of South Africa, the mines of the Rocky Mountains.

The production of coal and iron is of manifest importance in a comparison like the present.

On the Anglo-American side the annual output of coal is about 205 millions of tons for the British Empire and about 200 millions for the United States; in all 405 millions of tons. On the European side there appear 30 millions for France, 100 millions for Germany and 8 millions for Russia; in all 138 millions. Again, on the Anglo-American side the raising of iron ore amounts to 15 millions of tons for the British Empire and 10 millions for the United States; in all 25 millions of tons. The corresponding figures on the European side would be 4 millions

for France, 14 millions for Germany and 2 millions for Russia; in all 20 millions of tons.

Manifestly the power of a population partly depends on the extent to which manual strength is supplemented by that of machinery; or, in other words, the amount of mechanical force which is set in motion or directed by human hands. It is difficult to set forth this subject by statistics for either of the two sides. But the strength of the machinery in the British Isles has been reckoned at three millions of horse power, and there must be some considerable amount of the same power in India. The same power in the United States must be as much or more. There can be nothing at all like this on the Continent of Europe.

There is no space for attempting any estimate of the annual income and the accumulated wealth of the two sides, but the roughest of such estimates would show a preponderance on the Anglo-American side. An imperfect idea only could be formed by a consideration of the state receipts or the governmental revenues of the two sides. But it must be remembered that the Anglo-American peoples are, in comparison with their resources, more lightly taxed than the European peoples. Undoubtedly the taxable resources are greater on the Anglo-American than on the European side. The total revenue as above defined has been fully made out for the British Empire, and it stands at 255 millions sterling, annually. That of the United States appears to amount to 355 millions of dollars, Federal, and 270 millions for the various States, or 625 millions of dollars, reckoned at 122 millions sterling. Thus there would be a total of 377 millions sterling, annually on the Anglo-American side. Then on the European side the revenue of France would amount to about 130 millions sterling; that of Germany to 100 millions; that of Russia to 175 millions—in all 405 millions. It would seem accordingly that, although the Anglo-American revenues are mighty indeed, still they are exceeded by the revenues in the European combination. On the other hand, any exact comparison in this respect is hardly to be made. It is difficult to measure by a gold standard in pounds sterling the revenues of foreign countries which are stated in other denominations. In some of the foreign countries receipts like those of State railways are included, which appear but slightly if at all in the Anglo-American returns.

In general terms, in the financial power arising from bank-

ing facilities, from credit in the money market, from accumulation of capital from national savings, the superiority is great on the Anglo-American over the European side. But to set this forth statistically would be beyond the scope of this paper. This undoubted superiority is, however, a decisive element in national strength.

These several considerations, as set forth above, relating to population, area, sea-coast and harbors, railway communication, commerce and shipping, precious metals, mechanical power, industry and production, public revenues, certainly show a superiority on the Anglo-American as compared with the European side—not only under existing circumstances, but still more in the possibility of development. Abatements and reservations might be made by advocates on the European side. But after the utmost allowance had been made for all this, the balance of superiority on our side would be manifest. The dread question would, however, remain: Could this superiority be defended by force of arms?

Now, the numerical superiority of land forces on the European side is too manifest to need any statistical analysis. The peace establishments of the French, German and Russian armies are at least 1,850,000 men and, perhaps, may be two millions, all highly organized. Their possible war establishments might amount to totals from 6 to 8 millions of men. On the other hand, the peace establishment of the British Empire amounts to one million of men—a part of which is equally well, and another part not equally well, organized with the European armies. The possible war establishment of the Empire has never been seriously estimated. The peace establishment of the United States is under 30,000 men, doubtless well organized. Like the British people, the Americans have never reckoned their possible war establishment, but evidently they could, if so minded, raise it to a mighty strength. But neither British nor American leaders will, under the existing circumstances, consider land force as a dominant factor in any world-wide problem. Their thoughts will mainly be turned to sea force. They will anxiously inquire whether the sea force of an Anglo-American combination would or would not compare favorably with that of an European combination. It were needless to stop and show that all the European land forces would be of no avail against an Anglo-American combination, if that combination really possessed the mastery of the sea.

Now, of all statistical calculations which can be presented, the most fallacious are those which relate to naval strength. The mere enumeration of iron clads is little better than futile. The real point relates to the condition and quality of the ships. Last year, 1897, Americans as well as Britons saw the review at Spithead. Surely it was then seen that the display, with four lines of warships all ready for sea—each line five miles long—and representing only the Channel Squadron and the home reserves, was much more than a match for all the forces of the European Powers in northern waters. Yet, at the same moment, apart from all this, there was a British fleet in the Mediterranean more than equal to the French fleet there; similarly, there was a British squadron in Chinese waters superior to the other European squadrons; there were also British squadrons in the Indian Ocean, in the South African waters and in the Pacific. Moreover, there was a special squadron belonging to Australia. The United States too, had a navy, not large in numbers, but, as events have proved, high in efficiency. It was probably equal to the German navy, and was doubtless, in fighting capacity, superior to the Russian navy. Since 1897 European Powers have been building ships, but so has Britain. If a fresh review were held at Spithead now, it would be found that to the four lines of ships a fifth line had been added, the most terrible line of all. The American power for increasing the navy is indefinitely large.

Nevertheless, I give what appear to be the figures for what they may be worth. Last year in a book (named “Sixty Years of the Queen’s Reign”), after due inquiry, I stated the British force, including battleships, cruisers, sloops and gunboats, at 350, excluding torpedo craft. To this may be added the American strength in the same categories, of 60 vessels. The Anglo-American total would stand at 410 ships. Similarly, I stated the combined strength of France and Russia in the same categories (excluding torpedo craft), at 327 vessels. To that must be added for Germany 54 ships, making up a total of 381. Numerically, then, though there is, of course, a superiority on the Anglo-American side over the European, the difference apparently is not so very great. Yet we may frankly say that it were idle to suppose that the Russian ships, which have been practised mainly if not entirely in the Baltic and Black Sea, would be fitted to contend with British or American ships that have been practised in the breezy

and wavy Atlantic. This much must be openly said. For the rest, which relates to the quality of the men and the ships in each combination, respectively, both the British and the Americans will forbear to make a comparison, whatever they may think, except that in nautical capacity the Teutonic German sailors must be much the same as the British. For the development and, if necessary, the enlargement of naval force, the Anglo-American side possesses maritime resources so enormous that a statistical analysis would be beyond our scope. Against such resources a European combination has nothing comparable to produce.

In naval operations of any world-wide character, the arrangement of coaling stations is an essential factor. In this respect the British Empire is well provided. Quite a chain of fortified coaling stations is provided by Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Colombo, Trincomalee, Singapore, Wei-Hai-Wei, Thursday Island (New Guinea), St. George's Sound (Western Australia), the Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, Sierra Leone, St. Lucia (West Indies), Halifax, Vancouver. The United States will probably be establishing two or three coaling stations also. Against such array on the Anglo-American side—comprising the best strategic points on the globe—a European combination would have but little to present.

Here, then, I must leave the comparison between the Anglo-American side and the European side. For myself, from these and other facts or considerations, I believe entirely in the superiority, material, physical, naval, of the Anglo-American side. We may pray the Almighty that the necessity for testing force may never arrive. If it did, however, the question would be one of sea force rather than of land force. In any conceivable attempt to invade England, the matter would be one wholly of sea force. In any attempt to invade India or China, the matter would be one of land force primarily in the front, but fundamentally one of sea force. On neither ocean could the American coast be even approached. For Britain, the great advantages would be the keeping open of the Atlantic for her food supply by the co-operation she would have from the eastern side of the United States, and the aid she would receive from the western side of the United States in the protection of their common interests in China and the Far East. For the European combination the question would be how they could maintain their colonial possessions in Africa, or Asia, or Australasia in the face of an Anglo-American combination.

To us who believe in the superior power of the two English speaking nations in comparison with other races taken together, the question may be put whether such a condition is morally and intellectually beneficial to us. I am not concerned, however, here to attempt any answer to such a question, which is wholly a matter of opinion. This article relates not at all to opinion, but only to facts.

I will conclude the Anglo-American case with a metaphor. Britain is like a Grand Old Dame, well preserved and still maintaining the vigor and activity of her youth. Her eye is not dimmed by age; her strong hand is not weakened by the lapse of centuries. She has been the mother of many children, and has sometimes had troubles in her family. But in recent times she has been on good terms with all her offspring, all over the world. She would not suffer them to be beaten in the race of nations. If any of them were to fall into danger, she would bring out her stores, collected through many generations, in their support. If, on the other hand, she were to be hard pressed by any hostile combination, then her stalwart sons would gather round her.

RICHARD TEMPLE.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE WITH CUBA?

BY MAYO W. HAZELTINE.

WE may take for granted that, whatever may be the terms of peace ultimately accepted by Spain, they will include an evacuation of Cuba and a recognition of the fact that the destinies of the island are to be shaped by the United States. How are we to discharge the duty thus imposed upon us? The question could be easily answered but for a certain resolution, not suggested by the President's message, but adopted by Congress with a view of obtaining unanimous approval of the contemplated intervention. But for the existence of that resolution, there would be, indeed, no problem to be solved. We should deal with Cuba precisely as we have dealt with other foreign territory which, from time to time, we have annexed. Florida was sold to us by Spain in 1821, and, for twenty-four years, remained under a territorial government, but, in 1845, after the expulsion of the warlike Seminole Indians, it was admitted to the Union. California and New Mexico were annexed in 1848; two years later, the former became a State, but the latter is, to this day, a Territory. • Exactly similar was our treatment of the vast Louisiana region acquired by purchase from France; out of this many a State and Territory was, successively, carved, in proportion to the growth of population in particular localities.

Even under what we term Territorial government, the inhabitants of these extensive tracts were incomparably better off than they had been under Spain, Mexico or France, as regards the enjoyment of peace, order and civil liberty. When one of these tracts, or a part of one, entered the Union, it acquired, of course, all of the privileges which are possessed by any of the members of our confederation. Higher political privileges no people can possibly acquire—for our federal system combines the

maximum of safeguard against foreign aggression which is compatible with the exercise of self-government in State, county and municipal affairs. The thousands of Cuban exiles who, for years, have been employed in the manufacture of cigars at Key West, at Tampa and in many northern cities, know by experience what these privileges are, and they will testify that, at any time during the Ten Years' War, or during the present insurrection up to four months ago, their oppressed countrymen would have welcomed with enthusiasm the concession of such large political rights as are enjoyed by the citizens of Florida, or of New York, or of New Mexico, provided, of course, the concession were guaranteed by the substitution of American for Spanish sovereignty. They are keenly alive to the magnitude of the change that would be involved in such a substitution of sovereignty, and they could have been trusted to make it fully comprehended by their countrymen.

I.

The fact remains that we shall acquire Cuba under conditions different from those under which we acquired Florida, or under which Porto Rico will be ceded. The difference is not imposed by Spain; it is entirely self-assumed. When the message of President McKinley that led to the war was presented to Congress, that body adopted an amendment to the responsive resolutions, an amendment declaring that we entered upon the contest with no other motive than to assure complete political independence to Cuba. It is important for us to determine as promptly and precisely as possible what was meant by that declaration, assuming that those who made it had, at the time, any distinct comprehension of its significance. If we consider the spirit, instead of the letter, of the declaration, it is plain enough that we are estopped even from annexing Porto Rico or demanding coaling stations in the Ladrões and the Philippines. The acceptance, however, of this logical deduction would be a *reductio ad absurdum*. There is not one American citizen in a hundred, probably there is not one in a thousand, who believes that, because we entered upon the war with a philanthropic purpose, we are precluded from exacting some compensation for the outlay which the stiff-necked refusal of Spain to treat her colonists with justice has compelled us to make. Moreover, the logic of philanthropy would itself point to a different conclusion. The inhabitants of Porto Rico have little

more reason to be satisfied with Spanish rule than have the Cubans, and the inhabitants of the Philippines have even stronger reasons for detesting it. Having once opened the prospect of freedom to Porto Rico and Luzon, the same motives which impelled us to the liberation of Cuba should prompt us to shield the two former islands from a ghastly disappointment. So much for the absurdity of allowing ourselves to be guided, in the negotiations of terms of peace, by the widest possible application of the self-denying spirit of the somewhat hasty and gratuitous resolution passed by Congress.

Let us look now at the letter of the self-denying ordinance, and inquire to what it binds us. Here let us observe that the American republic is not the only power which, in recent times, has made a similar declaration at the outset of military operations. When France took possession of Tunis, and when England assumed control of Egypt, the act was coupled, in each instance, with the promise that the occupation should cease when the country occupied should be fully pacified, and the conditions requisite for the establishment of a stable native government should be forthcoming. Many years have passed, yet France continues to retain the Tunisian Regency, and England the valley of the Lower Nile: with good reason, also, for it is acknowledged by all unprejudiced observers that the evacuation of either region by its European custodian would be followed by anarchy and devastation. In the interest of the populations concerned, both England and France have proceeded on the assumption that the time for the fulfillment of their optimistic promise has not arrived, nor is yet even in sight; meanwhile, they have proceeded on the principle expressed by Pope:

"For forms of government let fools contest;
What's best administered is best."

We admit, however, that the lessons derivable from English experience in Egypt and from French experience in Tunis, although instructive, are not mandatory. We must solve the Cuban problem for ourselves, without more than a cursory glance at foreign precedents, but with a steadfast eye to the welfare of the inhabitants of Cuba, whereof, in the eyes of the world, we are the trustees and conservators. What do we mean by the inhabitants of Cuba? Do we mean the few thousand men who have fought under Gomez, Garcia and other commanders, claiming to derive

their commissions from a so-called provisional government? That government, it should be remembered, has never been recognized by President McKinley, even as a belligerent; no reference was made to it in the message which brought about the declaration of war. Not a few people in this country believed a year ago that the insurgents ought to be acknowledged as belligerents; but, in the light of the fuller knowledge obtainable since our invasion of the province of Santiago, the wisdom of withholding such acknowledgement has received a certain amount of confirmation. Have we any reason to believe that the insurgents and their sympathizers constitute a majority, or even a strong minority, of the inhabitants of the island? Where is the proof of such numerical preponderance? No conclusive proof can be forthcoming until a plebiscite shall be taken under conditions which assure a perfectly free expression of opinion. It may be that, if the purity of the ballot box were assured through American control, a large majority of the inhabitants of Cuba would invoke the guarantees against foreign interference and intestine disorder which would be afforded through the acceptance of the status of a State or Territory in our Union. If such should be the outcome of a plebiscite, it is obvious that the very spirit of the declaration made by Congress, no matter how narrowly construed, would forbid our adherence to the letter. We could not impose on the inhabitants of Cuba complete political independence, that is to say political isolation and economical paralysis, together with the grim necessity of coping with dangerous racial problems, against the consent of the majority; for, if the result of such an act upon our part were the eventual experience by Cuba of the fate of Hayti, we should be held responsible in history for a crime against civilization. Having delivered Cuba from the Spanish yoke, we are accountable for her tranquillity and prosperity; should she be ruined through our abandonment, we cannot absolve ourselves hereafter by the plea, "Was I my brother's keeper?"

II.

It is clear that thorough pacification is the condition precedent to an entirely free expression of opinion and aspiration on the part of a majority of the inhabitants of Cuba. By inhabitants we mean, and ought to mean, all those persons, whether insurgents, autonomists or ex-loyalists, whether born in the island or else-

where, who signify a wish to maintain a domicile in the Pearl of the Antilles. We cannot drive into exile those native Cubans who have supported Blanco's autonomist government; or those resident civilian Spaniards who follow vocations and own property in the cities and large towns, and who are said to number much more than one hundred and fifty thousand. If even the members of the latter category elect to abide in Cuba and to accept the change of régime, we cannot, without repudiating our philanthropic professions, withhold from them the privilege. We have entered Cuba in the name of even-handed justice, and not in that of revenge. If a sweeping expulsion of all Spanish-speaking residents who did not happen to be born in the island is ever to take place, we must leave the merciless proscription to be carried out by the Cubans when, if ever, they are invested with complete political independence. We suggest, however, that the cynical avowal or the circumstantial proof of an intention to execute vindictive reprisals ought to figure among the considerations that may lead Congress to modify its former declaration, or, at least, to hesitate to concede absolute independence, if we would keep ourselves clear from the charge of complicity in an act of gross barbarity, which, to judge by the Haytian precedent, would be the first fatal step toward social convulsion and catastrophe. The white element in Cuba, if it is to remain preponderant, cannot bear any marked depletion, for the mixture of races in the island differs materially from that which prevails among the Spanish-speaking commonwealths on the American mainland. In the latter communities, a large proportion of the inhabitants are descendants of the aborigines or the outcome of sexual relations between these and the Spaniards. In Cuba, on the other hand, there survives no trace of the aboriginal element; the racial struggle is exclusively between the white man and the black, and experience has shown that the black man is, on the whole, somewhat better suited than the white to the climatic conditions. The island, therefore, needs all the white men now sojourning there who are willing to remain as law-abiding citizens under the new order of things, for the fact must not be overlooked that no considerable emigration of white men from the United States or Northern Europe can be looked for unless the island is annexed to our Union, or until an independent Cuban government shall have demonstrated its ability to assure tran-

quillity and prosperity. Nor will there be any inflow of American enterprise or of American capital into Cuba until that island is known to be permanently safeguarded from the fate, we will not say of Hayti, but of the Central American republics.

What do Cubans want which they would be unable to obtain if their island were admitted to our Union as a Territory or as a State? Under the régime of absolute political independence, they would have to devote a large part of their public revenues to self-protection against foreign aggression. We could not be expected to bear the whole brunt of protecting them if we were suffered to take no part in the shaping of their attitude toward foreign nations. It is scarcely credible that any Cubans can be so infatuated as to attach more dignity and honor to the title of citizenship under a weak, insular republic, than to that name of American citizen which recent events have tended to exalt throughout the earth. If every native Cuban, indeed, could look forward to holding a government office and to following therein the same dishonest practices with which he has reproached the Spaniards, we could understand why he should insist upon retaining absolute control of the Cuban custom-houses, the revenue of which, if the island should become a State or Territory in our Union, would be collected by our Federal Government and, with similar revenue elsewhere collected, be employed for the defense of the whole confederation, whereof Cuba would constitute an outlying and important strategical part.

We will not calumniate the Cuban people by imputing to them a hankering after opportunities for speculation. We assume that, in the desire expressed by some of them for absolute political independence, they are swayed by sentimental motives alone. There is, however, in the character of the Cubans a good deal of shrewdness as well as sentiment. If the alternative were once presented to them distinctly, the mass of them would much prefer to be prosperous as American citizens, than to live from hand to mouth under the flag of a Cuban republic. They deceive themselves if they imagine that, for them, prosperity is compatible with political aloofness. They will soon receive an object-lesson from Porto Rico on this subject, which will gather force with every month during which our soldiers remain in the island for pacifying purposes, and which will receive extraordinary emphasis when Cuba is left, unpropped, to solve the problem of self-government. It

must be remembered that the sister island of Porto Rico is to be annexed to the United States; that is the avowed and irreversible intention of our Government. The instant, however, that Porto Rico enters our Union as a Territory, not only will American enterprise and capital pour thither in a fertilizing flood, but all its natural products, its sugar, its coffee, its tobacco, its timber and its tropical fruits, will be admitted to the vast American market free of duty. How can the products of Cuba compete with those of Porto Rico in the markets of the United States, if the former island remains a foreign country? What about reciprocity? we may be asked. It might not be for our interest to grant a reciprocity treaty to independent Cuba, if, thereby, we should run the risk of cutting short or impairing the progress of Porto Rico and Hawaii, which would have become integral parts of the national soil.

There is one way, and one way only, in which the Cubans can acquire, now and forever, perfect freedom of access to American markets for their natural products, and that is by the admission of their island to the Union. There would be no end to the development of Cuba's natural resources under such stimulating conditions. Nature has done more for her than it has done for Java, which is of almost exactly the same size; yet, in the short space of a century, the population of the latter island has increased from two to more than twenty millions. Cuba is standing, in this crisis, at the parting of the ways. If she chooses, a destiny more splendid than Java's may be hers, for she may unite the dignity and freedom of American citizenship with a more than Javanese prosperity. If, on the other hand, the Cubans shall cling to the barren honor of complete political independence, they will find that it means for them commercial backwardness and economic isolation; that American capital, emigration and enterprise will go elsewhere, and that, soon or late, American tariffs will foster the agricultural industries, not of self-centred and self-dependent Cuba, but of our own tropical domains.

III.

We return to the point from which we started. The Constitution of the United States has undoubtedly confided to Congress the power of making war, and, therefore, by implication, the power of defining the purpose for which a war is undertaken. In

the exercise of that power, Congress declared that we entered upon war with Spain from no motive of self-aggrandizement, but with the single-hearted resolve to give independence to Cuba. We will not quibble and allege that what many, or, perhaps, most of those who voted for the resolution really had at heart was the desire to give Cuba peace and civil liberty; as good a government and as large a measure of local autonomy as we, ourselves, enjoy under our mixed system of Federal and State administration. The question for us to keep in view is not what Congress might have said, or should have said, but what it did say. Congress pledged itself to give the Cubans political independence, and, until Congress itself shall have seen fit to retract or modify the pledge, it must be carried out.

As regards, nevertheless, the time and method of fulfillment, some reasonable precautions must be taken. The island must be thoroughly pacified, and the conflicting elements of its population must be brought into at least transient harmony before they are invited to discharge the high and difficult function of framing a constitution for an independent republic. In the interest of all the constituents which make up the mixed Cuban people, whether insurgents, or native-born autonomists, or resident Spaniards, it will be the duty of our Government, as their trustee before the world, to examine the proposed constitution and see whether, on its face at all events, it is calculated to administer the even-handed justice which we shall have dealt out during the period of pacification to all the inhabitants of Cuba, without distinction of color or descent. If the projected organic law shall be found ostensibly to answer all the requirements of good sense and equity, then, unless the resolution of Congress shall have been, in the meanwhile, modified, we shall be bound to allow the Cubans to institute their new régime, if they, not by that time enlightened by the happy experience of Porto Rico under the Stars and Stripes, shall still insist on the political independence which, for them, will mean economic isolation and relative commercial inactivity.

MAYO W. HAZELTINE.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF "IMPERIALISM."

BY CHARLES A. CONANT.

THE instinctive tendency of a race or civilization often outruns the wisdom of its leaders. Whether for good or ill, the inborn tendencies of race—whether for the highest achievement in art, like the Ionian; the military conquest of the world, like the Roman; the penetration of distant and barbarous countries for the purposes of trade, like the Tyrian or the Venetian; the command of the empire of the sea, like the English—these tendencies prevail by a sort of instinct. Other races in seeking to pursue the same paths by imitation have stumbled and gone astray. But when the current of race or national tendencies runs strongly in a given channel it is apt to override alike the misgivings of its sympathizers and the protests and resistance of those who would obstruct it. The United States to-day seem about to enter upon a path marked out for them as the children of the Anglo-Saxon race, not yet traversed because there has been so much to do at home. Almost as if by magic, the importance of naval power as the advance agent of commercial supremacy has flashed upon the mind of the country. The irresistible tendency to expansion, which leads the growing tree to burst every barrier, which drove the Goths, the Vandals, and finally our Saxon ancestors in successive and irresistible waves over the decadent provinces of Rome, seems again in operation, demanding new outlets for American capital and new opportunities for American enterprise.

This new movement is not a matter of sentiment. It is the result of a natural law of economic and race development. The great civilized peoples have to-day at their command the means of developing the decadent nations of the world. This means, in its material aspects, is the great excess of saved capital which is the result of machine production. It is proposed to point out in this

article how great this excess is at the present time, how profoundly it is disturbing economic conditions in the older countries, and how necessary to the salvation of these countries is an outlet for their surplus savings, if the entire fabric of the present economic order is not to be shaken by a social revolution. The law of self preservation, as well as that of the survival of the fittest, is urging our people on in a path which is undoubtedly a departure from the policy of the past, but which is inevitably marked out by the new conditions and requirements of the present.

The dominant note of modern economic life, since the beginning of the epoch of machinery and of negotiable securities, has been saving for investment. Saving against the risks of loss and the weakness of old age has existed from the beginning of civilization and has been accompanied by a limited amount of saving for increasing the means of production. But saving for the sake of an income without the impairment of the principal is, in its present extension, a modern phenomenon. Savings had to be made, before the period of negotiable securities, in consumable commodities, in land and its improvements, or in metal, the great store of value. The creation of corporations and the issue of their shares in negotiable securities afforded an outlet, toward the close of the last century and early in the present century, for savings which were becoming congested, because they could not be put to ready use. *The change in the form of the investment was only an evolution* from the great demands for capital which arose with the application of machinery to production upon a large scale and the discovery of methods of communication on land and sea by the use of steam. The necessity for carrying on such large enterprises as cotton mills, iron foundries, and canal, railway and steamship building by great aggregate sums of capital led to the division of the cost of the enterprise into divisible parts, which might absorb the capital of great numbers of men. For many years there was an outlet at a high rate of return for all the savings of all the frugal persons in the great civilized countries. Frightful miscalculations were made and great losses occurred, because experience had not gauged the value or the need of new works under all conditions, but there was room for the legitimate use of all savings without loss and in enterprises affording an adequate return.

The conditions of the early part of the century have changed.

Capital is no longer needed in excess of the supply, but it is becoming congested. The benefits of saving have been inculcated with such effect for many decades that savings accumulate beyond the development of new demands for capital which are legitimate, and are becoming a menace to the economic future of the great industrial countries. Jean Baptiste Say, the French economist, demonstrated by plausible reasoning that there could not be a general overproduction of commodities, because the increased product of one man or set of men would be exchanged against the increased product of the other producing classes of the community. But there was one flaw in this argument. M. Say based his reasoning upon the premise that the man who produced consumed in equal ratio with his production. He did not allow for saving. Saving is the setting aside from the products of one's labor or services of a portion of the proceeds for some other purpose than consumption. If every man in the community spent his entire income upon consumable goods there would be no overproduction except as a result of mistaken adjustments. There could not be universal overproduction until every human being had more than he could consume or enjoy. But if every man should undertake to set aside a fixed proportion of the products of his labor for some other purpose than consumption, he would necessarily diminish the demand for the other classes of commodities which he had formerly obtained in exchange for his own products.

The answer of the economist to this proposition may be that savings, in their turn, are applied to furnishing the means of consumption to laborers. This is true so long as these laborers can be employed upon productive work. But, by the hypothesis, they must be employed upon some permanent work, like increasing the machinery of production or the means of communication. If these improvements are necessary they pay an adequate return, and the point of congestion of capital has not been reached. If they are needless duplications of existing machinery they may either fail to pay dividends, or they may divide the work and earnings of existing machinery and laborers, making their creation barren of benefits to the community. In either case the person making the savings would have profited as much if he applied his surplus to the purchase of consumable goods and luxuries, and the community would not have suffered by the employment of labor-

ers in the production of such goods, instead of the needless duplication of existing plant, destined to increase the inconveniences of overproduction, lock-outs, strikes and commercial convulsions.

The famous proposition of John Stuart Mill that "Demand for commodities is not demand for labor" is true in a restricted sense, but, in the language of Prof. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, "has, in modern societies as they are constituted to-day, and with the enormous resources at their disposal, only a theoretical value." In fact, M. Leroy-Beaulieu goes on to declare, "Circulating and available capital is exorbitantly abundant in all the old and rich societies." Mill's argument in its last analysis comes to this—that time is required between the consumption of saved commodities by laborers and the production by them of finished goods, and that consumption of commodities does not add to existing capital. These two propositions are theoretically true, but the element of time for preliminary saving has been substantially eliminated by modern conditions, and the evil of consuming commodities without saving has long ceased to be a threatening one. That a continuous demand for consumable commodities does constantly provide the capital for continuing their production is practically admitted by Mill when he says, in referring to a sudden cessation of demand for velvets, that the true test of his principle is "to suppose that the change is gradual and foreseen *and is attended with no waste of capital.*"

If saving in any community no more than kept pace with new demands for capital which proved legitimate and profitable, the happy situation of a constantly progressive industrial condition would be realized. Saving is applied in too many cases, however, to the needless duplication of existing manufacturing plant and the creation of enterprises which do not prove productive. A few of these enterprises may do good to the community in the long run, by that process of friction which finally brings sound adjustments, but it can only be at the sacrifice of the savings of the first investors. It is the rude process of these readjustments which lies beneath the intensity of economic crises during the present century. Some of these crises have been accompanied by delusions growing out of the novelty of the principle of limited liability and negotiable securities, which have added to their intensity, but they have been due in an increasing degree in recent years to the vain seeking for safe investments which could not be

found. The duplication of needless plant, the multiplication of unprofitable enterprises, has flooded the market with products which could hardly be consumed if all the means of the community were applied to consumption, and which have resulted, under the existing system of abstinence from consumption for the sake of saving, in a glut of goods which has destroyed profits, bankrupted great corporations, and ruined investors.

It is the excess of saving, with the resulting accumulation of unconsumed goods, in the great industrial countries, which is one of the world maladies of the economic situation of to-day. It lies at the root of a large share of industrial discontent, and explains more logically than changes in the mere mechanism of exchange the conditions which set in about 1870, when the great civilized countries first appear to have become fully capitalized to meet all demands which consumers were willing to make out of their earnings. The world's economic history since that time—the intense industrial activity in machine production and railroad building up to 1873; the long period of stagnation which followed, broken only by brief periods of activity after surplus goods had been consumed; the great accumulations of both capital and metallic money; the convulsions attacking the great capitalistic countries, without respect for their differences in tariff policies and money standards; and the steady fall in the earning power of capital—all these tendencies point to excess of saved capital beyond the effective demand of the community as their underlying cause. There must always be savings in a progressive industrial society to repair the wear of existing equipment and to meet new demands, but under the present social order it is becoming impossible to find at home in the great capitalistic countries employment for all the capital saved which is at once safe and remunerative.

The rapidity of savings and the extent of the congestion of capital in Europe may be judged from the stock exchange lists and the savings bank returns. In Great Britain the market value of the securities quoted on the stock exchange on June 18, 1898, was £3,215,414,000. In France the nominal and actual value of negotiable securities has recently been carefully worked out in a series of articles by M. Edmond Théry, the accomplished editor of *l'Économiste Européen*. He shows that the market value of securities issued by French companies increased from \$9,000,000,-

000 on July 1, 1890, to \$13,250,000,000 on July 1, 1897, and while one-tenth of this amount was held in each case abroad, this is offset four times over by foreign securities held in France. The market value of all securities held by Frenchmen, which was \$11,000,000,000, paying an annual income of \$480,000,000 in 1880, had risen in 1897 to \$17,000,000,000, paying an annual income of \$580,000,000. In this form of wealth alone, therefore, there has been an increase of more than 50 per cent. in capital in seventeen years, with an increase of less than 21 per cent. in money earnings. A part of this increase may be fictitious, in the sense that former private undertakings have been turned into stock companies and that some of the stock companies represent worthless enterprises. The essential point, however, is not materially impaired, that the available money credits have been found among French investors to absorb this vast amount of stock in national, railway and industrial securities. This increase, moreover, is a net increase in both nominal and market values and takes account of the millions which have been sunk in worthless enterprises, like the Panama Canal, only at their capitalization and actual market value at the present time, and not at their issue value.

A calculation of all the movable wealth of leading European countries was undertaken in 1895 by the International Statistical Institute, under the direction of M. Alfred Neymarek, which covered the precious metals, mortgages and savings deposits, as well as negotiable securities. The total was found to be \$85,000,000,000. M. Neymarek distributes this negotiable wealth among the various countries as follows: England, \$35,000,000,000; Germany, \$18,000,000,000; France, \$15,500,000,000; Russia, \$5,000,000,000; Austria, \$4,500,000,000; The Netherlands, \$2,600,000,000; Italy, \$3,400,000,000; Belgium, \$1,200,000,000; Denmark, \$550,000,000; Roumania, \$240,000,000; Norway, \$150,000,000. In the four great investing countries of France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Great Britain there are more than \$46,000,000,000 of capital invested in negotiable securities alone—an amount equal to fifty times the bonded debt of the United States and to \$3,250 for every family of five persons in the United States.

The statistics of the savings banks indicate in some degree the manner in which the common people have come to the aid of the

great capitalists in accumulating loanable credit. The postal savings banks alone showed deposits, at recent dates, in Great Britain and Ireland of \$500,000,000; in France, \$150,000,000; in Belgium, \$100,000,000; in Italy, \$90,000,000, and in Russia, \$123,000,000. The French savings banks outside the postal service carry deposits to the amount of \$650,000,000; the Swiss banks have \$175,000,000, and the British trustee savings banks carry deposits of \$500,000,000. In these few countries, therefore, is an investment fund of nearly \$2,500,000,000, derived from the savings of people of small means. In the United States the deposits in the savings banks in 1870 were \$549,874,358, computed in depreciated paper money. In 1880 the amount, upon a gold valuation, was \$819,106,973; in 1890, \$1,524,844,506, and in 1897, \$1,939,376,035. The amount has more than doubled during the fifteen years since 1882, when it stood at \$966,797,081, and amounts to \$26.56 for each man, woman and child in the United States. No account is taken of the deposit accounts of the great discount banks, because they grow largely out of current commercial transactions rather than new savings. These accounts could not exist without preliminary saving, but the capital which they represent corresponds rather to the circulating capital which maintains production than to the great funds which are seeking investment in new enterprises.

The essential question regarding this vast mass of accumulated saving invested in negotiable securities is whether it is put to profitable use. It is growing at a rate which would mean greatly increased prosperity in every country, if increase of savings were accompanied by increase of earning power in the old proportions. The statements compiled annually by M. Laveleye, the editor of the *Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels* of Brussels, puts the total issues of new securities in 1897, including public loans, as well as railway and industrial stocks and bonds, at \$1,800,000,000. This is considerably less than in 1896, when the issues were \$3,200,000,000, but the conversions at that time were \$1,500,000,000, as compared with only \$135,000,000 in 1897, so that the net issues of new securities were not far apart in either year and amounted to nearly \$1,800,000,000. The total for 1897 includes \$26,000,000 in the United States and about the same amount in Canada, but the bulk was European capital, even where the recorded issues were in other countries. The applications of new capital to joint stock

companies and security issues in Great Britain in 1897 were \$775,000,000, and the issues of French securities in 1897 were computed by *l'Économiste Européen* of December 31 at \$90,000,000.

The effect of these great accumulations of capital was predicted as long ago as 1879 by Prof. Leroy-Beaulieu, the eminent French economist, in the first edition of his book, *Essai sur la Répartition des Richesses*. He made it plain that if European laborers and capitalists continued to pile up savings in later years as they had already done up to that time, the supply of loanable capital would become so great that its earning power would be materially reduced. The continued tendency in this direction has been pointed out in a striking manner by Prof. Leroy-Beaulieu himself and by M. Théry, in the series of articles already referred to, and is no longer a subject of dispute among European financiers. The conclusive evidence of the plenitude of capital and the cheapness of money is afforded by the conversions of the public debt which have been steadily going on among the great powers. Great Britain refunded her consolidated debt in 1888, and British consols now pay but little more than two per cent. at the current quotations. France negotiated loans of \$880,000,000 between 1880 and 1890, most of which were issued at three per cent., but were quoted at only 85 to 91 per cent. up to 1890. Since then the quotations have steadily risen, until the real return in interest is summed up by M. Théry in the declaration that a capitalist who should have invested 10,000 francs in proportionate purchases of the six types of French national securities would have drawn from his investment in 1880 an annual revenue of 380 francs, in 1890 355 francs and in 1897 only 297 francs.

The great Prussian conversion was operated during 1897 and applied to \$850,000,000 of consolidated four per cent. securities. These four per cents. were quoted at 104.5 and the three and a half per cents. were quoted at 104.2 in October, 1896. The three per cent. obligations issued in 1890 and then quoted at 86.5 reached par on July 5, 1895, and stood at 99.6 on October 5, 1896. One of the reasons for the close approximation of the four per cents. to the three and a half per cent. securities was the conviction that the government would soon proceed to the conversion of the former. M. Miquel, the Prussian Minister, in announcing his project, recalled the fact that in 1894 France had converted her four and a half per cents. into three and a half

per cents.; that Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, Zurich, Saxe-Gotha, Württemberg and Bavaria had converted four per cent. into three and a half per cent. securities; and that Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Bremen and Berne had converted three and a half per cents. into three per cents., not to speak of the great Russian conversion of five per cents. into four per cents.

Figures like these illustrate in a forcible manner the superabundance of loanable capital in Europe and the small return which it now pays to investors. The evidence that the leading European states, in reducing their interest rates, have only followed the tendency of commercial loans is afforded by M. Théry in his discussion of railway and industrial securities. That the situation is on the point of becoming much worse for investors is indicated by the fact that not only are governments preparing for conversions of the public debt at reduced rates of interest, but some of the railways and industrial societies are preparing to pay off their obligations and narrow the field of possible investment. The leading railway companies of France are beginning to issue obligations at two and a half per cent., which are still quoted a little below par, but which, after the deduction of the tax upon corporation earnings and the tax upon transfers, pay a net return of only 2.44 per cent. a year. Of the French railway obligations 121,525,000 francs mature in 1900, 167,205,200 francs in 1910, 216,214,000 francs in 1920 and larger sums during the three succeeding decades.

This congestion of capital in Europe follows a distinct economic law. This law, as worked out by the eminent Austrian economist, Böhm-Bawerk, applies to the earnings of capital the law of diminishing returns. In other words, capital becomes less productive in earning power where it is abundant, because less productive use can be found for the excess above a certain limit. And it is this excess which fixes the rate for all. In the luminous language of M. Leroy-Beaulieu, "The circumstance which most influences the rate of interest in civilized countries, where capital is generally sought and loaned for productive works, is the average productiveness of capital newly formed and the prospect of productiveness of capital which is available." Saving has reached a point in old countries where the offers of capital have almost exceeded the effective demand and the owners of capital are bidding recklessly against each other for the purchase at high premiums

of the evidences of the public debt and other unquestionable securities.

A remarkable proof that this great accumulation of capital is to a large extent doubling upon itself by duplicating the machinery of production, without substantial benefits to the community or even to investors, is afforded by the statistics of the French tax upon the income of negotiable securities. An article in *l'Economiste Français* of May 21, 1898, calls attention to the fact that the product of this tax, if the rates had been uniform, would show no appreciable increase for the past fifteen years. The rate was changed from three to four per cent. in 1891, so that the gross yield was increased, but the product of each one per cent. of the tax was 16,075,000 francs in 1883 and only 15,737,000 francs in 1896. This tax is levied upon the dividends paid upon negotiable securities. If the fact that the yield of the tax had not increased were considered by itself, it would indicate that the increased savings of the French people and their large investments in negotiable securities for the past fifteen years had been absolutely barren of increased earning power. In other words, the superfluity of capital has so reduced dividends that all the additional savings of half a generation have no more than offset the effect of declining interest rates. This calculation is, of course, subject to qualification, by reason of large investments by Frenchmen in foreign securities which do not pay this tax, and by reason of the reduction in the prices of commodities, which increases the purchasing power of the dividends earned. But even with these qualifications there could hardly be a more striking demonstration of the barrenness of the vast volume of savings and the manner in which the increase in volume accentuates the difficulty of sufficient savings to afford productive dividends.

The restlessness of capital under diminished earnings has been illustrated in many ways during the last few years. In every great capitalistic country there is an eager reaching out for new investments, which is sometimes willing to assume great risks rather than accept small returns. Germany, which was a comparatively poor country until within the present generation, is expanding greatly her foreign investments, in spite of occasional deficiencies of circulating capital at home. The proof that German capital is finding its way all over the world is found in the extension of German banks, of which there is one, with a capital of 10,000,000

marks (\$2,500,000), in Brazil; one with head offices at Buenos-Ayres and Valparaiso, with a capital of 20,000,000 marks; one at Shanghai and Calcutta, with a capital of 15,000,000 marks; and the German Bank of Chile, at Valparaiso, with a capital of 10,000,000 marks. Germany is interested in the Brazilian railway of Minas, with a capital of 62,000,000 marks, and in the railways of Anatolia (which are almost wholly owned in Germany), with a capital of 26,720,000 marks and loans of 68,340,000 marks. German capital is also largely invested in breweries, paper mills, soap factories, textile mills and machine shops in the United States.

Even Scotland, the example for many years of conservatism in banking and investments, has felt the pressure of the low returns upon saved capital in recent years. The Scotch incorporated banks gave notice on October 1, 1892, that after that date the allowance of interest on creditor balances of current accounts would be discontinued. This did not apply to distinct deposit accounts, but the rate on these was then only one and a half per cent., and was reduced in January, 1895, to one per cent. The congestion of capital in Scotland had already led to large transfers of money to Australia, and when the crisis of 1893 occurred in that country about one-third of the deposits of £153,000,000 were owned in Great Britain, chiefly in Scotland, and had been deposited in the Australian banks, because of the liberal rate of interest paid.

The present situation in regard to saving is not absolutely novel in the world's experience. The Florentine cities found capital accumulating on their hands beyond the capacity for its safe employment, and were compelled to make precarious loans to foreign kings. Holland faced a congestion of capital in the days of her great maritime supremacy, when money sought investment in vain at two per cent., and the wild folly of the tulip mania illustrated the tendency to speculation which such conditions foster. England was afflicted with such a congestion of capital in the early days of the Stuarts, when prosperity and commercial greatness began to afford small commercial savings to Englishmen, and again in the middle of the last century, when three per cents. were quoted at 107. In each of these cases the world was far from rich, and savings could not be said to exist in excess in the sense that there was more than enough for all. But the question of congested capital is a practical one and not a sentimental one. The few who then saved, the many who save now, will not hand over their whole

savings to the needy, except under compulsion of taxation or under the cruel stress of an economic crisis which wipes out dividends and shrivels the value of investments.

There are three important solutions of this enormous congestion of capital in excess of legitimate demand. One of these is the socialistic solution of the abandonment of saving, the application of the whole earnings of the laborer to current consumption, and the support of old age out of taxes levied upon the production of the community. It will be long before this solution will be accepted in a comprehensive form in any modern civilized state. The second solution is the creation of new demands at home for the absorption of capital. This has occurred at several previous stages of the world's history and is likely to continue as long as human desires continue expansible. But there has never been a time before when the proportion of capital to be absorbed was so great in proportion to possible new demands. Means for building more bicycle factories than are needed, and for laying more electric railways than are able to pay dividends, have been taken out of current savings within the last few years, without producing any marked effect upon their amount and without doing more, at the most, than to stay the downward course of the rate of interest. Aside from the waste of capital in war, which is only a form of consumption, there remains, therefore, as the final resource, the equipment of new countries with the means of production and exchange.

It is in the countries which Lord Salisbury describes as decaying that the means for the employment of new capital must be found. Western Europe and the Atlantic coast of the United States, with many of the interior States, are already fully equipped with the necessary means of production and communication. There remain many improvements of a permanent character capable of being made in the luxuries of living, but they are not in the nature of additions to the machinery of production and exchange. Such an improvement, for instance, would be the abolition of grade crossings by costly tunnels and bridges, where the improvement obviously would not pay for itself, but was rendered possible out of the abundant surplus savings in the form of earnings of the railway or the State. These improvements are very desirable additions to the accumulated comforts of a community, but their creation is essentially in the nature of the em-

ployment of capital for consumption, where they have no visible and appreciable effect upon earning capacity, rather than its employment as an investment. A railway which saw fit to employ a large surplus of earnings in such improvements would be pursuing the same course as an individual who applied his surplus to the purchase of valuable works of art and jewels. They would both have a permanent character, but not a productive character. The railway would not issue new interest-bearing securities for sale to investors for such purposes, and the individual would not borrow the savings of others to add to his personal luxuries.

For the means of finding new productive employments for capital, therefore, it is necessary that the great industrial countries should turn to countries which have not felt the pulse of modern progress. Such countries have yet to be equipped with the mechanism of production and of luxury, which has been created in the progressive countries by the savings of recent generations. They have not only to obtain buildings and machinery—the necessary elements in producing machine-made goods—but they have to build their roads, drain their marshes, dam their rivers, build aqueducts for their water supplies and sewers for their towns and cities. Asia and Africa are the most promising of these countries. Japan has already made her entry, almost like Athene full-armed from the brain of Zeus, into the modern industrial world. The increased capacity of her people for production, giving them increased command over the products of other peoples, is producing its natural effect in the rise of wages and increased importations. China, Siberia and the islands which have languished so long under Spanish inertia, are likely to follow, perhaps with more halting steps, in the footsteps of Japan. The opening of railways and canals will afford employment for the masses of capital piling up in Europe and the United States, which will be profitable if the merchandise is found to feed the new means of transportation. Existing commodities now imported from the interior of these countries at great cost will be swept on paths of steel to the seacoast, with the result of reducing their cost, increasing their consumption, and benefiting at once both producer and purchaser.

The United States cannot afford to adhere to a policy of isolation while other nations are reaching out for the command of these new markets. The United States are still large users of foreign capital, but American investors are not willing to see the re-

turn upon their investments reduced to the European level. Interest rates have greatly declined here within the last five years. New markets and new opportunities for investment must be found if surplus capital is to be profitably employed.

In pointing out the necessity that the United States shall enter upon a broad national policy, it need not be determined in just what manner that policy shall be worked out. Whether the United States shall actually acquire territorial possessions, shall set up captain generalships and garrisons, whether they shall adopt the middle ground of protecting sovereignties nominally independent, or whether they shall content themselves with naval stations and diplomatic representations as the basis for asserting their rights to the free commerce of the East, is a matter of detail. The discussion of the details may be of high importance to our political morality and our historical traditions, but it bears upon the economic side of the question only so far as a given political policy is necessary to safeguard and extend commercial interests. The writer is not an advocate of "imperialism" from sentiment, but does not fear the name if it means only that the United States shall assert their right to free markets in all the old countries which are being opened to the surplus resources of the capitalistic countries and thereby given the benefits of modern civilization. Whether this policy carries with it the direct government of groups of half-savage islands may be a subject for argument, but upon the economic side of the question there is but one choice—either to enter by some means upon the competition for the employment of American capital and enterprise in these countries, or to continue the needless duplication of existing means of production and communication, with the glut of unconsumed products, the convulsions followed by trade stagnation, and the steadily declining return upon investments which this policy will invoke.

The entry of the United States upon the competition for the world's markets means some radical changes in their existing policy, but it means an enlarged share in the world's earnings and in the respect of other civilized states. The system of protection, whatever its original merits, will lose its reason for being when the producers of this country are able to compete in the markets of the world with the producers of all other countries. Great Britain has blazed the path of future economic achievement by declaring her willingness to open the gates of every country which

she enters to the free competition of the world. The United States, if they would have her by their side, must follow the same course. The narrower policy, pursued by France and Russia, of endeavoring to shut up their colonies to their own commerce, is only a repetition within a slightly extended wall of the old policy of building up trade, which should be reciprocal, by endeavoring to destroy the purchasing power of one's purchasers. Such a policy cannot offset the effects of congested capital, for it only intensifies within the protected wall the intensity of competition and shuts up the producers to the barren contest against each other before the same body of consumers. Fictitious premiums set upon particular industries only make their last state worse than their first by drawing capital into such industries in excess of the requirements set by the natural laws of trade.

It is not even necessary to argue the question whether "trade follows the flag" or whether trade can be achieved without the prestige of political power. The present situation in China is such as to call for energetic political action on the part of all powers which desire to obtain new openings for their commerce. Russia, Germany and France have seized stations and large tracts of territory in China with a view to enforcing there their restrictive policy of shutting up the market to their own people. It is necessary, if the United States are to have an unimpaired share in the new trade of Asia, that they should protest against this policy of exclusion and seek to limit the area over which it is applied. Great Britain stands before the world, as she has done since the days of Huskisson and Peel, as the champion of free markets. The United States, if they are not to be excluded from Asia, must either sustain the policy of Great Britain or they must follow the narrower policy of the Continental countries in carving out a market of their own. Silent indifference to what is going on in Asia is not merely a question of political and naval prestige or of territorial extension. It is a question whether the new markets which are being created there shall be opened to our commerce in any form under any conditions, and nothing but vigorous assertion of American interest in the subject will prevent the obstructions to the natural course of trade which will follow the division of Asia among the protectionist powers of the European continent.

CHARLES A. CONANT.

THE EXPLORATION OF THE SEA.

BY CHARLES MINOR BLACKFORD, JR., M. D.

WHO is there in whom the sight and sound, or even the very mention of the sea does not arouse an interest, even enthusiasm? The sea has ever been a theme for artist, poet and orator. It furnished a highway for Hellenic traffic, and about it clustered many tales and traditions, many beautiful mythological fancies, many half historic stories. It was a second home for the Hellenic people, and it is easy to understand the joy with which the ten thousand under Xenophon hailed it with shouts as they saw from the hilltops the glitter that marked the end of their long and weary retreat.

The dancing ripples, the steady heaving of the tides and the resistless power of the waves when hurled by storms on the shore, excited the imaginations of early men, and thus peopled the waste of waters with deities. In the warm, mild seas, the Ægean and Mediterranean, Neptune held his court, attended by mermaids and dolphins, to whom even Orpheus deigned to play. Among its terrors were Scylla and Charybdis and the sirens. In the forbidding waters of the north the Lorelei held sway; and Undine lived in a palace as rich in barbaric splendor as the caverns of Capri in sensuous tints.

These were but fancies, for as to the real life of the sea the ancients were ignorant. Its simplest problems were inexplicable, for even Aristotle failed to understand its saltness. He argued that, as the water was continually evaporating, the sea would ultimately dry up, and as the upper layers are exposed to the sun, they must be warmer and more salt than those beneath them. He named 180 species of marine animals inhabiting the Ægean Sea, a truly wonderful feat for one who did not possess instruments or modern chemical, physical and biological knowledge.

Pliny, in his gossipy Natural History, gives a list of 176 species, which, though four less than those given by Aristotle for the *Ægean* alone, he asserted to comprise all to be found in the sea, and complacently remarks:

"Surely, then, everyone must allow that it is quite impossible to include every species of terrestrial animal in one general view for the information of mankind, and yet, by Hercules, in the sea and in the ocean, vast as they are, there exists nothing that is unknown to us, and, a truly marvellous fact, it is with those things that nature has concealed in the deep that we are best acquainted."

He states the depth of the sea to be 1,500 fathoms in some places, and in others to be immeasurable. In regard to the saltiness, he repeats Aristotle's view that the surface strata are more saline than the deeper ones, because "what is sweet and mild is evaporated from it, which the force of fire easily accomplishes, while all the more acrid and thick matter is left behind, on which account the water of the sea is less salt at some depth than at the surface."

During the Middle Ages, little was done save to repeat the teachings of Aristotle, and beyond question the fabulous dangers of the ocean delayed the discovery of America. The voyages of Columbus and his followers excited anew the old interest in marine life, and in 1558 Gessner published a "*Historia Animalium*," the fourth book of which is on "Fishes and Sea Animals." The slender store of knowledge of pelagic life received its next addition from "A Treatise on Aquatic Life," by John Jonston, in 1649, and, about 1650, Hooke invented a sounding rod with a detachable weight, an idea that slumbered two hundred years, till Passed Midshipman J. M. Brooke, a young Virginian in the United States Navy, † invented in 1854, a rod embodying it, that is so perfect that Sigsbee says of it: "In fact there is no sounding rod . . . that is not a modification of Brooke's rod in one respect or another."

The first attempt to explore the sea in the scientific sense was that made by Ellis off the northeastern coast of Africa. He succeeded, in 1749, in sounding, at a depth of 891 fathoms, and made observations of the temperature of the deeper strata of water by drawing up specimens in a valved box, so arranged as to close on striking bottom, and taking the temperature on deck after the box had been drawn up. This process was more ingenious

† Now Prof. J. M. Brooke of the Virginia Military Institute.

than adapted to precise results. The next year, 1750, two Italian naturalists, Marsili and Donati, used the common oyster dredge for collecting specimens, and as early as 1779, Otho F. Müller, a Dane, invented the "Zoologists' Dredge" by fastening a net to an iron frame, and the modern era was definitely begun.

The progress of thalassography has been so rapid and so great during this century, that it can be sketched only in bare outline. In 1805 Péron went around the world and took temperatures at many points. He conceived the remarkable idea that at the bottom of the sea lay a bed of ice, though he neglected to mention the manner in which it was fastened down. Preposterous as is this idea, it survived for thirteen years, when Sir John Ross upset it. This latter explorer invented an apparatus, called the "Deep Sea Clamm," a gigantic pair of tongs by which he secured specimens of the bottom and several worms from more than 1,000 fathoms. Of course, had Péron's ice sheet lain over the bottom, the "Clamm" would not have brought up earth, but it is strange, in view of what was to follow, that the presence of the annelids attracted so scant attention.

When marine life began to command notice, the question of the depth to which life could extend divided scientific thought into warring camps. About 1840, it was generally believed that the bathymetrical limit was about 300 fathoms, and some strange ideas were current as to the physical condition of water when under a pressure such as a depth of two miles would produce. It was thought that skeletons of drowned men, or even heavy cannon and the "wedges of gold" that popular imagination places in the sea, floated at certain levels, beneath which is water so compressed as to be impenetrable. In fact, water is almost incompressible, and the weight of a cubic inch of it at the depth of a mile is very little more than at the surface; but it was assumed that no living being could survive a pressure which at 1,000 fathoms is about a ton to the square inch. We ourselves live under a pressure of about fifteen pounds per inch, and are unaware of it. Indeed, we sometimes waken on a morning when the barometer has risen, say, half an inch during the night, and consequently find ourselves sustaining an increased pressure of several tons not only without suffering, but with a positive feeling of buoyancy and good spirits. On the other hand, if the tremendous pressure under which we live be relieved as by a surgical

"cup," severe injury may follow. Aëronauts suffer from this cause, and marine animals dredged from great depth often reach the surface in a most lamentable condition, with eyes protruding and viscera distended.

The notion that life could not exist below 300 fathoms soon received heavy blows. Ross had brought up worms in mud from 1,000 fathoms, and entangled on the line at 800 fathoms was a beautiful *Caput Medusæ*. Off the coast of Portugal there is a fishery of sharks carried on below 400 fathoms, and it is thus demonstrated that animals so high in the scale can survive a pressure of 1,120 pounds to the inch. But these facts, and others equally forcible, seem to have been overlooked in favor of a plausible hypothesis, especially when the latter bore the stamp of a great name. In 1843 Edward Forbes, then professor of botany in King's College, London, read a paper on the *mollusca* and *radiata* of the Ægean Sea and their distribution, considered as bearing on geology. For a botanist to discuss a zoological topic from a geological standpoint is remarkable, but this paper was the beginning of a series of works on marine life that were in the very front of the thought of the time. Space compels the omission of his ideas of distribution from specific centres, his "Law of Representation" and much of interest and ingenuity that sprang from his brain; but his "Bathymetrical Zones" require mention because of the influence they exerted on science. He distinguished around all seabords four well marked zones of depth, each characterized by a distinct group of organisms. These zones he called the Littoral, Laminarian, Coralline and the Zone of Deep Sea Corals. Of these, the Littoral extends between high and low water marks, and is periodically exposed to air, sun, and extremes of temperature. Animals *species* are rare, though *individuals* are many, and of them, many are vegetable feeders. From low water mark to about fifteen fathoms extends the Laminarian Zone, and it constitutes the chief home of the "tangles." It is always under water, except that at lowest ebb of the spring tides glimpses of its upper margin can be seen. The Coralline Zone extends to about fifty fathoms and vegetation is represented by millepores, zoophytes and bryozoa. Most sea fish—cod, haddock, etc.—inhabit this zone, though sometimes they go deeper.

Beneath this lies the zone of deep sea corals, in which life grows less and less, till it reaches zero. Erroneous as is this sys-

tem, it is a great advance on what had gone before, but it was destined to be short lived. Ross had brought up living organisms from depths far below Forbes' zero, and with improved dredging and sounding implements, it was shown that life was abundant even in abysmal regions. Sir James Clark Ross, R. N., dredging in 270 fathoms, lat. $73^{\circ} 03' S.$, lon. $176^{\circ} 06' E.$, reports "*Coralines*, *Flustra* and a variety of invertebrate animals," and further in the same paragraph says: "Although contrary to the general belief of naturalists, I have no doubt that, from however great a depth we may be enabled to bring up the mud and stones of the bed of the ocean, we shall find them teeming with animal life,"—a prediction that has been amply fulfilled. In regard to the same cruise, J. D. Hooker says that in lat. $33^{\circ} 32' S.$, lon. $167^{\circ} 40' E.$, living specimens of *Hornera frondosa*, four other corals, an *annelid*, a *dictyopia*, etc., were brought from 400 fathoms, besides which many infusoria and other evidences of life at 1,000 fathoms; and an unsigned paper claims that during Sir John Franklin's ill-fated expedition, the dredge was used at 300 fathoms; a depth evidently believed by the writer to have been unprecedented. In this he was in error, as the cases cited above will show.

The time was now ripe for true exploration, for scientists all over the world became interested in the strange new universe of water. In 1851, Michael Sars, a Norwegian, published a list of 13 species of living organisms from 300 fathoms. His son, G. O. Sars, aided the father in this work, and in 1864 he himself published a list of 92 species whose habitat lay between 200 and 300 fathoms beneath the surface. The collections made by these two have been of more service to science, though somewhat indirectly, than have many of ten times their size. For among those who saw them was Sir C. Wyville Thomson, and, gazing on those strange forms of life, he found food for much reflection. A mind like his needed no second hint, and at once he interested his friend, Dr. Carpenter, then a vice-president of the Royal Society, and enlisted his influence with the Admiralty to such purpose that the gunboat "Lightning" was put at the service of Thomson and his ally. The craft was ill adapted to the work, but it was a beginning, and a cruise was made off the northern shores of Scotland in 1868. The main object of this cruise was to determine, if possible, the effect of pressure on animal life at great depths, and the results of the diminution of light, besides

a number of minor problems. The cruise was successful, despite the unsuitableness of the vessel. It was shown that life was abundant at 650 fathoms, and that consequently Forbes' zero did not exist—at least, anywhere near the depth suggested by him. The prevalent idea that beneath a certain level the temperature was uniform was found to be an error, and a distinct oceanic circulation was discovered, in which currents of water at 2° C. were found quite near currents of a high temperature. Finally it was seen that a large proportion of deep sea forms were of new genera and species, thus opening a new world to the zoologist and botanist. Many of these new found organisms are identical with those of tertiary fossils or are sufficiently allied with them to explain some riddles and help clear up some of the problems of geology.

In the mean time, a battle was being waged over the organisms dredged from great depths. Among them were many *Rhizopods*, the most abundant being *Globigerina* and *Orbulina universa*. The first is a complex shell, like several spheres fastened together but communicating by a minute passage, to which the class owes the name *Foraminifera*. The second is a tiny perforated sphere, through the holes in which the protoplasm can be protruded and withdrawn. In parts of the ocean, these are so abundant that their shells or external skeletons make a peculiar sort of mud, called an "ooze," that covers vast tracts. As this ooze is found in abysmal depths, far below the assumed limit of life, it was suggested that the organisms had lived on the surface but had sunk to the bottom after death. Specimens were forwarded to Professors Ehrenberg of Berlin and Bailey of West Point, but these two high authorities disagreed; the former holding that, as the dead *Globigerina* was much heavier than its bulk of water and there was no reason to think that life altered this, the probability was that they had lived where found; but Bailey held that they more probably lived at or near the surface and sank after death. With a view to deciding the point, specimens were submitted to Prof. Huxley from those collected by Capt. Dayman of the "Cyclops" in 1857, who inclined to the view that they lived where found, though admitting it to be far from proven.

The question was soon settled in a manner simple and conclusive. A telegraphic cable was laid in 1857 through the Mediterranean between Sardinia and Bona, off the coast of Africa. It

failed completely in 1860, and the task of picking it up and remedying its defects was intrusted to Mr. Fleeming Jenkin, C. E., afterward Professor of Engineering in the University of Edinburgh. The cable had broken in seventy fathoms, but the sea end traversed a wide submerged valley of nearly 2,000 fathoms. When this was recovered, it was found to be covered with marine growths, many of which must have fastened on the cable while young and grown to maturity on it. Now at 2,000 fathoms the pressure approximates a ton and a half per square inch, yet Professor Allman, F. R. S., gives a list of fifteen forms, including the *ova* of a cephalopod, that had affixed themselves to the cable. The *ova* show, not merely that comparatively high organisms can survive this enormous pressure, but that they can fulfill the highest function of organisms, that of reproduction. M. Alphonse Milne-Edwards also prepared a paper and read it before the Academy of Sciences on July 15, 1861, in which he described the organisms found on the cable below 1,000 fathoms. One of them was a hitherto undescribed coral, to which he gave the descriptive name of *Thalassio trochus telegraphicus*.

As soon as it was settled indisputably that the organisms dredged from on or near the bottom of the sea lived where found, Professor Thomson again brought pressure to bear on the Admiralty for a vessel with which to explore this new realm. Private means avail but little in such an undertaking, and Governmental aid is essential, and it is a matter for congratulation that H. M. Surveying Ship "Porcupine" was commissioned on March 18, 1869, and ordered to be equipped for deep sea dredging. The "Porcupine," though small, was admirably adapted to its purpose, and her officers—Capt. Calver, Staff Commander Inskip, Lieutenant Browning and Mr. Davidson—aided the scientific staff with an intelligence and zeal that went far toward making the cruise an unqualified success.

During these years a discussion was going on among biologists that was of the greatest interest, scientific and otherwise, to scientists as well as to many without that category. The researches of Pasteur, Lister and others had shown putrefaction, suppuration and fermentation to be due to the action of living organisms, and much interest attached to the origin of these beings. A large school, led by Bastian, held that life could be spontaneously generated, and this they asserted to be proven by experiment. It was

claimed that it was a logical necessity of the theory of evolution, and that the dogma "*omne vivum ex vivo*" was fatal to evolution as a complete system. Tyndall and other careful experimenters destroyed their claim to experimental demonstration, and the doctrine of "abiogenesis" was falling to pieces, when unexpected aid came to it.

In dredging at the bottom of the Bay of Biscay, Thomson and Carpenter found a soft, gelatinous matter that appeared to be alive. It was like protoplasm, but was capable of indefinite increase in size, was not nucleated, nor did it reproduce itself; but it was thought to eat, move, and be sensitive. Huxley had seen it in 1868, and, in 1872, Bessels obtained it on the unfortunate "Polaris," but, on the other hand, the "Challenger" failed to secure it. Says Thomson:

"If the mud (containing it) be shaken with weak spirit of wine, fine flakes separate like coagulated mucus, and if a little of the mud in which this viscid condition is most marked be placed in a drop of sea water under the microscope, we can usually see after a time, an irregular network of matter resembling white of egg, distinguishable by its maintaining its outline and not mixing with the water. This network may be seen gradually altering in form, and entangled granules and foreign bodies change their relative positions. The gelatinous matter is, therefore, capable of a certain amount of movement, and there can be no doubt that it manifests the phenomena of a very simple form of life."

To this supposed being Huxley gave the name of "*Bathybius haeckelii*," and it was greeted with a flourish of trumpets by the materialistic faction. It was claimed to be inorganic matter in the very act of becoming organized, and to demonstrate that life was but a question of molecular arrangement. Huxley wrote a paper in support of these views, but the rejoicing was short lived. Biogenesis did not yield without a struggle, and a few experiments destroyed the *Bathybius*. It was noticed that it was seen only in alcoholic preparations, and it was next observed that when alcohol was poured into sea water a precipitate of calcium sulphate is thrown down that presents every appearance of the so-called *Bathybius*. The calcareous plates and other features that had been so carefully studied, and that had been so bewildering from their endless variations, proved to be accidental inclosures, and the mystery stood explained. As soon as Professor Huxley became convinced of his error, he admitted that he had been led astray and, in his discussion with Bastian, showed himself one of

the staunchest advocates of biogenesis and did as much as did anyone to establish the truth that all life springs from life.

From this time, the seas have been thoroughly explored, and so many expeditions have gone forth that it is impossible to sketch each one, however lightly. There is one that is as yet unique in the annals of science and some mention must be made of it, not only because of the perfect manner in which those actually engaged in the cruise performed their part, but also on account of the thorough and scientific way in which the reports and collections have been utilized. This expedition is that of the famous "Challenger."

The work of the "Lightning" and the "Porcupine" had thoroughly aroused the leading scientific men of England to the importance of marine life. The objections of the Admiralty, if any had existed, had been overcome, and, in 1872, H. M. S. "Challenger," a corvette of some 2,300 tons displacement, was put in commission for a three years' cruise. She sailed on December 21, 1872, and returned on May 26, 1876. It is safe to say that no expedition that has ever sailed has added so materially to the world's stock of knowledge, both by destroying errors and accumulating truths. The expedition was under the scientific supervision of Sir C. Wyville Thomson, who also undertook the publication of the scientific reports after his return. The task proved too much for his strength, and failing health forced his retirement some months before his death, which occurred in March, 1882, an event that was lamented by the whole scientific world.

The University of Edinburgh volunteered to care for the specimens sent home from time to time, and as each consignment reached its destination the cases were unpacked and the contents examined and compared with the accompanying catalogue, after which the bottles and other containers were replaced in the original boxes. It is convincing evidence of the great skill of the naturalists on board that of the thousands of bottles but three were broken, not a single specimen was lost, and very few suffered from leakage or from evaporation of the spirit in which they were preserved.

On the return of the vessel a question arose as to the disposition of the vast store of material, and whether the preparation of the reports should be confined to British naturalists. A liberal

policy prevailed, and eminent men from all over the world co-operated in producing a set of reports that is a veritable encyclopedia of the sea and its coasts. The official reports fill forty-eight large volumes, of which zoology has forty; botany, two; physics and chemistry, two; the "narrative," three; and one is devoted to a general summary of results. This set seems to cover the ground quite thoroughly, but besides the reports the books, monographs and articles based on this celebrated expedition are fairly innumerable.

This cruise added to science fourteen new species of birds, 250 new species of fishes, thirty-two varieties of cuttlefish, forty-nine new species in one order of the holothurians or sea cucumbers, and thousands of new Radiolarians. Eight out of fifteen known insects that walk on water were found by the "Challenger," and our knowledge of relationships between classes of organisms made much more complete. Indeed, the history of thalassography may be divided into two eras—before the "Challenger" and after it.

Were any description of later expeditions attempted this paper would be far too long, but the excellent work of American investigators cannot be overlooked. The Navy Department, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Fish Commission and individuals working in behalf of the Smithsonian Institution, have done admirable work that is equal to any done abroad, and private funds have supplied means by which much has been accomplished. Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Johns Hopkins and other colleges have working laboratories on our coast, or in the Bahama Islands, that rival the famous zoological station at Naples, and with the present interest in "the sea and all that therein is" the time may come when the boast of Pliny will be true.

CHARLES MINOR BLACKFORD, JR.

PRINCE VON BISMARCK—II.

BY EMILIO CASTELAR.

V.

“WE have thirty-four kings,” said Heine, “and we all call fatherland those kingdoms which belong to them by divine right.” To simplify this almost feudal régime by reducing to a common denominator these various fractions, and building up, if not a single state, at least one which should become predominant and constitute itself the guiding star of the group, what a splendid task for a statesman of Bismarck’s courage and power! To this task he devoted himself, and then followed the most brilliant period of his life and history, that dating from his preparations for war with Austria and coming down to the time when he was making ready for the inevitable conflict with France. I know of no greater prodigy of skill than that then displayed by him. The rout of the Austrians was indeed a portentous event in Bismarck’s career, following, as it did, so closely after he had been grievously defeated in the popular branch of Parliament, where he was supported by but thirty-six deputies—a miserable fraction better adapted to follow a petty political chieftain than a leader such as he.

However, having induced Austria to associate herself with him in his design for the seizure of the Danish duchies, he assumed a feigned humility toward that power as long as the work was in progress, but once completed and when he found himself no longer in need of assistance, he turned upon his quondam ally with fierce arrogance and dealt her a well-nigh fatal wound.

He had a thorough contempt for the idea, at that time prevalent in Germany, that a war between the two great branches of the German people would be little better

than fratricidal. He did not hurry the preparations for his enterprise; in fact, he spent five years in perfecting his plans, but no sooner were they fully matured than he struck at his enemy with lightning-like rapidity. The war lasted but a few days, and a single battle sufficed to decide the contest between Prussia and Austria. So brilliant and startling was the victory which crowned Bismarck's work—the expulsion from the Germanic confederation of the ancient and imperial protector of the Teutonic peoples, a work undertaken in opposition to everybody's advice and carried to a successful conclusion in spite of every obstacle—that the achievement will ever live in human annals as an example of what can be accomplished by a tenacious will; above all, when this has for its object the realization of a fecund and progressive ideal.

Such a stupendous feat cannot be judged from outside—from the standpoint of the anatomic cabinet of an impassive historian who coldly studies a cold skeleton. Such a critic having no relations with real personalities, is incapable of understanding the creations of others, and neither reflection nor study will ever enable him to appreciate and comprehend Bismarck. It is owing precisely to this, that the opinions of so celebrated a writer as Taine carry so little weight, as they are simply formulated by a professor for those who, comfortably seated by their library fire-side, give themselves over to the study of personages long since dead—the protagonists of ancient history, entities who at one time lived in the cosmic fires of revolution or took part in the apocalyptic battles of empire. Who can form an idea of the living lion of the desert by studying the desiccated lion of the museum? Vico, formulating historical judgment, says: "We can only know that which we have caused; so God, who is the great cause of all things, knows all things." I would add to this, that we know only through suffering; hence everyone who has revealed something to us is a martyr, and all redemption comes to us through the immolation of a redeemer. Only those who planned and succeeded in accomplishing Italian unity, as did Cavour or Ratazzi, or who, like Mazzini or Crispi, conspired for half a century, or who, like Garibaldi, destroyed absolutism; or who, like Lincoln, emancipated the slaves—only these can realize what it must have cost to establish German unity on the foundations of a defeated Austria, surrounded and but-

tressed as the latter was in her historic fortress by arms and superstitions eager to rush to her defence. The battle of Sadowa was simply the final consequence in logical sequence of religious reform; of the Treaty of Westphalia; of the philosophic and political movement initiated by Frederick the Great; of those two revolutions whose forces Prussia combated and in the end accepted; of the universal French Revolution of 1789; and, finally, of the German National Revolution of 1848. Bismarck might well feel satisfied with his work.

VI.

I have said that Bismarck's work was founded upon contradictions or antinomies. From the time of his access to power to the time of his triumph over Austria, these contradictions, like the antinomies of Hegel, are reconcilable only in synthesis; while, from the hour of victory over Austria to the time of his fall from power, they are as irreconcilable as are the antinomies of Kant. The great philosopher, upon seeing the destruction, as he supposed, of the cardinal principle upon which the universe is founded, namely, pure reason, formulated his theory of practical reason, and thus found a way out of his difficulties; but Bismarck was not so fortunate, for, after Sadowa, whether in his domestic or foreign policy, he did nothing but entangle and involve himself more and more each day, wandering, as it were, within the limits of an immense and continual contradiction.

The unity of his country having been established by the Treaty of Prague, it might reasonably have been supposed that a secure foundation had been laid for progress, and that no obstacles would henceforth be put in its path. Dominated, however, by that spirit of contradiction, as strong within him as it was in that German of the Germans, Robert the Devil, he showed himself to be under the influence of two contrary forces of which he was the product, and he proceeded to put the seal of reaction on his own work. The unity of Germany, accomplished with the aid or at least with the acquiescence of the French, it was not to be supposed that Italy and Prussia should become aggrandized by the initiative of France while the latter was to be confined strictly to her own limits. Irreducible antinomies—either France must be strengthened without detriment to Germany, or Germany must retain what she had gained, without, however, becoming an

offence or a danger to France. Bismarck proposed to gather into one group, and form into a union, the South German States; this union to bind itself not to pass beyond the limits of the Main and to engage to incorporate its army with that of the North. Prussia was to be the tutelar genius of the whole. She was to proclaim universal suffrage and would compel the feudalists themselves to support it. Then Bismarck proposed to have Prussia continue ancient feudalism by establishing it upon the waves of this same universal suffrage, building a castle as it were in the ocean. He proposed all this, and further, to impose upon so progressive and democratic a State as United Germany, the forms and processes of the conquerors and of the conquest; to divert Austrian ambitions toward the Slavonic races of the South, and thus embroil her with Russia, who had similar ambitions herself; to reconcile a king of so-called divine origin and of absolutist tendency with a parliament modeled upon that of Great Britain; subsidize socialism and formulate laws for it, and then declare a state of siege against the socialists; seek for religious peace and at the same time promulgate the Cæsar-like May laws of 1873 against the Catholic clergy. All this he proposed to himself, and then in his infatuation he attempts, in alliance with Dr. Döllinger and the Old Catholics, to form a new church, only to find himself shortly afterwards going humbly to Canossa to sue for pardon, offering in consideration the revocation of the May laws.

We next find him threatening the Papacy and treating it with terrible irreverence, which does not prevent him, however, from submitting to Papal arbitration and bowing to the Pope's decision in the colonial disputes between Spain and Germany; then we see him seeking to wound Russia by vetoing the Treaty of San Stefano, and to favor England and Austria by handing over to the one the Island of Cyprus and to the other Bosnia, without its ever occurring to him that Russia might seek to retaliate by entering into a close alliance with France. We have him seizing Metz and Striasburg under the pretence that this would conduce to preserve European peace; and he who sought to destroy Austria is found declaring that that power's existence is indispensable for the safety of Germany, and that she is providential in history as the protector of the incipient States of the Danube. Subsequently he plans and forms the Triple Alliance for the sake, he tells us, of European stability, and he compels the

partners to arm themselves to the teeth, thus ruining Italy and drawing from Germany the last drop of sweat for the purpose of filling the voracious coffers of the army chest. He fomented the hereditary principle by putting kings before all human institutions; but he has no scruple in embittering the last hours of the Emperor Frederick, and he turns angrily from the latter toward William II., in whom he sees nothing but a simple pupil to be managed as a puppet; only, however, to find in him a master who was soon to show that he, Bismarck, was not the Alpha and Omega of all created things. To the youthful Emperor was reserved the task of solving the great Chancellor's many contradictions by simply suppressing, as a useless cipher, the contradictor himself, and sending him into retirement.

In the midst of so many contradictions in the great statesman's character there are three which stand out prominently—one is displayed in his domestic policy, a second in his foreign policy and a third in his treatment of questions affecting one and the other. The contradiction in the first of these may be seen in his treatment of German socialism, while that in his foreign policy is exemplified in his dealings with Russia; the third of these contradictions being shown in his treatment of Rome.

To a statesman devoid of such contradictions, it would never occur to combat liberal political economy as out of fashion; to be in continual conference with Lasalle and seek to associate the latter with his work; to conceive German royalty as a patriarchy founded for the benefit of the poor; to pile law upon law and regulation upon regulation with no other result than to add to the fiscal estimates a burden of taxation and a load of misery, and to punish with violence and by useless measures the inevitable awakening from illusions which he himself had propagated and fomented.

Still more glaring was the Bismarckian contradiction as seen in the Chancellor's relations with Russia.

Some time ago I said in one of my Parliamentary speeches, that from about the year 1850 to 1859 there were premonitions of war between France and Austria; from the year 1859 to 1866 of war between Austria and Prussia; from 1866 to 1870 of war between Prussia and France, and from 1870 to 1877 of war between Russia and Turkey, just as from the time of the Treaty of Berlin to the present day there have been threats of war between Rus-

sia and Germany. Smiles of incredulity greeted this declaration, which, however, is based upon the most commonplace prevision.

Never were two dynasties more closely bound together than the imperial houses of Germany and Russia; and on the other hand, never was there a more implacable hatred than that existing between the Russian and German peoples. One has but to look at the princes of the Muscovite dynasty to see, at a glance, how close is the consanguinity between them and the princes of the German imperial family; in a word, they are all Germans. But on the other hand, one need but look at a Russian and a German, to see that the former has been grafted from the full Tartar to the Slavonic stock, while the latter is of the pure Aryan root. The Russian princes have maintained such an affection for the fatherland from which they sprang that for a long time the ruling ministers of state, the court chamberlains and the officers of the household guard were compelled by necessity to use the tongue spoken between the Rhine and the Vistula, or they had to belong, through some branch of their families, to the Teutonic stock. Under these circumstances, the Germans saw in themselves, as it were, a conquering and official race—the rulers of a conquered and servile empire. So dominant, in fact, was this Germanic influence that the Emperor Nicholas had for his Chancellor (that is to say during our own times), a man who could neither speak nor understand the Russian language. German blood, diffused by great Empresses through the race of the Romanoffs, became still more common by reason of the custom deeply ingrained in the latter, of allying themselves with German princesses, who exercised so powerful a social influence that they were able to secure the adoption of laws eminently favorable to the condition of woman, thus giving a token and sign of their unquestioned superiority. And these princesses, so manifestly superior, educated as they had been in cities which were the very focus of science and poetry (especially in the last century), brought to the throne of the Czars, together with the nostalgia of a fatherland, the firm resolution to rear and educate their offspring in a love for that Germany which was so dear to them. While the Russian dynasty, therefore, entertains for Germany an honest and honorable friendship, the Russian people, on their side, feel for that country nothing but implacable hatred. In their pride, common to all nations which have a long life before them and but a short history to

look back upon, they detest the people to whom they owe what little culture they possess. The pure Muscovites, the guardians of the national thought, believe that the blending of the Slavonic and the Tartar races represents a purer blood than that of the Teuton, just as the Teuton in the beginning of modern history believed that the old tree of the Latin Empire and the Latin race could only renew its life by the pure sap injected into it by the tribes wandering on the foggy plains of the north.

The Russians have an abiding faith in the superiority of that civilization which was originally represented by cities purely Muscovite, like holy Moscow; defended by heroes like Ivan the Terrible, and consecrated by such a church as the Orthodox, which unites the genius of Europe with the genius of Asia; and this faith in their peculiar civilization is strengthened by the illusions common to a love of country, thus forming, as it were, a magnificent monument erected by a race which believes itself to be the elect of heaven and to be predestined to a brilliant future. This marvellous work of history found itself, at the time of Peter the Great, interrupted and almost smothered beneath the vast pile of documents heaped upon it by German bureaucracy, and as a result Moscow fell, the holy Synod expired, Russian originality became extinct, the patriarchal empire was converted into an autocracy, the militant church became a bureau, the free and original life of the Slav and Cossack, who had found themselves providentially united on the boundless steppes for the purpose of saving and regenerating the world, became simply a German parody. Such was the Muscovite idea, and it went still further—the Russian believed that, in like manner as the civil law of Rome sought to found a race superior to any which had previously existed—a race which should be purer in sentiment, nearer to nature and better fitted for liberty; so the social problem of the modern world required a race like the Slavonic, the only one capable of facing and solving it; and the solution was to come through free and ample municipal government as patriarchal as that enjoyed by the Asiatic tribes and as progressive as that of any European state. Animated by such sentiments as these, the patriotic Russian hated to see his Czar—already too absolute—adopt the despotism of the German; he hated to see the Synod—already too official—assume the form of German bureaucracy; and to see in the staff of the army the German officers supreme.

St. Petersburg, to him, represented nothing but the city of the conquerors; and in all modern life, from the time of Peter the Great to the present day, he simply sees a vile parody of the customs and institutions which, according to his ideas, have made the Western nations thoroughly adapted for war and conquest, but have totally unfitted them for natural liberty and political progress.

Statesmen, bureaucrats and military men are accustomed to forming their combinations without ever giving a thought to the poet who gives his country a poem, to the publicist who writes a pamphlet, or to the historian who records a deed. They resemble the husbandman who sows the seed without knowing what inclemencies or what favors heaven has in store for his crops, or whence came the cloud which watered or the hail storm which destroyed his beloved fields. That strophe of the poet, that word of the orator and that idea of the philosopher—all these are lost sight of in the whirlwind of practical politics, the most impure of all the impurities contained in this living reality; but still they take possession of the people in some mysterious way, just as the living germs of certain plants are carried by the wind and fall with vivifying force upon other plants far distant; and they awake sentiments heretofore dormant, but now springing to life and setting in motion the greatest and loftiest enterprises.

Hence, while Emperors and Chancellors sought to form a close alliance with Germany, the Russian people cursed the project; and here again Bismarck made the mistake of supposing that the court could vanquish the people, but that the people could never vanquish the court. As a matter of fact, the Russian people have recently triumphed over the court; and, strangely enough, they have been assisted in their work by two very opposite forces—by the Nihilists, who some years ago assassinated the Czar, and by his successor, who brought to the throne a character and principles of a distinctly Muscovite type. Thus it is that Germany finds herself between the Russian and the French, or, as one might say, between the hammer and the anvil.

A like perplexity and uncertainty plagued Bismarck in his treatment of the Catholic question. In 1873, after a furious combat with the church, supposing that he could suppress Catholicism by a *coup d'état*, he attempted to subject the very soul of the people to coercive laws; but, ten years later on,

we find him rising in the German legislature to declare that the State was powerless to oppose ideas, hence that all measures adopted for and aimed at the conscience must necessarily prove abortive. And the same thing which happened to him in the ecclesiastical question arising out of the May laws, befell him in the military question arising out of the conquest of Alsace and Lorraine. Bismarck's profound genius enabled him to quickly understand what a grave mistake it was to retain Metz and Strasburg, the two cities beloved beyond all others by France, and loving her beyond all else in return. But he permitted an oligarchy of victorious generals to impose their own and the national will upon him; and, failing in sufficient resolution to oppose them, he proceeded to devour the bitter fruit of moral defeat. As long as Alsace and Lorraine are retained from France, Europe will know no peace; and as restoration to their nationality is but an act of simple justice, these provinces will some day be returned to their rightful owner; notwithstanding the regrettable weakness displayed by the Chancellor in his attitude toward German military leaders.

Bismarck committed a similar error in his colonial policy. How many shameful defeats he sustained in his ambitious designs to make Germany a colonial power! After having moved heaven and earth to acquire territories on the Dark Continent, he found himself compelled to exchange an empire in Zanzibar for an insignificant islet in the German Ocean.

His experience was similar in regard to his personal power, so tenaciously and persistently defended by him against all and everything. He championed the old principle of the imperial will as the basis of the State and as the foundation of the law, regarding the legislature as simply a consulting body. He made the Kaisers his gods and he flattered them to such an extent that he was able to induce them to seize the crown from the altar and place it upon their own heads as though by divine right. But there came a day when imperial power, in order to assert its assumed divinity and omnipotence, sacrificed upon its altars no less a victim than the Chancellor himself.

EMILIO CASTELAR.

BISMARCK AND MOTLEY.—WITH CORRESPONDENCE TILL NOW UNPUBLISHED.

BY JAMES PEMBERTON GRUND.

WHEN I found myself in Berlin, several years ago, as the correspondent of a great American newspaper, I felt that to leave Berlin without having had an interview with the "Iron Chancellor" would mean that my mission had been a failure. No journal at that time had obtained an interview from the Prince for twelve years—not since M. de Blowitz had performed his memorable feat of securing in advance a copy of the Berlin Treaty before its ratification for publication in the *Times*. I had been presented to the Chancellor a short time before his retirement, but as at that time his relations with his imperial master were rather strained, he declined to discuss politics. After he had gone to Friedrichsruh, the labor question in Europe entered upon an acute phase, and it was thought that the First of May would not pass without trouble in any one of the great cities of Europe. Through the kindness of Count Herbert Bismarck, I obtained permission to visit his illustrious father at Friedrichsruh about the middle of April, in order to obtain from him his view on the Labor Question, and more particularly the end, aim and probable result of the socialistic agitation then carried on with feverish activity in every country of the civilized world.

I had had the honor of meeting Count Herbert Bismarck many years before that time—when he was a student at the University of Bonn. The Chancellor received me very graciously and granted me an interview on the subject of socialism in which, as was his wont, he disdained the artificial aspect of the question altogether and went at once to the very essence of it, tearing out the heart of his subject, of which he knew every detail. He took me for a two hours' drive with him on the second day of my

arrival—not along the highway, but along the rough roads cut through the woods. This was thought to benefit his digestion. He talked of socialism almost the whole time without a pause. Never once was his memory at fault, either with regard to places or people or their actions. Nor was there lack of anecdote to make the tale more living. Of Lasalle, whom he had known in his youth, he said: “A great vanity, but greater knowledge. The best talker I ever listened to. Had he lived, he would have become a conservative—at least he would never have remained a socialist.” The guilds of the master workmen in the Middle Ages that placed the handicraftsman in a position to be envied by his descendants of to-day, the Chancellor summed up in a single sentence as “an aristocracy of labor.” The present struggle for existence and the law of the survival of the fittest was in the ex-Chancellor’s opinion a necessary condition of modern life. “If it ever came to an end,” he observed, “there would be a deadlock of human action, of human activity, which is not the intention of Divine Providence. Such a condition of affairs is, moreover, only possible where slavery exists, as in Africa—where it has existed ever since the world had a history—or in the thousand isles of the Southern Pacific Ocean, where man, when he is hungry, has but to put forth his hand to pluck the fruit from the tree. But our modern progress and civilization is produced by the friction of human competition. If society wishes to secure peace it must always be ready to fight for it.” Speaking of the politicians who coquette with socialism in order to obtain votes, he said: “They do not keep before their minds the image of what society would be when dominated by the least instructed and intelligent portion of the population, whose ignorance is easily led by any eloquent liar, who supplies them with the most liberal promises at the cheapest rates. The mob needs flatterers, as much as, or more than, any sultan.”

The Prince was not disposed to make light of the spectre of socialism. “Troubles ahead caused by the Labor Question,” he continued, “are more imminent than foreign wars. We are riding a steeplechase over an unknown country.” The Chancellor, in conclusion, said that all reasonable demands of the workingmen for the improvement of their condition were sure to be realized by means of workingmen’s suffrages without a lapse into political chaos.

The life at the castle was simple—the table plentiful and exquisite. The Chancellor had always been fond of the good things of this life and his iron constitution had not only enabled him to withstand the ill effects of early excesses—but to carry a moderate enjoyment of the pleasures of tobacco, wine, and the table into an advanced period of his existence. In the morning everyone had coffee or tea, toast and eggs in his or her room—the Chancellor himself taking two eggs to his share without any liquid refreshment of any kind. About ten o'clock, when the visitors began to drift into the dining room, the Chancellor sat at the head of the table, chatting, glancing at the newspapers and sipping a pint of still Moselle, unaccompanied by any solid refreshment. Beside his arm-chair lay the two great dogs, *Thyras*, the gift of the young Kaiser, and *Rebecca*. For many years, dating from his student days, successive dogs of the Chancellor's have borne the names *Thyras* and *Rebecca*. There was always a *Thyras* at Varzin or Friedrichsruh with a *Rebecca* to keep him company.

After the pint bottle of Moselle and the chat—wherein the Chancellor never became didactic, but allowed everyone his say—only when he added his comments to a remark it seemed in every instance amplified, clarified and explained in the light of his own powerful and comprehensive intellect—he went out for a walk. A great charm of his talk was the simple direct way in which he treated of subjects he had mastered, or great events in which he had taken part. Nothing elaborate, no striving after effect. All discussed in a plain, easy style; all the more graphic because it was so simple. He was a great naturalist—a great botanist—a great farmer; like Goethe, “he understood trees,” and the nature of various animals, wild or domestic. While walking he talked—or rather thought aloud—and nothing he said seemed trivial, even when he discussed some very simple every-day matter. He was sure to find some striking side in the thing itself, or in its relation to other things in this world, and proved this to you in a couple of crisp sentences.

He did me the honor on one or two occasions to allow me to accompany him in these little walks. One day we saw on a rustic bench a quantity of feathers and some blood, the remains of some small member of the feathered tribe, made a meal of by a hungry bird of prey. “How much useless cruelty there is in this world,” he observed, “the hawk devoured the breast of that bird while it was yet alive.”

When the Prince reached a spot on the bank of a little stream on the far side of which were a couple of mills belonging to him, the Prince took a seat on a rustic bench, with the two great dogs at his feet. I happened to speak of a picture hanging in the drawing-room at the castle, showing the famous "Death-Ride," as the Prussians call it, of the First Dragoon Guards (now Queen Victoria's Own) on August 16, 1870, at Mars-la-Tour; in which both the Chancellor's sons took part. Count Herbert was severely wounded in the thigh. Count William's horse was shot under him. But I will endeavor to tell the story of the part his sons took in that famous charge as the Chancellor told it to me.

"Both my sons were present in the famous cavalry charge of August 16," said the Chancellor, "and my son Herbert received there a bullet wound through the leg, from which he has never completely recovered, and which has at times been aggravated by his tendency to abuse his remarkable faculty for work. He received no regular medical care on the field, the only one who looked after him then being a veterinary surgeon, a Swiss. The wound remained open for a considerable period, and from time to time pieces of leather were ejected that had been carried into the wound by the bullet.

"My other son, William, was but a few hundred yards from the French front, when his horse was shot through the hoof and fell across the sheath of his sabre so as to prevent his getting up. He managed, however, to cut the leather thongs holding the scabbard to his belt, and not only regained his feet, but managed to make his horse get up. No sooner had he done this than the French line fired a volley, from the effects of which he sheltered himself behind his horse. He was making off for his life, as the French spared none who took part in the charge, when his attention was attracted to a wounded dragoon of his regiment, who shouted to him, 'Save me!' My son seized him and managed to lift him up and sling him across the saddle. So they proceeded until they reached a ditch; when the horse fell for a second time and it was impossible to make him get up again. So my son was compelled to abandon his steed and the wounded trooper to their fate. When he looked at his horse for the last time he counted eight bullet holes in the animal's body.

"Besides the shot in his thigh, my son Herbert was struck by another bullet in the chest and his life was saved in rather a re-

markable manner. When his regiment was under marching orders, I told him that it would be a pity, in case he were wounded, for a handsome gold watch he carried to fall into the hands of the French. So I made him give it to me to keep, giving him instead a plain French hunting watch of ebony, as hard as iron and of no great value. This was struck by the bullet, which deviated from its course, otherwise my boy must have perished."

During the course of this conversation, the Prince, in alluding to the necessity of being beforehand with an enemy, whether in politics or war, said: "When you see his hand in his pocket, put your own on your pistol; when you hear him cocking, fire!"

Of the value of an English alliance he said: "The enormous fleet of England makes her a valuable ally. It is always in her power—by making a naval demonstration on the coasts of a power at war with her—to compel that power to divide its forces to guard its line of seaboard from attack."

In speaking of the fall of a great minister, he said: "It is always a fool's work when you are called upon to assume responsibility for acts in which you had no share."

I have known three private secretaries of Prince Bismarck. The first was Herr von Rottenburg, who was in his service at the time he ceased to be Imperial Chancellor, but did not follow his master into retirement, though he has since then been several times his guest at Friedrichsruh. Herr von Rottenburg is now a Secretary of State and the son-in-law of the late Mr. William Walter Phelps, at one time Minister of the United States in Berlin. Lothar Bucher, a man who played a leading part in German politics when he was an advanced Liberal, or, more truly stated, an extreme Radical or Socialist of the school of Ferdinand Lasalle, of whose last will and testament he was executor, was his successor. He became the convert to Conservatism that Prince Bismarck said Lasalle himself would have been if he had lived. With his change of opinion, the great personal influence of Prince Bismarck had, no doubt, a great deal to do; but it is a curious fact that it was Bucher's long residence in England after the events of 1848, that brought home to him the conviction that parliamentary government is a failure, and that "the talk of the tribunes" could do nothing to bring about German unity.

And that is exactly where the shoe pinches, and that is why Herr Eugen Richter, the Freisinnigs, and Herr Leibknecht and Herr Bebel, the Socialists, were so bitter against the Chancellor. He accomplished the work they lamentably failed in, by employing methods of his own with which theirs had nothing in common.

Lothar Bucher expressed his acquired convictions in a book entitled "*Der Parlamentarismus wie er ist*," (Parliamentarianism as it is.) After that his old friends among the German Radicals would have nothing more to do with him, and he accepted a position in the Foreign Office.

Lothar Bucher, now gathered to his fathers, was a little man, of manners and appearance quaint enough to have delighted Charles Dickens. Very short and slight, almost as diminutive as the late Herr Windthorst, with a queer, puckered up little face, all wrinkles, and the shrewdest, kindest, bright blue eyes imaginable.

We took a walk together one morning. Among the features of Friedrichsruh is a hedge, or rather wall, of pine and fir trees surrounding the Castle and the grounds in such a manner as to protect the inmates from the biting blasts of autumn from which ever quarter they may come. Every variety of the pine is represented, and it seems there are several hundred of them; whenever I asked Bucher the name of one, he looked carefully at the leaves, plucked one, tasted and smelled it, and if then unable to classify it, which was seldom, said, with a little sigh, "I must ask the Prince." Bucher was a fine botanist and practical farmer himself, and told me, among other things, that he had experimented with the planting of Indian corn in various parts of Germany, with a view to introducing it to the Fatherland as a new article of diet.

That set us to talking of the United States, of which Bucher spoke with admiration. A people who had brought such a stupendous civil war to a successful conclusion and who had so magnificently developed the resources of the country, must possess the highest qualities. This led us naturally to discuss the Prince's friendship with distinguished Americans, including Bayard Taylor, William Walter Phelps and others; but more especially with the late John Lothrop Motley, Ex-Minister of the United States to London and Vienna and the historian of the "Rise of the

Dutch Republic," who was Prince Bismarck's college "chum," first at Goettingen and then at Berlin, and for whom he cherished a tender regard that lasted until the end of the distinguished American's earthly career.

The Prince had often spoken to Bucher of Motley. "Motley," said Herr Bucher, "went to Goettingen in 1833. He remained there a year. While there he made the acquaintance of Bismarck, known in his student days as 'the mad Junker' (squire) on account of his recklessness, daring, and defiance of University authority. Besides the Prince, the principal friends of Motley at Goettingen were Count Hermann von Keyserling (afterward a great botanist) and Herr von Kanitz, who was later on Prussian Minister at Naples. Both Prince Bismarck and Motley followed the lectures of the great jurist Savigny. After remaining a year at Goettingen Motley went to Berlin. Prince Bismarck did the same and while in the Prussian capital, they lodged in the house of an old gentleman named Logier at No. 161 Friedrichstrasse.

In the admirable collection of letters of John Lothrop Motley, edited by George William Curtis, is one to his mother, dated Berlin, "up one flight of stairs." He speaks of Berlin as "this most right-angled of cities." He was a good republican, even as a boy; and speaks of "Prussian tyranny dealt out in homœopathic doses constantly administered." Of German students he says: "German students are certainly an original and peculiar race of beings, and can be compared to nothing. . . . Their character is a labyrinth out of which I cannot find my way."

The German students have changed a good deal since the thirties. The romantic side of their character has suffered abatement. At that time it was a proper thing for a dandy student to promenade the streets of a University town in a frogged dressing gown, buckskin breeches with jack boots with enormous spurs, an enormous sabre clanking at his heels; a pipe a yard long between his teeth and a monster mastiff (Ulmer) gambolling at his side, whom occasionally, to amuse himself or the passers-by, he made to jump over his stick. To-day the students smoke cigars in the street and the jack boots are reserved for festive occasions. The duels were more frequent and more bloody in the good old times. The duellists did not wear the great wire spectacles to protect their eyes as they do now, so that the sight of a Cyclops among

members of the corps was not unfrequent. A few years after Motley left Goettingen, he gave to the world in a novel, "Morton of Morton's Hope," a vivid picture of German University life as it was then. The German hero of the book is *Otto von Rabensmarck*, a desperate, roystering, swaggering, but high-minded and clever student; and there is little room for doubt that here the young Bismarck sat for his portrait. Rabensmarck in the novel compels the bully of the University to jump over his stick at the word of command, like a dog, in order to avoid fighting a duel to the death, and I have heard that the Prince in his student days did something of the sort. Motley's friends, Kanitz and Keyserling, also figure in the book under thin disguises, as do his two American chums at Goettingen, both of Charleston, S. C., Amory Coffin and Mitchell King.

After the youth who was to become a great statesman and the youth who was to become a great historian had passed two years of university life together, each went his way; one became a country gentleman, the other returned to the United States. They did not meet again until 1855, twenty-two years afterwards. Both had married ladies born and brought up in their immediate neighborhood: Motley, the charming sister of Park Benjamin; Bismarck, the amiable and accomplished Fraulein Johanna von Puttkammer. Both were fortunate enough to marry women singularly gifted intellectually, and with whom they were in perfect sympathy. Motley, in 1855, was passing through Frankfort-on-the-Main, where Bismarck was accredited Prussian Minister to the Diet of the German Confederation (he was appointed in 1851). The Diet was mainly composed of visionaries and wordy triflers, not a man of mark among them, and it was there that Bismarck imbibed that contempt for parliamentary long-windedness that never since then entirely deserted him. A clever man has called the Frankfort Diet "the political toy-shop of Europe," and of the Bund of German States (including Austria), then in a somewhat shaky condition, Heine wrote:

*"O Bund,
Du Hund,
Du bist nicht gesund!"*

In Mr. Curtis's collection of Motley's letters is one to his wife, dated Frankfort, July 27, 1855, in which he describes the renewal of his acquaintance with the old college friend he

had quitted nearly a quarter of a century before. When he called, Bismarck was at dinner, so he left his card and promised to return in half an hour. Motley learned later that as soon as Bismarck received his card he despatched a servant to Motley's hotel, but the servant missed Motley, who had returned to his hotel by another way. "When I came back," Motley continues, "I was received with open arms. I can't express to you how cordially he received me. If I had been his brother instead of an old friend, he could not have shown more warmth and affectionate delight in seeing me. I find I like him even better than I did, and you know how high an opinion I have always expressed of his talents and disposition. He is a man of very noble character and of very great powers of mind."

We like to recall our youth in the faces of friends of our early days, and Bismarck was no exception to the rule. Motley, one of the most charming and distinguished of men, was at once restored to his old place in the heart of his whilom companion and friend.

Motley dined and took luncheon repeatedly with the Bismarcks, and was entertained with an account of the part Bismarck played in the events of 1848. Bismarck was always the staunchest of Royalists—"a Jacobite Squire," as he has described himself to me; while his friend, though of a refined, reserved, and aristocratic temperament, that earned him later on a healthy corps of enemies among his rough-and-ready compatriots, was, by conviction, as well as the impulse of his heart, a Republican, who, to quote his own words, considered "Democracy the climax of political progress and the destiny of advanced races." It is difficult to underestimate the influence two such noble natures must have had in early youth one upon the other—how much of Bismarck's cast-iron prejudices of country and of caste may have softened at the touch of the other, nor how the powerful nature of the German may have modified the sanguine views of human perfectibility and power of self-government entertained by the generous, high-spirited young American.

In another letter to his wife Motley concludes a summary of his friend's great qualities by saying: "Strict integrity and courage of character, a high sense of honor, a firm religious belief, united with remarkable talents, make up necessarily a com-

bination which cannot be found any day in any court, and I have no doubt that he is destined to be Prime Minister, unless his obstinate truthfulness, which is apt to be a stumbling-block for politicians, stands in his way."

A shrewd prophecy to make as long ago as 1855, when few people outside of Germany had even heard the name of Bismarck. His love of truth has indeed been at times the stumbling-block in his way, which only his transcendent ability and determined energy enabled him to shove aside. He despised all matters of convention in his heart of hearts, and for his bluntness received from his colleagues of the Corps, the nickname "the diplomatist in wooden shoes." "He went to office," writes Motley, "with a holy horror of the mysterious nothings of diplomacy, but soon found out how little there was in the whole galimatias."

The two men threshed out the subject of the recent struggles in Europe between throne and people, over their wine, of course from different standpoints, but Motley writes: "I am glad of an opportunity of hearing the other side put by a man whose talents and character I esteem and who so well knows *le dessous des cartes*."

The household arrangements of Prince Bismarck, at least in the country, varied but little from what Motley says of the Frankfurt household. "It is one of those establishments where every earthly thing that can be eaten or drunk is offered you; porter, soda-water, small beer, champagne, burgundy or claret are about all the time, and everybody is smoking the best Havana cigars every minute." The Prince was hospitable as an Arab, and the stranger within his gates, be he humble or great, was looked after as if he were a king. In the country the dinner hour was six, and there was an abundance of the most excellent wines and capital cosmopolitan cooking, English, French, German and even Russian dishes admirably prepared; while at eleven there was a handsome cold collation set out in the dining-room for those who felt equal to eating more.

On the morning of the day before I left Friedrichsruh, I visited the Prince in his own apartments. He was walking up and down the room in a heavy frogged dressing-gown. In the open fire-place, although it was warm weather, fire had been made, while his secretary was busy in sorting the letters from a number of cases and placing them in symmetrical order upon a large table. Now and again the Prince, after glancing through one of these

little packets, would fling them into the flames and watch them until they were consumed. He was destroying the correspondence of a life-time, only reserving the letters to be used in the preparation of his memoirs and a few to which a history attached.

How an autograph hunter would have wept at the sight! The secret thought of warriors and statesmen nobly expressed, signed by the greatest names in Europe, a crackling flame, a little puff of smoke, and then ashes. I don't know why, but it seemed to me one of the saddest sights I ever saw—as if a whole page of history were torn out of the book of the world to disappear forever.

The father of the writer had known and liked Motley when they were both young men and there is a reference or two to him in Motley's published letters. They crossed the ocean on the same sailing vessel when Motley, a boy of eighteen, was on his way to Goettingen. My father described Motley to me as he was then, a slight, delicate stripling, strikingly handsome and somewhat of a dandy. He affected the turn-down collars and the cynicism of Lord Byron, as was in 1832 very much the fashion among the well-bred youth of England and America. He had a very sweet voice and beguiled the few pleasant hours of a very tempestuous voyage by singing to the accompaniment of a guitar—a practice he kept up at the University, when, no doubt, the words

“In good old Colony times
When we lived under a king,”

first struck upon the ear of the Prince. In a letter to his wife written from Frankfort Bismarck asks, “Where did I get that song which has been haunting me the whole day?”

“‘Over the blue mountains,
Over the white sea-foam,
Come, thou beloved one, come,
Come to thy lonely home.’”

“I do not know,” he adds, “who must have sung it to me in ‘auld lang syne.’”

No doubt Motley could have told him.*

The Prince had mentioned Motley's name to me in terms of the greatest admiration, a feeling which I shared. Knowing that my father had known the historian, and my own admiration

* Bismarck referred to the old Colony song in his great Reichstag speech on February 6, 1888, and spoke of having been taught it “by his dear deceased friend, John Motley.”

of his character and works, he paused in his work of burning the letters to hand to me six from John Lothrop Motley to himself, full of clever and original matter, and two of them possessing considerable historical interest. "Take them," he said simply, handing them to me.

I glanced at them, and seeing how important they were, asked if I might use them as the subject of an article.

"Certainly," replied the Prince, "but you must omit anything in them that might give annoyance to any surviving member of my old friend's family."

I promised and took the letters away with me that afternoon. A month later I received a note from Count Herbert Bismarck, enclosing three other letters of Motley's. "Here are three letters of Motley which my father gave me for you, thinking that it would interest you to keep them. They are quite charming and I am sure you will like to add those lines of a distinguished countryman of yours to your collection of autographs."

The first of these letters appears to have been preceded by some short notes subsequent to Motley's visit to the Bismarcks at Frankfort in 1855. It was written a short time after the appointment of Motley as Minister of the United States at Vienna. In it he endeavors to enlist the sympathies of his powerful German friend for the cause of the North, and tries to ascertain the exact nature of the attempts made by Louis Napoleon to induce England to join hands with him in an active intervention in American affairs, or at any rate in the recognition of the Southern States as belligerents. This went so far that in 1862 a motion to recognize the Southern Confederacy was introduced in the British House of Commons and lost. Lord Palmerston was decidedly opposed to it, and there were those in England higher placed even than he, who earnestly desired the success of the North, the emancipation of the blacks, and the continued existence as a united nation of the transatlantic branch of the great Anglo-Saxon family. Thus the attempt of Louis Napoleon failed in spite of the fact that it was supported by almost the whole of the British aristocracy and by a very large and influential portion of the prominent commercial magnates of England, who had suffered seriously in pocket by the long struggle going on across the Atlantic.

When this letter was written, Bismarck was Prussian Minister

in Paris, and the watering place in the south of France here referred to is Biarritz. It was at this time that Bismarck first met the Emperor Napoleon and, with his usual acumen formed at once that estimate of his character by which he was ever afterward governed in his dealings with him. He looked upon him as a very much over-estimated man, and disagreed with all Europe in thinking him not so much a great genius with a bad heart as a man of excellent heart and very ordinary abilities. "Bismarck," writes Motley, "is according to common report to be called to Berlin in the autumn to form a ministry." He recalls that delightful visit to Frankfort eight years before, and wishes to be remembered to Madame Bismarck, whom he has described to his wife as one of the cleverest and most amiable of women.

He then, like a true patriot, takes up the cudgels in defence of his country, menaced by enemies abroad and at home. He sets forth in a few terse sentences the essence of the Monroe doctrine, and intimates that the United States "will resist to the death any interference on the part of Europe." He then begs Bismarck to tell him what he knows with regard to the French Emperor's intrigues against the Northern States, "if he can do so without violating any confidences." He shows his knowledge of England's turning a deaf ear to Napoleon's proposal and enumerates the excellent reasons, practical reasons, that exist for England's holding aloof. But with France it is different. She loves *la Gloire*, the Mexican expedition is on the *tapis*, and Louis Napoleon is what Bismarck has called "the would-be self-appointed manager of the affairs of the world."

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

VIENNA, August 29th, 1862.

MY DEAR BISMARCK: I have been at this point now about eight months, and ever since I came here I have been most desirous of opening communications with you. But for a long time you seemed to be so much on the move between Berlin, Petersburg and Paris, that even if I should succeed in getting a letter to you, it appears doubtful whether I should be lucky enough to receive a reply.

Perhaps I shall be more successful now—for the newspapers inform me that you are in some watering-place in the South of France. So I shall write but a very brief note, merely to express my great desire to hear from you again, and my hope that in an idle moment, if you ever have such, you will send me a line to tell me of yourself, your prosperity, and of your wife and children.

Pray give my sincerest regards to Madame de Bismarck, and allow me to add those of my wife, altho' personally still unknown to you both—alas!

I don't know whether you have observed in any newspapers that I was appointed about a year ago Minister Plenipotentiary, etc., to this court. I arrived here from America about the beginning of November. I much fear that this is the very last place in Europe where I shall ever have the good luck of seeing you. Nevertheless, whether you remain in Paris or go—as seems most likely from all I can gather from private and public sources—to Berlin this autumn, to form a ministry; in either case there is some chance of our meeting, some time or other, while there would have been none so long as you remained in St. Petersburg. Pray let me have a private line from you—you can't imagine how much pleasure it will give me. My meeting with you in Frankfort, and thus renewing the friendship of our youth, will remain one of the most agreeable and brightest chapters in my life. And it is painful to think that already that renewed friendship is beginning to belong to the past—and that year after year is adding a fold to the curtain.

However, you *must* write to me, and tell me where we can all meet next summer, if no sooner. I wish you would let me know whether and how soon you are to make a cabinet in Berlin. Remember that when you write to me, it is as if you wrote to some one in the planet Jupiter. *Personally*, I am always deeply interested in what concerns *you*. But, publicly, I am a mere spectator of European affairs, and wherever and whatever my sympathies in other times than these might be, I am too entirely engrossed with the portentous events now transacting in my own country to be likely to intermeddle or make mischief in the doings of this hemisphere, save in so far as they may have bearing on our own politics. You can say anything you like to me, then, as freely as when you were talking to me in your own house.

The cardinal principle of American diplomacy has always been to abstain from all intervention or participation in European affairs. This has always seemed to me the most enlightened view to take of our exceptional, and therefore fortunate, political and geographical position. I need not say how earnest we are in maintaining that principle at this moment, when we are all determined to resist to the death any interference on the part of Europe in our affairs.

I wish, by the way, you would let me know anything you can pick up in regard to the French Emperor's intentions or intrigues in regard to our civil war.

Of course I don't suggest to you for an instant any violation of confidence, but many things might be said with great openness to you that would not, from reserve or politeness, or a hundred other reasons, be said to an American diplomatist.

I suppose there is no doubt whatever that L. N. has been perpetually, during the last six months, provoking, soliciting, and teasing the English Cabinet to unite with him in some kind of intervention, and that the English Ministers have steadily refused to participate in the contemplated crime. Of course they know and we know, that intervention means war with the United States government and people on behalf of the rebel slave-holders, but I have very good reason to know that the English government refuse—and that Lord Palmerston even ridicules the idea as preposterous. Not that the English *love* us. On the contrary, they hate us, but they can't understand how it will help the condition of their starving populations in the manufacturing districts to put up the price of cotton 500 per cent., which a war with

America would do, and to cause an advance in corn in the same proportion. There is no doubt whatever that the harvest in England is a very bad one, and that they must buy some 30 million sterling worth of foreign corn. On the other hand, the harvest in America is the most fruitful ever known since that continent was discovered.

Unless lunatics were at the head of affairs in England, they would not seize the opportunity of going to war with the granary of corn and cotton without a cause.

But it may be different with France. She is fond of "*la Gloire*." And she is sending out an expedition to Mexico, altho' she seems likely to have her hands full in Italy just now. Moreover, L. N. is the Heaven-appointed arbiter of all sublunary affairs, and he doubtless considers it his mission to "save civilization" in our continent, as he has so often been good enough to do in the rest of the world.

What do you think is his real design? How far do you believe he has gone in holding out definite encouragement to the secessionist agents in France? Do you think he has any secret plot with them to assist them against us in the Gulf of Mexico? Will he attempt anything of this kind without the knowledge and connivance of England? I say no more except to repeat that you may give me, perhaps, a useful hint or two from time to time, of what you hear and know. It is unnecessary for me to say that I shall keep sacredly confidential any thing you may say to me as such.

I shall not go into the subject of our war at all, save to say that it is to me an inconceivable idea that any man of average intellect or love of right can possibly justify this insurrection of the slave-holders. The attempt to destroy a prosperous, powerful and happy commonwealth like ours, merely that on its ruin might be constructed a slave-breeding, slave-holding confederacy, is one of the greatest crimes that history has recorded. In regard to the issue of the war, I don't entertain the slightest doubt, if foreign interference is kept off. If the slave-holders obtain the alliance of France, the war will of course be indefinitely protracted. If we are left to ourselves, I think with the *million of men* that we shall have in the field in the course of the month of October, and with a fleet of 12 or 15 first-class iron-clad frigates, which will be ready by that time, that the insurrection cannot hold out a great while longer. However, of that I am not sure. Time is nothing to God—nor to the Devil either, as to that matter. We mortals, creatures of a day, are very impatient. The United States Government is now fighting with the Devil, for the spirit of this slave-confederacy is nothing less. How long it will take us to vanquish it I know not. But that it *will* be vanquished completely I entertain no doubt whatever. I don't expect you to accept my views, but I thought it as well to state them. I am more anxious about the next three months than about anything that can happen afterwards. Let me however warn you—in case you take an interest in the progress of our affairs—not to believe in Reuter's telegrams as in the *London Times*. Their lies are stupendous, and by them public opinion all over Europe is poisoned. This is nothing to me. Their lies can't alter the facts—I have other sources of information. But when I see how the telegraph and the European press have been constantly worked for the interest of the secessionists, it does not surprise me to see the difficulty which honest people have in arriving at the truth, either in fact or in theory. Do you know your colleague, Mr. Dayton, U. S. Minister in Paris? Let me recommend him to you as a most excellent and honorable man. Renewing all our

kindest regards to you and yours, believe me, my dear Bismarck, always most sincerely your old friend,

J. L. MOTLEY."

To this letter there was no doubt a reply, but it is not published in any edition of the correspondence of Bismarck or of Motley. The first letter of the Prince to Motley is the one written at Berlin on April 17, 1863. In it the Prince begs Motley to write longer and oftener. He expresses his hatred of politics and regrets the necessity of constantly keeping his attention fixed on them like that of the grocer on his figs, "*affaire de metier*." He is now Prussian Prime Minister, but the change from Frankfort to Berlin seems to have been that from the frying-pan to the fire. The Prussian Parliament he nicknames "The House of Phrases." "I am obliged," he writes, "to listen to particularly tasteless speeches out of the mouths of particularly childish and excited politicians." Poor Prince! No one ever took more deep-sea soundings than he in the ocean of German political stupidity. "As Envoy," he laments, "I still feel like a gentleman—as Minister one is a Helot. I have come down in the world and hardly know how." The most sarcastic passage in the letter is where, speaking about the deputies scolding one another in the course of a debate concerning a subject about which they are agreed, he says that they are perfectly unanimous, but only fighting over the different reasons that make them so—"a quarrel about the Emperor's beard" (a senseless quarrel). "You Anglo-Saxon Yankees," he adds, "have something of the same kind also. Do you all know exactly why you are waging such furious war with each other? All certainly do not know, but they kill each other *con amore*; that's the way the business comes to them. Your battles are bloody, ours wordy. These chatterboxes really cannot govern Prussia. No view of politics but local ones, 'church steeple interests.'" Yet the Chancellor admits that the Germans taken singly are clever, and only foolish in the mass.

In conclusion he says that he has written a stupid letter, but, like Pilate, "*quod scripsi scripsi*," and the drops of my own ink will show you at least that my thoughts when left alone readily turn to you. I never pass by old Logier's house in the Friedrichstrasse without looking up at the windows that used to be ornamented by a pair of red slippers, sustained on the wall by the feet of a gentleman seated in the Yankee fashion, his head below and

out of sight. I then gratify my memory with remembrances of the song of 'good old Colony times.'"

These little touches more clearly prove the depth of the affection of the German for the American than the most violent protestations could have done. What is that old song of Colony times? Who wrote it and how do the other verses run? Perhaps some reader will kindly answer.

JAMES PEMBERTON GRUND.

(To be Continued.)

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

GREAT TEACHERS.

A HIGHLY valuable series, under the editorial supervision of Nicholas Murray Butler, of New York, entitled, "The Great Educators," is now in progress. It includes such celebrated names as Aristotle, Abelard, Froebel, Herbart, Loyola and Pestalozzi, and, as especially interesting to English readers, Thomas Arnold, of Rugby, and Horace Mann, of America. These volumes deal not only with the lives and writings and intellectual influence of the respective men discussed, but with the great educational movements of which they were the exponents, and with the pressing problems in the science and art of teaching growing out of their various labors. Thus, in the treatise on Aristotle we have the whole subject of the old classical system; in Alcuin, that of the origin of the Christian schools; in Abelard, the University methods; in Pestalozzi, the interesting theme of the training of children; in Arnold, the great English secondary system; and in Horace Mann, that of public education in this country. The series suggests a question of special educational interest: What constitutes a Great Teacher?

To our mind there are four factors or elements essential to the personality of an educator of eminence. First: He must be a scholar, especially in the particular department in which he is working. As a Professor, he must actually know what he professes to know, knowing it thoroughly, or, as the Old English expresses it, thoroughly, through and through, in itself as a specific subject or section of truth, and in all its manifold relations to the general department of truth and fact. In the organization of our Secondary Schools, teachers are significantly called, Masters, both in the disciplinary and educational sense. Educators must be masters of their departments, masters of their mental selves, and thus able to command the respect of those looking to them for knowledge, and needing it. First and last, they must be well informed men, thoroughly booked, or "thoroughly furnished" with knowledge as their stock in trade. The teacher is, first, a storehouse, a base of supplies, a source of enlightenment to the student as a Learner. In Old English, the teacher is a *Lareow*, a man of lore, an authority to his pupils, who as disciples or learners sit at his feet and wait upon his word.

Further, the teacher must be an Expositor or Interpreter of Truth. The etymological force of our word "teach," is here in place, the Old English verb, *taecan*, meaning to exhibit, to set forth, to show. It is one of the prime offices of the teacher to set forth the truth in clear light so that all may see it, and, seeing it, may apprehend it. It is his office to hold up

the truth before the observer's mind, to make it, as our oldest writers would have said, understandable. Hence, his function is that of an Expositor, an Interpreter, an Explainer, having it as his duty to make the truth plain, to bring it down to the level of the recipient's mind, so that it may have its full effect as truth.

This is something more than mere knowledge. It is the ability to impart and diffuse knowledge. Mere knowledge may exist without it. It involves the art of communication, or dispensation of truth. The teacher must be "apt to teach," "able to teach others also," anything but a "novice" in his work, having by nature or study the facility of expression or elucidation. How much this includes will be seen on reflection—a large and exact vocabulary; clear views of truth; a lucid and logical method; in fact, all that is included in the important work of the presentation of knowledge to the mind. When, moreover, the teacher rises as an expositor to the highest planes of his office, into the region of great general principles that need unfolding and application, it is at once evident that his function has to do with all that is fundamental and vital. Knowledge and fact in their concrete forms now give place to the great laws and principles that underlie them, and the teacher becomes a real Illuminator, setting forth the deepest truths to the inspection of men for their acceptance and profit.

Again, the teacher must be a Mental Trainer. Here we rise, in educational work, to a still higher level. This is the sphere of education proper, as a mental exercise and profession. Our word "train" (from *trainèr*, *traho*) means precisely what our word education (*educare*) means, the evolving of inner power, the drawing forth of native faculty and function.

This is the specifically disciplinary side of the teacher's work, wherein as an intellectual guide and helper he seeks to bring out into open and fullest expression the best that is in his pupils—their latent powers and aptitudes, their abilities and capabilities, so as to reveal them to themselves. Education is essentially a training, the very word discipline (*discere*) radically involving the idea of teaching. As such, teaching includes two somewhat distinct and yet closely related processes, which we may best express by the etymological use of the words, Instruction and Education—building in [*in-struo*] and drawing out [*educo*], working all acquired knowledge into the very mental substance of the pupil, so as to make it an actual element of himself, and also evolving that which is inherent in him, and giving it objective form and process. Instruction is thus mental construction, the real edification or building up of the pupil in all that makes his intellectual power; while Education is the unfolding and manifest expression of inward ability. Each process, however, is alike disciplinary, and contributive to the highest intellectual results, without which, indeed, no such thing as teaching, in its truest sense can exist. At no point is the difference more marked between the mere pedagogue and the real educator, as a mental disciplinarian.

As a fourth and final essential, we note that the Teacher is an Intellectual Quickener, an Inspirer of minds and men, more impressive in his mental and general personality than any knowledge that he communicates or any discipline which he secures. Indeed it is here that we reach the summation of the teacher's work, the highest element of his power, wherein he appears as a vital force, a potent factor in all that affects the well-being of his pupils. He himself and his teaching are thus alike quickening, incitive and energizing, sending the student to the library and the laboratory to follow out the lines laid down for him, and to utilize all that he has

received by independent investigation. Herein we see the element of enthusiasm in educational work, by which its somewhat necessarily formal methods are animated and relieved, and its most didactic processes invested with genuine interest. It is by such an inspiring method as this that notable teachers reproduce themselves in their students, and herein is it seen that the true teacher is immeasurably greater than the books that he consults or produces.

Such, as we conceive them, are the four fundamental marks of a Great Teacher.

Such teachers are, indeed, rare. They are as rare as great epic writers are in verse, or great historians in prose, here and there appearing by conspicuous contrast among the numerous names of lesser note, and serving to give educational renown to any age or period which they respectively represent. Limiting our survey to America, such educators were Mark Hopkins, and Francis Wayland, and Theodore Woolsey. Such, in theology, were Park and Shedd, and the Alexanders. Such, in science, were Guyot, Agassiz and Henry; Theodore Dwight, in the department of law; McCosh, in philosophy; Hadley, and Taylor, and Whitney, in language; and Child, in literature.

These men, without exception, were Scholars and Interpreters and Trainers and Inspirers—great teachers in their respective departments, immense educational forces in the land, and giving to American institutions an order of historic repute which any nation might covet. Is this apostolic succession in any sense maintained among us? We have scholars and interpreters. Have we also teachers, in any considerable number, who know what is meant by intellectual training and quickening as their highest privilege and function? Have we great educators in such a ratio as the old régime produced? Is there not danger in the radical changes now making in educational methods, and in the unduly hasty assumption of university functions on the part of our colleges, that education may become less and less mentally broadening and inspiring, a matter merely of knowledge and the skilful manipulation of it? While our processes and methods are expanding, are they also deepening? With university extension, have we university intension, more and more of the philosophic and less and less of the pedagogic? Is it not possible that the disciplinary element in our higher education is diminishing rather than increasing. Students are taught to listen and observe and read and experiment. Are they taught to think, and are our teachers, first of all, thinkers? With all the decided advantages connected with the widening of the curriculum in our colleges, it is possible that the early opening of the elective system to somewhat immature minds, so often incapable of the wisest choice, the increasing prevalence of the lecture system to the gradual displacement of the text-book, and the increasing distance between professors and students by reason of the rapidly growing numbers in our larger institutions, may tend directly to superficiality, and make it all the more difficult to develop great teachers or great students.

The claims of the smaller colleges, at this point, as to the value of their less ambitious courses, and their more direct intimate relationship between teacher and student are not to be ignored. It is, indeed, under such so called limited conditions that most of America's notable teachers have been produced. The greatest need of Higher Education at the present moment is great educators.

TH. W. HUNT.

RULES OF WAR.—CAPTURE UPON THE SEA.

THAT war upon the ocean has a character of its own no publicist denies. Now and then a spasmodic protest is made against conditions which produce the fact, but it is probable that such will remain ineffective.

The sea is so absolutely different from the land that it is hopeless to make every rule equally applicable to each. Walled towns and fortified places in the interior of a country may bear some analogy to the armed ships of a nation, but the former are within a territory which the citizens of a belligerent possess for tillage and support in time of peace as well as in war; the latter are on an unstable element to which property rights cannot be acquired, and which is equally the high road of all nations. Here is a wide difference amply sufficient to explain the special severities of war upon the sea.

Again, when the moment of hostilities arrives, it becomes the endeavor of each belligerent to work as much harm to the other as possible, certain limitations being recognized by both. In order to do this, the country taking the offensive seeks on land to cut the enemy off from his supplies, and in every way to exhaust his powers of defence. Such activities would be handicapped if the rules of war forbade any interference with the commerce of belligerents. The constant inflow of supplies from the coast cities would be sure to make good any disasters caused by victorious armies in the interior. Therefore, since the earliest times it has been understood that, in case of war, private ships belonging to the enemy were lawful prey for belligerent cruisers.

Fortunately, many of the severities formerly practised upon the sea have been done away with, and also such application of rational law as was illogical and barbarous. Meanwhile, the rules cited may be considered at present as endorsed by general consent.

1. Public vessels of a belligerent can be seized wherever found, either on the high seas or in the ports and harbors of the enemy; although, for some time, there were those who gave as exceptions the case of warships in the rivers and estuaries of the country under whose flag they sailed.

With public ships may well be catalogued all auxiliaries, whether despatch or supply boats. The question of hospital ships or repair ships does not seem to have been finally settled. Undoubtedly, the latter will be no exception to the rule, while the former may be. It certainly seems reasonable that a ship supplied with all the tools and machinery which may be needed to put an ironclad into fighting trim, would be as well fitted to work disaster to the enemy, if indirectly, as a squadron of battleships.

There are, however, two well settled exceptions to this rule, one being that of cartel ships, and the other of ships engaged in public scientific expeditions, where the same are in no way charged with operating in a manner which is or may be construed as hostile to the enemy.

2. Private vessels belonging to the citizens of a belligerent may be captured wherever found, as long as the laws of neutral nations touching surrounding waters are respected.

Naturally, doubt often arises as to whether or not merchant vessels belong to the enemy or otherwise. In order to ascertain the true character of a ship, war vessels are recognized by International Law as having the right of search, and may command a suspected vessel to lay to until her papers may be examined. No objection can be made to such forcible de-

tention, even if the ship be neutral. Any mistake made by the commanding officer will be rectified by his government; at all events, it will later be a good cause for complaint. Meanwhile, if right of search were not granted, it would be impossible for belligerents to interfere with the commerce of enemies.

It is to be noted that a friendly or neutral vessel that habitually uses an enemy's flag is in peril, just like a citizen who takes up his abode in an enemy's country.

When hostilities commence time will probably be given merchantmen to clear from the enemy's ports in which they may happen to belying. This is not a matter of right, but it is recognized as an act of comity and is customary at present.

As exceptions to the foregoing rule under which enemy's shipping can be seized, we may mention fishing boats, whose nets and trawls lie off the coast; possibly private hospital ships belonging to charities and, as already noted, ships sent out on scientific expeditions by societies. Again, it often happens that ships are driven into port by stress of weather. In this case it is suggested by some that they shall be accorded different treatment, which is generally prompted by the generous feelings of mankind in hours of distress. If this is true touching storm beaten ships seeking harbor, it certainly should apply to ships that are wrecked upon an enemy's coast.

Previous to the Declaration of Paris the practice of nations differed—little respect being shown to neutrals carrying enemy's goods and less to neutral goods upon hostile ships. The United States having placed itself upon record, in the beginning of its existence as a nation, as a champion of neutral rights, has, through its different agencies, sought to bring about a recognition of the principles which are at present generally accepted. To day the goods of a neutral may not be touched by a belligerent, unless they are contraband of war, wherever found, and enemies' goods are equally safe if put in neutral bottoms.

There might at this point be some discussion as to neutrals and the rights of neutrals, but the subject is so broad that it cannot be satisfactorily treated incidentally.

It may be well to note, regarding the right of search, that any interference with a nation's vessel or man-of-war belonging to a neutral would be *casus belli*.

Often it happens that a war ship takes a private vessel belonging to the enemy but is unable to hold it, owing to the appearance of the enemy's fleet or for some other reason. In this case, ransom may be taken, the private vessel giving hostages to assure the captor that it will proceed on its way to port, taking a definite course. If the course is not followed, the ship may properly be recaptured by another cruiser, in which case adjustment will be made with the vessel that first captured the prize. The bill given for the ransom should be honored on presentation.

As a general rule, nations forbid their cruisers to destroy merchantmen at sea if it is possible to bring them before a prize court. The reason for this lies in the fact that the commanding officer may have made a mistake, and in order to have his action ratified the capture should be brought before a properly constituted tribunal.

No objection can be made by a neutral or friendly vessel to being chased or fired upon by the enemy if they exhibit wrong colors. A spoliation of papers is good ground for capture.

Notable historical exceptions to the action of governments are furnished by the United States in the war with England, where orders were given to commanders to demolish the ships which they could not expect to save without risking their own ships. This course was further followed by the Confederate States during the Civil War.

It often happens that a vessel captured upon the high sea is retaken by a friendly cruiser. To whom does the property then belong?

This leads to a brief discussion of what is referred to by writers as *jus postliminii*, a term taken from the Roman law, which in many ways has done pioneering work for International Law. The *jus postliminii* has to do with the right of the original owner of the property after recapture. In order to ascertain this, it is necessary to trace the vessel's history through the time which has expired since it first came into the enemy's hands.

By common consent of the powers, a vessel after it has been twenty-four hours a prize becomes the property of the belligerent State that has captured it. This is clearly shown by rules which grant larger salvage to rescuers who retake the vessel before such a period has elapsed than afterwards. Yet it is safe to say that the title does not become absolutely the enemy's until a prize court has passed judgment, and that, if a recapture be made before the vessel is regularly condemned, the party whose property was thus wrested away may upon payment of salvage demand that which is his. Meanwhile, an adjudication of the court which finds the vessel to be a lawful prize, should certainly cut off any lingering title that the original owner may have possessed.

A word in closing as to prize courts. These represent government; and, being duly constituted, pass upon the acts of national officers who, in discharge of their duties, have apprehended vessels supposed to be the property of the enemy. The findings of such courts are subject to appeal, but, in spite of a probable bias in every case, it is seldom that they are in error, owing to the judicial temper of the trained men commonly selected to fill such positions.

If the captain of a warship, therefore, makes a mistake, there is every reason to believe that the wrong will be righted when the case reaches the prize court. If not, the responsibility lies with the nation, and the neutral whose rights have been invaded may properly demand indemnity and use force to procure the same. This, however, rarely happens. The higher courts of states passing upon these matters have as a rule consisted of eminent jurists whose wisdom and integrity were beyond suspicion; and the endorsement by such of any capture carries a weight that is convincing, especially as it is recognized that any gross partiality or unfairness shown by the bench would react prejudicially, besides tending to seriously diminish the influence of such courts, which, at present, to a certain extent, perform the duties of an international council.

DANIEL CHAUNCEY BREWER.

CASH VERSUS GLORY.

An ordinary service to mankind is usually paid for at current rates in legal tender. An extraordinary service, not involving the element of heroism, is rewarded by both legal tender and more or less fame. The highest of

all services, rendered at the risk of life, is supposed to receive its full compensation in glory, unaccompanied by more sordid considerations. If, however, the hero of the service last mentioned should not be contented with his meed of glory, but should demand more substantial reward, he may receive it indeed, but at a large discount from the other (and in sentimental estimation more valuable) consideration. Unlike the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick-maker, who receive their *quid pro quo* without a thought of humiliation, either in their own minds or yours, the man who saves your life at the risk of his own is looked upon as almost if not quite disgracing himself by accepting your proffered pecuniary reward, although he may in fact be in far sorer need than any one of the worthy trio who simply contribute to your necessities or comforts.

The man, for example, who clings to the bridle of your runaway horse and brings you to safety at his own imminent peril, would excite a feeling not far removed from contempt if he should deliberately pocket your bank-note, giving you a receipt therefor, for "services rendered," while the lad who merely held your horse's bridle while you were shopping would take your quarter-dollar with the unquestioning approval of all observers.

Suppose your child were swiftly drifting toward death, down the current of disease. A great surgeon offers to save it, with absolutely no risk to himself, for some hundreds of dollars. "Famous specialist!" says everyone approvingly.

But suppose the current were literal, and Death awaited his victim at the base of the cataract. A "hero" offers to leap to its rescue, with an even chance of perishing with it, for the same sum. "Mercenary wretch!" exclaims the world.

Noblesse oblige. But does it oblige to endure hunger and privation rather than accept compensation honestly earned?

However fully and freely the average American citizen acknowledges the desert of the honest veterans who receive their pensions from an honest government, according to contract distinctly entered into at the time of enlistment, he no doubt most heartily wishes there were no necessity of thus derogating from the "glory of our nation's defenders." Does he feel any such wish in regard to those who offered their money instead of their lives to the country in its time of need? The bondholders have received far greater pecuniary compensation for the risk they ran than the soldiers; but for one grudging word uttered against the bondholders there are ten against the pensioners. It is, of course, perfectly fitting and proper that the one class should receive their compensation in cash. What a pity the other class cannot be satisfied with glory!

Now, underneath his heroic exterior, the average citizen soldier is as practical a man as his fellow patriot, the bondholder. When the call came to him to offer his bosom as a target for the enemy's bullets, he said in effect: "Yes, I will do it; but the service is worth more than thirteen or sixteen dollars a month during the danger, and a little more or less than that when the danger is over. Life is of more value than money. The capitalist would rather give his whole fortune than his life. My life is worth as much as his. But I will not be unreasonable. I do not demand a fortune. I demand only that I and my family shall be assured against want and privation during our lives. With this understanding I hereby agree to offer my body as a shield against national destruction. If my terms are accepted I shall expect the contract will be fulfilled faithfully and ungrudgingly, just as it is with my colleague, the bondholder."

"But," the sentimentalist might have said, "you will have glory, while the bondholder will be satisfied with his interest."

To which the soldier might have replied:

"He *needn't* be satisfied with his interest. Let him relinquish his bonds and he can have glory too. As for me, I shall demand cash as *per* contract, and you can allow me the glory or not, as you choose."

The government was at liberty to accept or refuse his terms. It could accept salvation or destruction at its pleasure. Since it chose salvation on his terms, who has the right to complain or to grudge him his just due?

EDWARD PAYSON JACKSON.